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ABSTRACT
Research in the psychology of religion over the past five decades has found that
religious individuals tend to be more prejudiced than those who are not religious. In
addition, research has identified various orientations to religion, each having a unique
relationship to prejudice. The purpose of this study was to explore whether cognitive
complexity, as defined by the Reflective Judgment Model (RJM), might emerge as a
predictor both of religious orientation and of prejudice, thereby explaining the variability
in the relationships between religious orientation and prejudice. While a relationship
between cognitive complexity, religious orientation, and prejudice has been theorized
(Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005), it had yet to be tested empirically using a standardized
measure of cognitive complexity such as the RJM.
The sample used for this study was collected from four different undergraduate
and graduate-level institutions, each representing a unique approach to religion. Overall,
the results of this study were inconclusive with regard to the role of cognitive complexity
in the relationship between religious orientation and prejudice. However, findings did
support previous research in terms of the relationships between religious fundamentalism,
Christian Orthodoxy, Quest and prejudice. Finally, school was found to be a significant
predictor of both religious orientation and prejudice, suggesting that future research on
the impact of educational environment on various forms of religious orientation is
warranted.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
“That . . . man . . . says women can't have as much rights as man, cause Christ wasn't a
woman. Where did your Christ come from? . . . From God and a woman. Man had
nothing to do with him.” ~Sojourner Truth, speech at the Woman’s Rights Convention in
Akron, Ohio, 1851.
One should no more deplore homosexuality than left-handedness. ~ Towards a Quaker
View of Sex, 1964
"We cannot be truly Christian people so long as we flaunt the central teachings of Jesus:
brotherly love and the Golden Rule." ~ Martin Luther King, Jr., 1944

Over a century ago, William James is said to have noted, “Many people think they
are thinking when they are merely rearranging their prejudices” (Congressional Research
Service, 1989). Fast forward to modernity, when American courts have granted women
the right to vote, outlawed segregation, and are currently engaged in addressing civil
discrimination against homosexuals. Recent polling of Americans suggests a general
increase in tolerant attitudes toward homosexuals in the workplace, interracial dating, and
women holding positions of power (Pew Research Center, 2010). This increase in
tolerant attitudes is reflected in various religious groups and denominations, even as large
differences still remain between specific religious denominations and also between
people with strong religious affiliations and those who are not religious.
Yet a quick scan of recent events drives home the truth of James’ astute
observation: prejudicial attitudes are not dead, they simply emerge in new, often more
subtle, ways. While the United States reached a monumental milestone in electing its
1

first African-American president, a recent Pew Poll suggests that roughly 1/3 of
conservatives believe President Barack Obama to be a Muslim, despite his Christian
background (Pew Research Center, 2010). Regarding homosexuality, several mainline
protestant denominations have taken action to pave the way for full acceptance of
practicing homosexuals, including the ordination of openly gay and lesbian clergy (Pew
Research Center, 2009). Yet other data suggests that religious beliefs are the major
underlying factor in opposition to legislation that would afford basic civil rights to
homosexual individuals (Pew Research Center, 2010). Finally, recent research reveals
that some of the very same Christian denominations that denounce severe restrictions
placed on Muslim women, continue to restrict women from holding certain positions of
leadership within their own governing bodies (Banks, 2010).

Prejudice and its Relationship to Religion
In general, prejudice has been defined as “the prior negative judgment of the
members of a race or religion or the occupants of any other significant social role, held in
disregard of the facts that contradict it” (Jones, 1986, p. 280). Some prejudicial
judgments are overt -- for example, some individuals or groups might believe that women
are intellectually inferior to men. Other more nuanced forms of prejudice, sometimes
called “subtle prejudice,” are less obvious. Subtle prejudice is “inconspicuous, indirect,
and often unconscious” and often more difficult to detect. An example of subtle
prejudice may be found on college campuses today, where young men may well perceive
women as their intellectual equals, but continue to treat them primarily as sexual objects
(see Chapter 5 of this study). Subtle prejudice is often fueled by stereotyping and
2

“cultural myths” regarding others and pervades American culture in increasingly complex
ways (Anderson, 2010, p. 3).
Contemporary research on these more subtle forms of prejudice highlights the
conflicted attitudes held by many American individuals. Research on subtle forms of
racism has prompted some social psychologists to suggest “that many White Americans
simultaneously hold anti-Black feelings and a sincere belief that people should be treated
equally” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Devine, 2005, p. 330). With regard to
homosexuality, many religious denominations hold a “love the sinner, hate the sin”
approach, in which homosexual actions are condemned, while the value of the individual
is upheld (Veenvliet, 2008; Mak & Tsang, 2008). And while dramatic increases in
tolerant attitudes about women in positions of leadership have occurred over the last
several decades, salary disparities and discriminatory hiring biases against women
abound. In our contemporary climate, the gradations of prejudice have taken on new
textures and tones, yet the reality of its impact remains.
Interestingly, religion plays a significant role in both the perpetuation and the
exacerbation of both subtle and overt forms of prejudice. Each of the quotations at the
beginning of this chapter was chosen to illustrate ways in which religious leaders and
religious communities have harnessed religious values and ideals to motivate and fight
for social equality. However, such examples notwithstanding, studies over the past five
decades have found that religious individuals tend, in general, to be more prejudiced than
those who are not religious (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Pitt, 2010). Furthermore,
polling suggests that religious beliefs have become increasingly aligned with political
ideologies (Pew Research Form, 2010). Religious beliefs held by private individuals and
3

groups are likely to have an increasingly profound impact on the social-political
landscape.

Religion and Religious Orientations
Religion has been understood in a variety of ways – both theoretically and in
terms of its operational possibilities. Theoretically, religion may incorporate a system of
beliefs, rituals and traditions rooted in sacred texts and practiced in groups and
communities. Religion may serve individuals and groups by providing behavioral norms,
beliefs, and values by which to live (McIntosh, 1995; Hood et al., 2009). Religion may
also be viewed as a “search for significance in ways related to the sacred” (Pargament,
2002, p. 169). Finally, religion may be viewed as a subset of “spirituality” which has to
do with “the quest for understanding ourselves in relationship to our view of ultimate
reality” (Hood et al., 2009, p. 10). In general, religion seems to provide a framework
through which people find meaning – cognitively, affectively, and behaviorally (Hood et
al., 2009).
Throughout decades of research, social psychologists have attempted to
operationalize religion by describing it in terms of concrete, measurable variables. While
analyzing the pragmatic aspects of religion may oversimplify the complexity of religious
experiences and phenomena, such operational definitions are often used to assess
empirically the benefits (or harmfulness) of religious practices on outcomes such as
physical and mental health, or levels of tolerance and prejudice (Pargament, 2002).
Operationally, a religious individual might be identified in terms of church membership,
frequency of attendance at religious activities, theological beliefs, or participation in
4

religious practices, such as prayer (Hood et al., 2009). In addition, psychologists of
religion have also focused on understanding the nature and quality of individual
approaches to religion in terms of motivation, personality differences, and cognitive
styles (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Whitley, 2010).
Such individual approaches to religion have been studied extensively in the
psychology of religion, and five key “orientations” to religion have been identified. For
instance, individuals vary in their motivation for being religious, in the totality with
which they incorporate religious viewpoints, and in the outcomes they desire from
engaging religious practices. Initially, distinctions were made between intrinsic and
extrinsic religious orientations – distinct from each other primarily in terms of
motivation. Intrinsically religious individuals have embraced a particular religious creed
out of a sincere and mature commitment to honor their religious ideals and to incorporate
them into all aspects of their daily lives. Extrinsically religious individuals may embrace
a religious creed, but are motivated out of a utilitarian desire to find security or a desire
for social acceptance (Allport & Ross, 1967).
A third religious orientation, quest, was developed as an alternative to the intrinsic
and extrinsic orientations and is characterized by an open-minded, flexible attitude
toward one’s religious convictions (Batson et al., 1993). “Religion as quest” is an
approach to religion that involves
honestly facing existential questions in their complexity, while at the same time
resisting clear-cut pat answers. An individual who approaches religion in this
way recognizes that he or she does not know, and probably never will know, the
final truth about such matters. Still, the questions are deemed important, and
however tentative and subject to change, answers are sought (Batson &
Schoenrade, 1991a).

5

A quest approach is not necessarily related to a particular religion or set of beliefs.
Rather, it describes an attitude about spiritual, “existential” matters in general that may or
may not be practiced within a particular religious group or denomination. The currently
popular designation, spiritual but not religious, may well be another name for a growing
number of Americans who understand religion primarily as “quest.”
The opposite of quest, some have speculated, is a more close-minded disposition
called religious fundamentalism characterized by certainty and a belief in absolute truth
(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Kirkpatrick, Hood, & Hartz, 1991). Researchers have
defined fundamentalism as
The belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains
the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity
and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of
evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed
today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past;
and that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a
special relationship with the deity (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, p. 118).
Like the quest approach, a fundamentalist approach is not necessarily unique to one
religious perspective, and could theoretically encompass a disposition or set of beliefs
regarding a wide variety of religious, and non-religious topics (Altemeyer & Hunsberger,
2005).
Finally, a fifth construct, Christian orthodoxy, has been examined as it relates to
the actual content of Christian religious beliefs. Christian orthodoxy has been
conceptualized as “the acceptance of well-defined, central tenets of the Christian religion.
In large measure these tenets are contained in the officially adopted ‘credos’ of the
various denominations…Catholics and Protestants alike” (Fullerton & Hunsberger, 1982,
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p. 318).1 Such beliefs are rooted in the Apostles’ and Nicene Creeds, and include,
among other things, core beliefs in the existence of God, the Trinity, and the birth, death,
and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Where fundamentalist and quest religious orientations
seem to have to do with the overall approach an individual takes toward religion,
Christian orthodoxy describes a specific set of religious beliefs that may theoretically be
approached from a fundamentalist or a quest perspective.

Religious Orientations and Prejudice
Each of these five religious orientations has been studied extensively and indeed
differential relationships to prejudice have been found. In addition to the five
orientations, social psychologists have identified a personality dimension, referred to as
Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), which seems to have a strong link to prejudice.
Individuals with right-wing authoritarian tendencies may be more inclined to demonstrate
submissive attitudes toward authority, aggressive attitudes toward those who rebel
against authority, and prefer to uphold conventions and traditional values (Altemeyer,
1996). Individuals who demonstrate right wing authoritarian tendencies tend to be more
prejudiced than those who do not demonstrate these tendencies, and also tend to utilize a
fundamentalist approach to religion (Altemeyer, 1996; Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick,
2001).

1

Most of the studies on religion and prejudice have taken place in North America, within
predominantly Christian populations (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). Recently, more crosscultural analyses are being conducted, sampling from a wider variety of religions; however since
the participants for this study will be drawn from institutions at which the predominant religious
background is Christianity, Christianity will be the primary scope for measures of orthodoxy in
this study.
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Recently, increasing evidence has suggested that RWA, religious
fundamentalism, and quest may be related to unique cognitive styles (Billings, Guastello,
& Rike, 1993; Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001, Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005).
“Cognitive style” is a general term used by cognitive and educational psychologists to
describe the unique ways individuals process information and apply thinking skills to
intellectual activities such as problem solving and decision-making (Riding & Raynor,
2010). And while religion includes affective, behavioral, and existential components, “at
one level religion can be viewed as cognitive in that every religious system includes a set
of explicit and implicit propositions held to be true” (McIntosh, 1995, p. 2). As a
“cognitive schema,” religious perspectives are forged via interactions with the
environment, and in turn shape the ways in which religious individuals understand and
interpret the world (McIntosh, 1995; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005).
As such, religion functions as a sort of personal epistemology (Hunsberger &
Jackson, 2005) – an all-encompassing approach to the nature of reality justified by
particular claims about one’s ability to “know.” Some individuals believe their religious
values and beliefs are revealed directly from God through a prophet and/or a sacred text
or texts (Dale, 2005). Others arrive at religious conclusions based on scientific evidence,
logical “wagers” (i.e. Pascal’s Wager), or subjective experiences. Regardless the
methodology, individuals’ assumptions about how they know what they know may well
be as important was what they claim to know.
The question of how people approach their religious beliefs and values
cognitively (and more specifically, epistemologically) may be an important key to
understanding the relationship between religion and prejudice. An individual’s
8

epistemological assumptions not only impact the religious beliefs and values that
individual adopts, but also impact the ferocity with which that individual applies that
value system to the greater world. Since religious questions usually deal with ultimate
questions regarding life and death, right and wrong, meaning and purpose, and the role of
the sacred (Silberman, 2005), the stakes regarding religious “truth” claims are high. One
of the most well researched assessments of personal epistemology, the Reflective
Judgment Model, has yet to be assessed as it relates specifically to various religious
orientations (King & Kitchener, 2004).

The Reflective Judgment Model
The Reflective Judgment Model (RJM) was designed to assess the development
of epistemic cognition – that is, the ability to focus on the nature of knowledge itself and
the underlying assumptions upon which a variety of truth claims are based. Based on
John Dewey’s expositions of reflective thinking, the RJM measures cognitive complexity
as it pertains to “ill-structured problems” with several possible solutions. There are two
salient features to ill-structured problems: 1) “they cannot be defined with a high degree
of completeness; and 2) they cannot be solved with a high degree of certainty” (King &
Kitchener, 2004, p. 6). Examples of such problems are poverty, healthcare, and global
warming. Arriving at conclusions about such problems requires much more complex
cognitive processes than solving “well-structured problems” which have single, correct
answers.2 In fact, King and Kitchener argue that solving such ill-structured problems

2

Examples of a well-structured problem are mathematical formulas, puzzles, or logical
algorithms. Such problems require intelligence and critical thinking, but do not necessarily
require reflective thinking.
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involves “epistemic cognition” or an ability to focus on the nature of knowledge itself
and how it is acquired (King & Kitchener, 1994, 2004).
The RJM is comprised of 7 stages grouped in 3 levels -- Pre-Reflective Thinking
(Stages 1, 2, and 3); Quasi-Reflective Thinking (Stages 4 and 5); and Reflective Thinking
(Stages 6 and 7). Pre-Reflective Thinking is characterized by a view of knowledge that
tends toward certainty and a lack of perception of alternative viewpoints. QuasiReflective Thinking is characterized by a view of knowledge that tends toward
uncertainty and justifications of views based on idiosyncratic variables. Finally,
Reflective Thinking is characterized by a view of knowledge that takes into account its
constructed nature and therefore the need to investigate a wide body of evidence,
including that from differing perspectives. Individuals who demonstrate reflective
thinking are able to defend their beliefs probabilistically on the basis of a thorough
investigation of available evidence, and remain open to the possibility of considering new
evidence should it become available (King & Kitchener, 1994). (See Appendix A for a
full description of each reflective judgment level).
Research has indicated that cognitive complexity, as conceptualized by the RJM,
may indeed play a role in predicting prejudicial attitudes (Guthrie, King, & Palmer,
2000). Yet no study has assessed whether reflective judgment may also play a role in
predicting an individual’s religious orientation. Furthermore, no study has assessed the
possibility of a relationship between reflective judgment and RWA. If indeed there is a
relationship between reflective judgment and prejudice, and if indeed there is a shared
component of reflective judgment in specific religious orientations, and also with RWA,
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then assessing reflective judgment may help to clarify cognitive complexity as a key
underlying variable in the relationship between religion and prejudice.

Thesis and Scope of the Dissertation
This dissertation explored whether cognitive complexity, as measured by the RJM
and a strikingly different cognitive style, RWA, would be a more significant predictor of
prejudice than religious orientation. This study hypothesized that reflective judgment
would not only predict prejudice, but that it would also predict the religious orientation to
which religious individuals would subscribe: pre-reflective thinkers would tend toward a
fundamentalist religious orientation and also be more prejudiced; reflective thinkers
would tend toward a quest religious orientation and also be less prejudiced. Orthodox
individuals may utilize pre-reflective thinking or reflective thinking to arrive at their
conclusions; and reflective judgment would account for the differences in the relationship
between orthodoxy and prejudice. Finally, non-religious individuals--those who do not
subscribe to any particular religious orientation--would be more or less prejudiced based
on their capacity for reflective thinking.
While this theory provides an alternative explanation for the religion and
prejudice link, the magnitude of research necessary to test it adequately is vast. There are
a variety of ways to define and assess cognitive complexity, not to mention religious
orientation and prejudice. In addition, many other variables, such as educational
environment, nuances of religious and theological teachings, and demographics such as
age, generation, gender, and sexual orientation, may also impact a religious individual’s
relationship to prejudice, confounding the role of cognitive complexity. Each of these
11

variables was considered; but the primary scope of this study was fourfold: 1) to
investigate the relationship between reflective judgment and prejudice; 2) to investigate
the relationship between reflective judgment and RWA; 3) to investigate the relationship
between reflective judgment and religious orientations; and 4) to investigate whether
reflective judgment explains a shared component between various religious orientations
as they relate to prejudice.
In sum, the present study is a first step in placing the following theory under the
lens of scientific scrutiny: it is not so much whether a person is religious that makes him
or her prejudiced; rather it is a person’s ability to engage his or her viewpoint with
thoughtful reflection and an awareness of cognitive complexity that makes the difference
between those who are prejudiced and those who are not.

12

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

The following chapter will present research suggesting that increasing cognitive
complexity could play a key role in reducing prejudice and in moving away from a
fundamentalist religious orientation. In addition, research on the Reflective Judgment
Model will be introduced in order to demonstrate its utility as one possible tool for
assessing cognitive complexity for the purposes of this study. Research related to each of
these areas will be summarized as follows: 1.) the social psychology of prejudice; 2.) the
relationship between religion and prejudice; 3.) religion and the religious orientations;
and 4.) the Reflective Judgment Model.

The Social Psychology of Prejudice
Social psychologists have identified cognition as a key component in prejudice
from some of the earliest research on prejudice. In particular, research suggests that
individuals tend to use cognitive strategies to create categorizations of belonging. For
example, individuals might categorize their immediate family, their cultural heritage,
their religious community, or their neighborhood as a group of people with whom they
feel a sense of safety. Categorizations may be beneficial, in that they help individuals to
feel that they are part of a community – sometimes called an “in-group” by social
psychologists. At the same time, categorizations inevitably create an “out-group” – a
13

group of people who are not considered to be as important to an individual’s sense of
safety and belonging. The following section describes the ways in which the cognitive
processes underlying categorization can lead to prejudice.
Gordon Allport (1954) provided one of the earliest and most comprehensive
examinations of prejudice, laying the groundwork for much of the thinking and research
on prejudice in social psychology for the past five decades. He defined prejudice in
general terms as “an antipathy based on a faulty and inflexible generalization” (Allport,
1954, p. 9). Contemporary psychologist James W. Jones (1986) specifies that prejudice
involves “an affective, categorical mode of mental functioning, involving rigid
prejudgment and misjudgment of human groups” (p. 280). Prejudice is generally thought
to have a cognitive component, an affective component, and a behavioral component
(Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986). It is differentiated from discrimination, which primarily has
to do with actions resulting from prejudice.
A key cognitive component of prejudice is stereotyping (Dovidio & Gaertner,
1986; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005; Devine, 1989, 2005; Stangor, 2009). Stereotyping has
been defined as “a set of beliefs that is incorrectly learned, overgeneralized, factually
incorrect, or rigid” (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981, p. 16). Stereotypes lead to a process of
categorizations which influence the cognitive “schema”3 through which an individual
understands and interprets various aspects of his or her environment (Dovidio &
Gaertner, 1986; McIntosh, 1995). In sum, a stereotype is a belief that is either in itself
erroneous (e.g. that person is smart because she has brown eyes) or erroneously applied
3

McIntosh (1995) defines schema as a “cognitive structure or mental representation containing
organized, prior knowledge about a particular domain....Schemas are built via encounters with the
environment and can be modified by experience” (p. 2).
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to a group of people (e.g. that person with brown eyes is smart, therefore all people with
brown eyes are smart). As a result, all “brown-eyed” people are assumed to be smart,
and the category for “brown-eyed people=smart” becomes a basic assumption through
which all interactions with brown-eyed individuals are subsequently filtered.
Such categorizations often lead to intergroup bias: “the systematic tendency to
evaluate one’s own membership group (the in-group) or its members more favorably than
a non-membership group (the out-group) or its members” (Hewstone, Rubin, Willis,
2002, p. 576). In the aforementioned example, the categorization that “brown-eyed
people are smart” might lead to the assumption that blue-eyed people are not smart. In
other words, the erroneous stereotype not only categorizes a large group of people (in this
instance people with brown eyes), but it sets up a negative stereotype toward an alternate
group of people (for example, people with blue eyes.) As a result, two groups of people
who are different in terms of one superficial variable (eye color) are now assumed to be
different across a much more substantive variable (intelligence) about which value
judgments can then be made.
The conceptual foundations for the study of intergroup bias were present in
Allport’s earliest writings. He described the cognitive underpinnings of prejudice as
fundamental to human development, insisting that stereotyping and social categorization
are “necessary and normal” contributors to an important psychological sense of
belonging: “The human mind must think with the aid of categories…Once formed,
categories are the basis for normal prejudgment. We cannot possibly avoid this process.
Orderly living depends upon it” (Allport, 1954, p. 20). While Allport maintains that

15

categorizations are fundamental to psychological development, he does not suggest that
ensuing biases are equally fundamental:
Although we could not perceive our own in-groups excepting as they
contrast to out-groups, still the in-groups are psychologically
primary…Hostility toward out-groups helps strengthen our sense of
belonging, but it is not required…The familiar is preferred. What is alien
is regarded as somehow inferior, less “good,” but there is not necessarily
hostility against it…Thus, while a certain amount of predilection is
inevitable in all in-group memberships, the reciprocal attitude toward outgroups may range widely (Allport, 1954, p. 42, emphasis added).
Allport laid a theoretical foundation for the nuance required to examine prejudice
effectively – some of the cognitive processes at the core of prejudice may also be at the
core of some aspects of healthy psychological development.
Contemporary research in social psychology has upheld and expanded upon much
of Allport’s thinking on the “normalcy” of social categorization and stereotyping. Social
identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) built upon Allport’s notion that social
categorization is a necessary part of human functioning claiming that it “creates or
protects” in-group status, “providing a positive social identity for in-group members and
satisfying the need for positive self-esteem” (Hewstone, Rubin & Willis, 2002, p. 580).
Devine (1989, 2005) and Monteith (1993, 2002, 2009) built much of their work around
the notion that “the tendency to categorize and stereotype people arises from the need to
simplify one’s understanding of the complex social environment…” (Monteith et al.,
1994, p. 326). Their work on “decategorization” presumes that categorization is in fact
fundamental to psychological development. Similarly, Gaertner & Dovidio (2000, 2005,
2009) maintain that any efforts at ameliorating prejudice should be directed at refocusing
categorizations, rather than eradicating them.
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Social psychologists also maintain that such categorizations – even in the absence
of overt hostility toward an out-group – form the basis for prejudice. Allport theorized
that the “love-prejudice” that results from favoring members of the in-group is just as
important a contributor to intergroup bias as the “hate-prejudice” involving more overtly
discriminatory actions toward out-group members (Allport, 1954, p. 25). Indeed,
research on subtle racism indicates that it has to do less with the presence of hostile or
negative attitudes toward an out-group, and more to do with the lack of positive
perceptions toward those groups (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Pettigrew & Meertens,
1995; Stangor, Sullivan & Ford, 1991; Brewer, 1999). Brewer (1999) found that in-group
identification is independent of negative attitudes toward members of a perceived outgroup, and concluded that “much in-group bias and intergroup discrimination is
motivated by preferential treatment of in-group members rather than direct hostility
toward out-group members” (Brewer, 1999, p. 429).
Furthermore, a large body of research indicates that once a categorization is made
people tend to reward members of the in-group more in terms of distribution of resources,
work-place evaluations, empathetic pre-judgments, and positive attitudes in general
(Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005). While in-group
favoritism alone may not lead to hostility towards a perceived out-group, it can promote a
more subtle form of prejudice and discrimination, placing a minority out-group at a
disadvantage on a variety of fronts (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005, 2009). Further, when a
sense of scarcity ensues – such as limited physical resources or diminished political
power – an out-group may be perceived as a real or symbolic threat (Esses et al., 1993,
1998; Stephan, Ybarra & Morrison, 2009). In such situations, an in-group may go on the
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attack in order to defend and protect the rights, resources, and/or traditions of its
members.
In addition to in-group favoritism, categorizations can lead to experiences of
moral judgment and perceived threat that may contribute to overtly hostile attitudes and
actions toward perceived out-group members (Brewer, 1999; Stephan & Stephan 2001;
Stephan, Ybarra & Morrison, 2009). An in-group functions as a sort of social community
providing the safety and familiarity of rules and order for its members. According to
Brewer (1999), “When the moral order is seen as absolute rather than relative, moral
superiority is incompatible with tolerance for difference” (p. 435). In other words, ingroup bias is converted into moral superiority, inducing attitudes of contempt, disgust,
and downright hostility toward other groups who may go about things differently.
In sum, the foundational categorizations that lead to prejudice are a double-edged
sword. The sense of belonging that is achieved by identifying with an in-group can
provide individuals with a sense of community, customs, and behavioral norms – all of
which lead to a greater sense of security and self-esteem (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis,
2002). On the other hand, such in-group identification can also lead to both subtle and
overt forms of prejudice and discrimination toward those who are not perceived to belong
to the “in-group” – biases often based on superficial dividers such as gender, race, and
sexual identity. How, then, do social psychologists address this divide?

Counteracting Prejudice
There are several categories of thought about the best way to address in-group
bias as it pertains to prejudice. Building upon Allport’s notion of “inner conflict,”
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Devine’s (1989, 2005) model capitalizes on the conflict that arises between the
“automaticity” of stereotyping and deeper-seeded values within an individual (Devine,
2005, p. 333). According to Devine (1989), recognizing and counteracting prejudice
involves overcoming a lifetime of socialized responses. Research has indicated that lowprejudice individuals experience uncomfortable feelings, including guilt, about their
“automatic” prejudiced tendencies, and that conscious awareness of such feelings
motivates them to “control” or counteract them (Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002;
Devine, 2005; Plant & Devine, 2009). In these “decategorization” models, low prejudice
individuals actively and consciously engage the process of inhibiting stereotyped
categorizations – a response which takes “time, attention, and effort” (Devine, 1989, p.
16).
However, one critique of Devine’s model of decategorization is that it potentially
deprives “individuals of valued social identities in smaller, less inclusive groups”
(Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002, p. 590). Another trajectory builds on Allport’s
notion that intergroup contact can reduce prejudice, even as the functional aspects of
categorizations are maintained. These social psychologists maintain the importance of
intergroup distinctions, but seek to change the nature of the original perception of the outgroup away from threat and toward cooperation (Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Kenworthy,
Hewstone, Turner, & Voci, 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2005).
Dual-Identity or Common Ingroup Identity models aim to increase the complexity by
which social categorizations are made, thereby retaining the benefits of a smaller/closeknit community, while increasing tolerance for difference (Gaertner et al., 1989; Gaertner
& Dovidio, 2000, 2005). In particular, Gaertner & Dovidio’s (2000) Common In-group
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Identity Model “involves interventions to change people’s conceptions of distinct group
memberships to either a single, more inclusive group, or to subgroups within a more
inclusive superordinate group” (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005, p. 77). Under this model, the
“us” and “them” still exist, but within a larger umbrella that is “we.” Indeed extensive
research has supported the idea that increasing the complexity by which social
categorizations are made is effective in reducing prejudice (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis,
2002; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000, 2005).
Critics of such recategorization models suggest that majority group members
favor a different style of integration than minority group members, resulting in continued
forms of discrimination (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). However, while problems
with this model exist, research indicates that the idea of creating a common group
identity in general promotes cooperation and reduces intergroup bias. For example,
recategorizations – a process of introducing former out-group members into a larger
vision of an “in-group” reduces tendencies toward intergroup bias, and increase favorable
benefits for newly recategorized group members (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Both
laboratory studies and field studies have suggested that when a common ingroup identity
is formed out of multiple “in-groups” (for example ethnic groups rallying around a high
school sports’ team, business mergers, and even in blended families) cooperation ensues,
and intergroup bias is reduced (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005). Such recategorizations
require a form of cognitive complexity as individuals must assimilate different “circles of
inclusion” previously unconsidered (Allport, 1954; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005).
Further evidence for the importance of increasing complexity is found through
sociological studies. In-group favoritism may be more inclined to become out-group
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antagonism in societies where categorizations are simplistic and dichotomous (Brewer,
1999). For example, in the U.S. racial divisions have often been dichotomized as “white
majority” vs. “minorities” or political division as “Republican vs. Democrat” – categories
which over-simplify the diversity and even overlapping aspects of these groups.
However, in societies where diversity of ethnic, religious, and cultural traditions co-exist,
individuals begin to develop the necessary skills to identify, often simultaneously, with a
variety of different in-groups: “In a complex social structure characterized by crosscutting category distinctions a single person may be attached to one in-group by virtue of
ethnic heritage, to another by religion, to yet another based on occupation, or region of
residence, and so forth” (Brewer, 1999, p. 439). Individuals in a complex social
structure tend to simultaneously utilize categorization effectively to maintain a sense of
belonging, while resisting the impulse to engage in biased attitudes toward others.
Anthropological political scientists and sociological research findings verify that in more
complex, flexible social structures, “the multiple group affiliations of individuals makes
them participate in various group conflicts so that their total personalities are not
involved in any single one of them” (Brewer, 1999, p. 439).
In sum, social psychology research suggests that an effective way to reduce
prejudice is to uphold the “normalcy” of in-group identification, while simultaneously
helping individuals to both a.) control/inhibit automatic stereotyping toward members of
a perceived out-group; and b.) increase the complexity with which they understand
categorizations. In each of these instances, an increased level of cognitive complexity is
required.
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Religion and Prejudice
The problem of the paradoxical relationship between religion and prejudice has
been well documented by psychologists of religion (Allport & Ross, 1967; Wulff, 1997;
Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005, Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009). Religion has been linked to
intolerance of members of racial or ethnic minority groups, perceived nonconformists,
socialists, women, gay and lesbian individuals, and religious out-groups or non-religious
individuals (Batson et al., 1993; Wulff, 1997; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Whitley,
2009). In more recent studies, distinctions between prejudice that is religiously
proscribed (“forbidden”), such as racism, and prejudice that is nonproscribed (“not
forbidden”) but tolerated and even encouraged, such as homophobia, shed light on more
subtle forms of prejudice previously undetected (Rowatt & Franklin, 2004; Hunsberger &
Jackson, 2005).
The literature on religion and prejudice has been reviewed a number of times over
the past several decades (e.g., Batson & Burris, 1994; Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis,
1993; Wulff, 1997; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009).
Early reviews presented a picture for the most part damning of religion and its
relationship to prejudice. In his comprehensive 1997 overview, Wulff found that
using a variety of measures of piety – religious affiliation, church
attendance, doctrinal orthodoxy, rated importance of religion, and so on –
researchers have consistently found positive correlations with
ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, dogmatism, social distance, rigidity,
intolerance of ambiguity, and specific forms of prejudice, especially
against Jews and blacks (Wulff, 1997, p. 223).
Based on their 2005 overview of the literature, Hunsberger & Jackson concluded that
“religion can both reduce and exacerbate prejudice” (p. 217). This more nuanced
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understanding of the relationship between religion and prejudice arose as more
sophisticated measures were developed to examine religious orientation.
Additionally, more sophisticated measures for prejudice have been incorporated
into the literature on religion and prejudice. Recent studies have focused on prejudice
that is proscribed and nonproscribed (Duck & Hunsberger, 1999; Hood et al., 2009, p.
413). Indeed, a recent meta-review indicates that the correlation between religious
orientation (particularly extrinsic and fundamentalism) and racism has decreased over
time as racist attitudes are increasingly proscribed by church communities (Hall, Matz, &
Wood, 2010). Additionally, more positive attitudes toward women working outside of
“traditional” gender roles have consistently developed in religious communities that do
not prescribe specific limitations (Hood et al., 2009).
However, negative attitudes toward homosexuals – attitudes which are often
nonproscribed in religious communities -- seem to have remained steady and even
increased (Fulton, Gorsuch, & Maynard, 1999; Whitley, 2009). A new line of research
questions whether certain religious individuals can differentiate between “sin” and
“sinner” in church communities who explicitly teach a “love the sinner, hate the sin”
model with regard to homosexuality. Early studies indicated that fundamentalists, and, in
some cases, intrinsic religious individuals did not differentiate between “sin” and
“sinner,” and tended to discriminate more against homosexuals regardless of their
behavioral practices (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1993; Batson et al., 1999, 2001). Other
studies have not replicated these findings (Hood et al., 2009). Two recent studies have
suggested that positive attitudes toward gay and lesbian individuals increase when a “love
the sinner, hate the sin” model is taught in church communities which believe
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homosexual actions to be a sin (Mak & Tsang, 2008; Veenvliet, 2009). Conceptually, the
reality of a “love the sinner, hate the sin” model stands on shaky grounds, and the
research to date is inconclusive (Hood et al., 2009).
Finally, it is important to note the development of implicit measures of prejudice.
While explicit measures ask individuals directly about their attitudes and beliefs,
measures of “implicit” prejudice attempt to tap into attitudes which may be at work
indirectly and even outside of conscious awareness (Gawronski et al., 2005). For
example, implicit racism is typically measured via “priming,” wherein subjects may not
be aware of racial “triggers” introduced into a study, or computer software programs that
prompt categorizations of race, religion, gender, etc. and different adjectives with both
positive and negative content (Fazio et al., 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998). Three basic
assumptions underlie the use of implicit measures: 1.) “indirect measures provide access
to unconscious, ‘implicit’ mental representations that are not accessible to introspection
or self-report;” 2.) explicit measures “are often biased by self-presentation or social
desirability” in ways that implicit measures are not; and 3.) implicit measures are thought
to assess “highly stable, old representations that have their roots in long-term
socialization experiences” (Gawronski, et al., 2005, p. 182). Several recent studies have
found similar patterns of relationships between religion and measures of implicit
prejudice as the relationships already established between religion and explicit measures
of prejudice (Rowatt & Franklin, 2004; Rowatt, Tsang, Kelly, Lemartina, McCullers, &
McKinley, 2006; Tsang & Rowatt, 2007).
Hence, whether using direct, explicit measures of prejudice, or more subtle,
implicit measures of prejudice, religion seems to have a consistent relationship to
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prejudice. At the same time, as previously noted, religion often extols love as the greatest
virtue, and religious leaders have often been some of the greatest advocates for social
justice. How then are we to understand the ways in which religion is functioning in its
relationship to prejudice?

Religion and Religious Orientations
A primary theoretical underpinning of this study is that cognitive complexity is a
key component not only in ameliorating prejudice, but also in distinguishing between
various religious orientations. Specifically, the quest and fundamentalist religious
orientations, along with RWA, seem to have a strong cognitive component. The
following section will examine research on religion and each religious orientation in
order to highlight the importance of cognition in establishing religious attitudes,
approaches, and belief systems.
Theoretically, religion has been conceptualized in a variety of ways. It can be
viewed as a meaning making system influencing the personal beliefs and values of
individuals (Geertz, 1973; Silberman, 2005). Such beliefs and values become
particularly potent as they are connected with a concept of the Sacred or Divine:
When religion is incorporated into the meaning system of a person,
conceptions of the sacred are connected to beliefs about the nature of
people, of the self, of this world, and of whatever may lie beyond
it…religious systems may include beliefs about humans as being sinful or
pious, and of the world as being evil or holy (Silberman, 2005, p. 646).
As a result, religious values and beliefs may have a significant impact not only on how
religious individuals view others, but the quality and intensity of those evaluations. For
example, if an individual believes that God abhors homosexuality, and that participants in
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homosexual activities will go to hell, there is an inherent “ultimacy” to the belief that
may result in specific behaviors such as attempts to “convert” the imperiled individual, to
stop the behaviors, and to fight to ensure that other members of society are not similarly
drawn into what the believer sees as an ultimately destructive path.
Religions are also unique because they function collectively (Silberman, 2005).
In her overview of research on the role of religions as “collective meaning systems,”
Silberman (2005) concludes that
these collective meaning systems enable groups and group members to
interpret their shared experiences including their historical and recent
relations with other groups…however, once they are constructed
collective meaning systems tend to be viewed within a given group as
basic undisputable truths (p. 649).
The collective nature of religious systems reinforces the values and beliefs held by
individuals within the group. Consequently, belonging to a religious group can provide a
high degree of confidence, protection, and security for individual members, particularly
immutable and insoluble since the core values of the group center on concepts of the
sacred (Silberman, 2005). In other words, religious groups function as powerful “ingroups.”
Research has supported the idea that religions function as a unique and protective
in-group, much like a political, ethnic, or cultural group (Altemeyer, 2003; Hall et al.,
2010). In fact, religious rituals are often practiced “within-race,” and there is an
increasing disparity among the political views of specifically Christian denominations. In
other words, members of particular religious communities tend to group around ethnicity
and political partisanship, in addition to religious perspectives (Hall et al., 2010.) Indeed,
research suggests that membership in a religious in-group tends to predict prejudice
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toward members of perceived out-groups – whether members of a different race,
religious group, or political persuasion (Hunsberger & Jackson, 1999; Burris & Jackson,
2000; Hall et al., 2010).
If religions in general provide strong in-group security, it should come as no
surprise, based on the crucial role intergroup bias plays in prejudice, that religions may
foster both overt and subtle prejudice. The question, then, is why do some religious
individuals use their in-group membership to fight against prejudice and discrimination?
How and why do some religious individuals resist the inherent pitfalls of intergroup bias?
In order to answer such questions social psychologists and psychologists of religion in
particular, have focused on the individual nature of religion – the ways in which
individual persons relate to their larger religious beliefs, communities, and experiences.
There are a variety of ways in which people connect to religious meaning systems
as individuals. Individual orientations to religion – a concept initially formulated by
Allport (1966, 1967) – have been studied extensively in the psychology of religion and
have become the focus for much of the research on the relationship between religion and
prejudice.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Religious Orientations
Allport (1966, 1967) initially hypothesized that individuals with an intrinsic
orientation to religion would be less prejudiced than those with an extrinsic orientation.
Subsequent research has demonstrated that extrinsic orientation correlates positively with
racism, dogmatism, authoritarianism, and ethnocentricism (Wulff, 1997; Hall et al.,
2010). Intrinsic orientation has been correlated negatively with prejudice and racism, as
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well as dogmatism and authoritarianism, and has correlated positively with nondiscrimination in helping behavior toward others (McFarland, 1989; Wulff, 1997; Mak &
Tsang, 2009). Such findings suggest that individuals who subscribe to religious systems
of meaning primarily for their benefits – i.e. in-group membership and social status and
security -- are more inclined toward intergroup bias; whereas individuals who genuinely
seek religion as an end in itself – i.e. as a way to uphold religious ideals and values -resist intergroup bias and promote tolerance, peace, and good will.
However, as more sophisticated tools for measuring subtle forms of prejudice
developed, a more positive relationship between intrinsic orientation and prejudice
emerged (see, for example, Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). Such research indicated that
intrinsic individuals simply knew how to provide socially acceptable answers, without
necessarily acting on them. Furthermore, ongoing issues with the Intrinsic/Extrinsic (I-E)
scales’ construct validity and reliability have discredited their use in recent years (Laythe,
Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001; Hood et al., 2009). The scales are theoretically distinct, but
may confound religious orientation with social conformity and social desirability (Batson
et al., 1993; Wulff, 1997; Hunsberger & Jackson; 2005, Hall et al., 2010). Such problems
with the I-E scales have prompted researchers to think about other ways in which
individuals might relate to religious systems of meaning.

Quest Orientation
Batson et al. (1993) developed their “religion as quest” concept in an attempt to
broaden the definition of religiosity to include a wider variety of persons who may or
may not subscribe to particular religious beliefs. In their view, extrinsically oriented
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individuals approached religion as a means to another end; and intrinsically oriented
individuals approached religion as an end. But they argued there could be a third way –
religion as “quest.” Persons who approach religion as quest are engaged in a process of
genuine questioning and searching, even as they resist the temptation to arrive at
simplistic, “clear-cut” answers (Batson et al., 1993, p. 166). Baston’s quest scale was
developed specifically to measure “the degree to which an individual’s religion involves
an open-ended, responsive dialogue with existential questions raised by the
contradictions and tragedies of life” (p. 169). Such individuals may be actively engaged
in understanding the same sorts of “ultimate” life questions about the sacred, values, and
purpose and meaning as other religious individuals; however they do so without
necessarily arriving at specific or formulated conclusions.
Quest orientation seems to describe an approach whereby individuals have a
relationship to the sacred and/or to ideas about meaning and existence without necessarily
becoming members of a religious “in-group.” Batson and his colleagues speculated that
individuals with a quest approach to religious questions would be more tolerant of others,
since they are by nature resistant to simplistic in-group categorizations. Indeed, they
initially found evidence that individuals with a quest orientation were more open-minded
and inclined toward “universal compassion” than those with extrinsic or intrinsic
orientations (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991a, 1991b). Two subsequent studies showed that
individuals with a quest orientation were more inclined to help gay individuals than those
with an intrinsic orientation (Batson et al., 1999, 2001). In their 2005 review of sixteen
studies conducted on religious orientation and prejudice, Hunsberger & Jackson found
that there was either no relationship or a negative relationship between quest orientation
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and prejudice toward racial/ethnic groups, homosexual individuals, women, communists,
and members of religious out-groups. In addition 4 of these studies showed a negative
relationship between quest and authoritarianism (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). In their
meta-analysis of 55 studies on the relationship between religion and racism, Hall, Matz,
& Wood (2010) found that quest orientation had a consistently negative correlation with
racism. And in his 2009 meta-analysis of 61 studies examining the relationship between
religion and attitudes toward homosexuality, Whitley found that quest orientation was in
general related to positive attitudes toward gay and lesbian men and women.
All in all, while the “religiousness” of the quest construct has been challenged – it
does not tend to correlate with other measures of religiosity (Altemeyer, 1996; Wulff,
1997) – it does seem to provide a space for more open-minded views about religion and
spirituality. In fact, research has consistently demonstrated that Batson’s quest orientation
correlates negatively with prejudice and positively with more tolerant, open-minded
attitudes (see for example, Batson et al., 1993; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Duck &
Hunsberger, 1999).

Religious Fundamentalism
As researchers honed in on the more tolerant prospect of religion as quest, a
related construct known as fundamentalism was distinguished and operationalized.
Questioning prior studies that seemed to confound theological beliefs (see, for example,
McFarland, 1989), with a dogmatic, authoritarian approach to religion, Altemeyer &
Hunsberger (1992) proposed a clearer definition of fundamentalism as a “close-minded,
ethnocentric” attitude toward belief systems not specifically tied to one set of theological
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beliefs. For example, with regard to Christianity, fundamentalism may be operative in
some Orthodox individuals but not others (p. 117). They created an expanded scale for
measuring fundamentalism, which strategically avoided explicitly Christian beliefs and
instead targeted attitudes about belief systems that could be applied to a variety of
religious (and non-religious) topics. Their initial 20-item scale was later replaced by a
12-item scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004) which has demonstrated high internal
consistency and excellent reliability (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005).
Indeed, research has shown that a fundamentalist religious orientation correlates
consistently positively with prejudice (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Hood et al., 2009).
In situations where I-E scales showed varying relationship with measures of
discrimination, when fundamentalism was controlled for, the relationships between I-E
and prejudice disappeared (Fulton, Gorsuch, & Maynard, 1999). Fulton et al. (1999)
similarly found that when fundamentalism was controlled for, the relationship between
intrinsic religious orientation and prejudice against homosexuals disappeared. In
addition, fundamentalism has correlated positively with measures of racism (Altemeyer
& Hunsberger, 2005); and several studies have found a strong correlation between
fundamentalism and hostility toward homosexuals (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992;
Kirkpatrick, 1993; Altemeyer, 2003) suggesting that fundamentalism is a key component
in the relationship between religion and prejudice.
In addition, fundamentalism tends to be a powerful predictor of a strong tendency
toward “in-group” identification already implicated in the research on prejudice.
Altemeyer (2003) found that religious fundamentalism correlated positively with
ethnocentrism, particularly with regard to religious differences. Individuals who tended
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toward a fundamentalist orientation suggested they would rather associate and work with
other members of their own religious community rather than with people of alternative
viewpoints. In addition, fundamentalism has been associated with a belief in
proselytizing, belief in creation science, dogmatism (even in the face of opposing
scientific evidence), an aversion to doubt, a need for closure, and zealous attitudes about
personal beliefs (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005; Brandt & Reyna, 2010).
In general, fundamentalism seems to involve a rigid, deeply engrained knowledge
structure that provides its adherents with a sense of “coherency, control and a reduction
of ambiguity” – a protective “in-group” which both provides and requires protection at all
costs (Brandt & Reyna, 2010, p. 715). In contrast, quest orientation involves a more
open-minded, flexible approach to knowledge, which allows for a variety of perspectives
to emerge as potential outcomes. Both orientations deal directly with assumptions about
knowledge and the ability to ascertain “truth claims” – fundamentalism correlates
positively with prejudice, and quest does not.

Christian Orthodoxy
Glock & Stark (1966) first conceptualized Christian orthodoxy as a measure of
religiosity pertaining exclusively to core theological beliefs. Building on this foundation,
Kirkpatrick, Hood, & Hartz (1991) distinguished between the content of Christian beliefs
(orthodoxy) and the structure of religious fundamentalism, suggesting that
“fundamentalism refers to a centralized belief system, whose ‘meta-beliefs’ may define
the way in which orthodox beliefs are organized within that belief system” (p. 5). Social
psychologists have continued to differentiate measures of Christian orthodoxy and assess
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the impact of specific theological beliefs on prejudice as a construct distinct from
religious fundamentalism (Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 1982; Kirkpatrick, Hood, & Hartz,
1991; Kirkpatrick, 1993).
While a mild correlation seems to exist between religious fundamentalism and
orthodoxy (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005), several studies indicate that the two
constructs appear to correlate differentially with prejudice. Early studies noted that
religious fundamentalism was a stronger predictor of prejudice than Christian orthodoxy
was (Kirkpatrick & Hunsberger, 1990; Kirkpatrick, Hood, & Hartz, 1991). Kirkpatrick
(1993) in particular, found a strong distinction between fundamentalism and Christian
orthodoxy. Whereas fundamentalism correlated positively with prejudice toward ethnic
minorities, women, homosexuals, and communists, Christian orthodoxy was either
unrelated or positively related with tolerance toward each of these groups. More recently,
Ford, Brignall, VanValey, & Macaluso (2009) found that Christian orthodoxy correlated
with motivation toward inhibiting prejudicial responses to homosexuality.
While some studies suggest that Christian orthodoxy may not correlate with
prejudice to the same degree that fundamentalism does, other studies have found that
Christian orthodoxy is associated with increased levels of prejudice in some instances.
Furthermore, Christian orthodoxy also correlates with other measures, including
dogmatism, indicating a strong “in-group” tendency among those who are orthodox
(Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). McFarland (1989) found that Christian orthodoxy
correlated positively with prejudice toward ethnic minorities, homosexuals, women, and
communists, whereas quest correlated negatively with each dimension of discrimination.
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Pancer et al. (1995) found that religiously orthodox individuals were “less
complex in their thinking about religious issues” than non-religious thinkers (p. 213) and
in a follow-up study (1996) found that orthodox individuals tended to be less inclined to
disclose religious doubting, indicating a strong emphasis on the importance of
maintaining “correct” beliefs (Hunsberger, Pratt, Alisat & Pancer, 1996). In general, the
relationship between orthodox Christian beliefs, fundamentalism and prejudicial attitudes
is ambiguous –it seems that belief in core theological claims may encourage prejudice,
and may also discourage it, depending on whether an individual engages those beliefs
from a more rigid, fundamentalist orientation, or a more flexible, quest orientation.

Right-Wing Authoritarianism
While RWA correlates positively with fundamentalism, conceptually these
attitudes are different. Questions on the RWA scale seek to uncover the personality
components of authoritarian aggression, submission, and conventionalism. References to
God and “God’s law” on the RWA scale aim to assess the way in which a concept of God
is incorporated into an authoritarian personality structure – a supreme “authority” – if you
will – whose law requires ultimate submission (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005).
Individuals who score high on RWA tend to endorse established political leaders, trust
law enforcement officials, uphold social conventions (such as gender roles), and value
punishment for those who deviate from social norms. Religious fundamentalism tends to
reinforce and even teach directly the core components of right-wing authoritarianism;
however fundamentalism assesses the individual’s attitude specifically toward his or her
religious beliefs (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005). In general, RWA seems to be a
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stronger predictor of prejudice; and fundamentalism may “be viewed as a religious
manifestation of right-wing authoritarianism” (Altemeyer, 1996, p. 161).
Because of its consistently positive correlation with both prejudice and
fundamentalism, the personality variable RWA has become a popular construct in
understanding the relationship between religious orientation and prejudice. Studies
suggest that when RWA is accounted for, the correlation between fundamentalism and
prejudice drops to insignificant levels (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Altemeyer 1996;
Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). Similarly, Christian
orthodoxy was found to be negatively correlated with racial prejudice when controlling
for the influence of RWA (Rowatt & Franklin, 2004). Such results suggest that RWA
explains a shared component of fundamentalism and orthodoxy and may therefore
provide an alternate explanation for the link between religious orientation and prejudice
(Duck & Hunsberger, 1999).
RWA has been correlated with an “unquestioning” approach to knowledge, a
lack of imagination, and an inability to look at problems from alternative viewpoints
(Billings, Guastello, & Rike, 1993; Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001), indicating a
strong cognitive component. Furthermore, quest and fundamentalism deal specifically
with assumptions about knowledge and the nature of truth claims, indicating that they
may represent unique styles of epistemic cognition (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). In
addition, each of these constructs – RWA, fundamentalism, and quest – has a very strong
relationship with prejudice, suggesting that cognitive style may be a key underlying
variable in these relationships.
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The Role of Cognitive Complexity
Theoretically, the impact of cognitive style on religious orientation has been a
popular concept. Both the quest and the fundamentalism scales were developed based on
attitudes about knowledge, as opposed to the actual content of the beliefs themselves. The
idea of religions as “personal epistemologies” has provided a basis for understanding
individual approaches to religion for some time (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). Yet little
empirical work has been done investigating the role that cognition, or more specifically,
epistemology, plays in various religious orientations.
Studies have found that religious fundamentalists tend to use less cognitive
complexity to think about existential issues (Batson & Raynor-Prince, 1983; Hunsberger,
Alisat, Pancer, & Pratt, 1995), whereas quest thinkers are more likely to incorporate more
sophisticated critical thinking skills to approach their religious beliefs (McFarland &
Warren, 1992). Hunsberger (1995) found that religiously orthodox individuals tended to
use less complex thinking, specifically about their religious beliefs, than those who were
not orthodox. However, orthodox individuals and non-orthodox individuals did not differ
on complexity of thinking when approaching non-religious issues.
Hunsberger, Alisat, Pancer, & Pratt (1996) established a correlation between
fundamentalism and simplistic thinking, using a non-standardized measure of cognition.
They concluded that fundamentalist individuals tend to take new information and
converge it with their religious teachings, whereas low fundamentalist individuals
respond to new information by adapting their religious beliefs, suggesting a more flexible
cognitive style. As a result of these findings, the authors concluded that “the content of
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people’s doubts, and their interpretations of the doubt process, may differ depending on
the religious orientation of those individuals” (p. 202).
In a provocative study, Wulff (1997) proposed that certain religious orientations
could be located on opposite ends of a literal vs. symbolic dimension. In other words,
individuals with a fundamentalist orientation would be more inclined toward literal
interpretations of religious phenomena, while individuals with a quest orientation would
be more inclined toward symbolic interpretations. Duriez (2004) assessed whether
literal vs. symbolic interpretations would relate differently to racism. Results indicated
that literal vs. symbolic distinctions were significant predictors of racism, even after
RWA and empathy were accounted for (Duriez, 2004). Duriez concluded that
If religious contents are processed in a literal fashion, one is more likely to
be intolerant against people of a different race and/or culture. In contrast,
if religious contents are processed in a symbolic fashion, one is unlikely to
hold racist attitudes…this implies that the danger of religious
fundamentalism (RF) does not lie in religions as such but in the cognitive
style that is applied when processing religious issues (Duriez, 2004, p.
187).
In summary, “what seems to be crucially important is not so much whether one is
religious or not but whether one processes religious contents in a literal or in a symbolic
way…” (p. 177).
In a recent study of 227 students, Hathcoat & Barnes (2010) found that a
fundamentalist religious orientation predicted a specific “system of beliefs about
knowledge and knowing” very similar to Hunsberger & Jackson’s (2005) hypothesis that
fundamentalism may in fact function as a personal epistemology. Furthermore, the
system of beliefs correlated with authoritarian attitudes. Results of this study suggest that
fundamentalism and RWA share a “belief in certain knowledge, simple knowledge, and
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omniscient authority” (Hathcoat & Barnes, 2010, p.73). Findings from such studies
reinforce the idea that cognitive style may be a key component in fundamentalism and
RWA, and may even largely account for their consistent relationship to prejudice.
Religious fundamentalists simply may not readily access the cognitive complexity
necessary to allow for nuance, uncertainty, and difference.4 On the other hand, quest
individuals may approach knowledge with a higher degree of cognitive complexity –
allowing room for uncertainty and tolerance for ambiguity. These considerations indicate
that cognitive complexity, and epistemic cognition specifically, may be an important
component of the relationship between religion and prejudice; however, a direct
comparison of religious orientations and RWA to a standardized measure of cognition,
such as the RJM, has awaited empirical investigation.

The Reflective Judgment Model
The Reflective Judgment Model (RJM) and the Reflective Judgment Interview,
the initial tool used to assess Reflective Judgment, provide the most systematic approach
and well-researched assessment of the epistemological component of cognitive
development to date (Moshman, 1998; Hofer, 2002). An examination of 33 studies of
more than 1700 individuals has provided good evidence for the validity of the Reflective
Judgment Model (King & Kitchener, 2004.) While the RJM finds its roots in other
cognitive and developmental models, its aim is to focus specifically on the development
of “epistemic cognition” -- the ability to understand and interpret knowledge itself as it
has been accumulated and constructed over time, in order to effectively determine “the
4

It is important to note that cognitive complexity is a very different construct from intelligence, a
conceptual and empirical distinction that will be clarified in the next section.
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limits of knowing, the certainty of knowledge, and the criteria for knowing” anything of
real substance (King & Kitchener, 1994, p. 12). The RJM presupposes that in order to
become an effective thinker, individuals must be able to address epistemic assumptions –
the very nature of knowing in general.
Theoretically, the Reflective Judgment Model is rooted in John Dewey’s concept
of reflective thinking as “active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or
supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further
conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey, 1933, p. 9). For Dewey, true reflective thinking
is only initiated after acknowledgment that a real problem exists for which there is not
one correct answer and which logic alone is not sufficient to solve. In Dewey’s words,
To be genuinely thoughtful, we must be willing to sustain and protract
that state of doubt which is the stimulus to thorough inquiry, so as not to
accept an idea or make positive assertion of a belief until justifying
reasons have been found (Dewey, 1933, p. 16).
In other words, a good reflective thinker must be able to tolerate a certain amount of
doubt and uncertainty in order to investigate a variety of possible solutions.
Beyond the initial recognition of a dilemma, reflective thinking requires that an
individual define the issue by selecting the appropriate evidence and principles, weighing
his or her own “assumptions and hypotheses against existing data and against other
plausible interpretations of the data,” and arriving at conclusions (or judgments) based on
“reasonable integrations or syntheses of opposing points of view” (King & Kitchener,
1994, p. 7). Reflective thought requires dialectical reflection, a cognitive skill considered
to be the pinnacle level of cognitive development (King & Kitchener, 1994, Moshman,
1998).
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As a measure of advanced cognition, the RJM is well suited to the study of
religion and prejudice. First, the RJM focuses on ill-structured problems about which
“reasonable people reasonably disagree” (King & Kitchener, 2004, p. 5). Most religious
questions involve complex dilemmas for which there are no easily verifiable or simple
solutions. Second, the RJM focuses on epistemological assumptions rather than content
of belief. For example, a religious individual operating at pre-reflective levels of thought
assumes his or her religious positions to be absolute, certain, and would not consider the
possibility of alternative viewpoints. However, individuals who utilize reflective
thinking – while perhaps arriving at a similar theological conclusion as someone at a prereflective level -- understand that knowledge claims are often uncertain, that evidence can
be contradictory, and that beliefs are often “probabilistic,” or in terms of religious
language, often taken on “faith,” rather than absolute certainty.

Reflective Judgment as Developmental
As Erikson’s (1963) work on adult development became prominent, cognitive
psychologists began similarly to expand their understanding of cognitive development
beyond Piaget’s (1965) initial model. King and Kitchener (1994, 2004) shared Piaget’s
(1965) underlying assumption that meaning is constructed, that individuals make
meaning out of their experiences, and that development occurs as people interact with
their environments. However, they rejected Piaget’s assumption that cognitive
development is best measured by deductive reasoning and also rejected his assumption
that formal operations (age 16) is the completion of cognitive development. In fact,
according to the RJM, the achievement of abstract thinking does not begin until stages 4
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& 5, and an individual is only able to relate 2 or more abstract concepts (e.g. knowledge
and evidence) together in stage 6. In sum, King & Kitchener (2004) along with Fischer
& Pruyne (2002) argue that the ability to think reflectively depends on the capacity for
abstract thinking and is therefore almost exclusively tied to adult development.
As a cognitive-developmental model, the RJM assumes that development occurs
in stages in which the frameworks used by individuals to interpret their environment
become “more complex, integrated, and complete over time” (King & Kitchener, 2004, p.
9). Furthermore, the cognitive skills acquired at earlier stages provide the foundational
scaffolding by which more advanced cognitive skills are developed (Kitchener, King, &
DeLuca, 2006). Indeed, longitudinal research has established strong evidence for the
developmental and sequential nature of reflective judgment, suggesting that it tends to
develop steadily over time, especially as individuals participate in educational pursuits
(King & Kitchener, 2004). However, while they observe “stage-like properties,” the
RJM is not a lock-step, one step at a time approach – in fact, King & Kitchener grant that
people do not often neatly fall into one stage, and may in fact provide answers
characteristic of multiple stages based on the nature of the problem presented (King &
Kitchener, 2004).
Reflective Judgment as a Unique Construct
Reflective Judgment is not the same thing as intelligence – an important
qualification in relating it to religious orientation. Several studies have established
reflective judgment as a unique construct from other cognitive styles or abilities,
including critical thinking, verbal reasoning, scholastic aptitude, and intelligence.
Research has suggested a low to moderate correlation between critical thinking and
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reflective judgment (Mines, King, Hood, & Wood, 1990). However, while critical
thinking is closely related to reflective judgment, critical thinking and reflective judgment
are used to measure different aspects of problem solving (King & Kitchener, 1994).
Measures of critical thinking typically involve well-structured problems (for example, the
analytical section of the GRE); whereas reflective judgment assesses ill-structured
problems typically having more than one possible solution. Wood (1997) and King &
Kitchener (1994) made the distinction that critical thinking “may be necessary but not
sufficient” for an individual to achieve higher levels of reflective judgment (p. 191).
Finally, reflective judgment scores increase significantly over time and with educational
attainment, whereas critical thinking skills do not (Brabeck, 1983). In sum, individuals
who score high on reflective judgment will also probably score high on critical thinking;
however individuals who score high on critical thinking may or may not score high on
reflective judgment. Overall, the body of research suggests that reflective judgment and
critical thinking have some relationship to each other, but are unique constructs.
Additional studies have examined whether there is a relationship between
reflective judgment, intelligence, and verbal ability as measured by the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale – Revised (WAIS-R) and the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children
– Revised (WISC-R) as well as the SAT and ACT scholastic aptitude tests (Kitchener,
Lynch, Fischer, & Wood, 1993). Correlations between reflective judgment and the
verbal subtests of the WAIS-R and WISC-R were moderate; however, results from
longitudinal studies demonstrated that verbal ability did not account for the development
of reflective judgment (King & Kitchener, 1994), indicating they may be related but
distinct constructs. In addition, correlations between reflective judgment and measures of
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scholastic aptitude such as the ACT and SAT are low. In general the verbal ability
sections of these intelligence and scholastic aptitude tests tend to measure well-structured
problems for which there is one correct answer, further underscoring the unique type of
cognitive complexity measured by reflective judgment.
Finally, studies have suggested a relationship between reflective judgment and
specific disciplines of education. Social science and humanities graduate students score
significantly higher on reflective judgment than those in natural science and math
(Fischer & Pruyne, 2002). In general, the social sciences and humanities may equip
students more specifically to solve “ill-structured” problems, whereas natural sciences
and mathematics deal more with “well-structured” problems. So while individuals may
score very high on assessments of intelligence, scholastic aptitude, and other measures of
cognitive ability, their ability to approach complex situations for which there are no
easily identifiable “correct” answers may not be as advanced.

Reflective Judgment, Ethnicity, Age, and Gender
Since the present study includes attitudes about race and gender, it is important to
establish the RJM as an unbiased measure with regard to race and gender. Multiple
cross-sectional studies have been examined to determine gender differences in reflective
judgment scores. Eleven of those studies reported no statistically significant differences
between men and women. Seven showed that men had slightly higher scores than
women; and one showed that females scored higher than males (King & Kitchener,
2004). In four additional studies, two showed no differences, and two showed women
having higher scores than men. In one longitudinal study (King & Kitchener, 1994),
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there were no differences between genders in the first three phases; but slightly higher
scores for men in the fourth testing phase. In general, women were found to have a larger
stage of growth in reflective judgment in their late teens; whereas men developed at a
faster rate post-college. When education level is factored in, the difference between
genders is modified; therefore data on the RJM seems to suggest that there is not a
separate epistemology utilized by women (King & Kitchener, 2002).
King & Kitchener (1994) rejected claims of cross-cultural universality. While
few cross-cultural studies have been done, Reflective Judgment scores do seem to remain
consistent across European-American, Hispanic, and African American populations
within the United States. In particular, RCI scores are similar for college students
regardless of ethnicity when controlling for scholastic aptitude (King & Kitchener, 2002).
Finally, reflective judgment scores are consistent for age after controlling for education
(Wood, 1997). In conclusion, a large body of research indicates that the RJM is not
unduly biased against a particular gender or ethnic group, when specific variables such as
education level are controlled (Kitchener et al., 2006).

Reflective Judgment and Education
The RJM is strongly correlated with education. Neither Dewey nor current
cognitive psychologists presumed that reflective thinking would develop automatically;
rather, it is a skill which requires active, conscious effort (Kitchener, 1992, p. 11). The
primary tool of its development appears to be education (Fischer & Pruyne, 2002).
Both longitudinal and cross-sectional research shows that individuals who engage
in higher education steadily increase in reflective thinking: Reflective Judgment scores
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increase as students progress educationally, particularly through college. High school
students consistently demonstrate pre-reflective thinking (King & Kitchener, 2004),
whereas optimal levels of reflective thinking (stages 6 & 7) typically emerge consistently
only in populations of students at advanced levels of graduate education (Fischer &
Pruyne, 2002). Wood (1997) reviewed 964 college students and found significant
differences between the reflective judgment scores of freshman, sophomores, juniors, and
seniors. Freshman and sophomores tended to score within level 3, whereas only seniors
consistently reached level 4. Non-traditionally aged college students score similarly to
traditionally aged college students, when controlling for education level (Fischer &
Pruyne, 2002). Wood (1997) found that graduate students scored significantly higher than
undergraduate students on Reflective Judgment. Beginning graduate students in Master’s
degree programs averaged 4.62, whereas advanced graduate students (those with 2 years
of graduate education or more) averaged 5.27. Finally, in a comprehensive analysis of
Reflective Judgment scores, it was found that only graduate students attained Reflective
Judgment scores of 6.9 (7 is the highest) (King & Kitchener, 1994).
Significant to the present study, Dale (2005) studied the Reflective Judgment
scores of seminarians enrolled in the Master of Divinity program at an evangelical
Christian seminary emphasizing the “revealed” nature of knowledge (e.g. through
Scripture or a prophet). Differences between entering and graduating students were not
statistically significant, indicating that the seminary education did not significantly help
them develop reflective judgment – a striking difference from those found in Wood’s
(1997) meta-analysis of trends in thought development. This may be related to the fact
that the epistemology underlying stages 4 and 5 involves an assumption that knowledge
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is constructed -- which may not correspond well with the emphasis on the authority of
revealed knowledge at the seminary used in Dale’s study.
Perhaps more to the point, however, research indicates that reflective judgment
“emerges and develops most commonly in environments rich in intellectual stimulation
involving multiple arguments and consideration of evidence, especially post-secondary
educational institutions” (Fischer & Pruyne, 2002. p. 193). Furthermore,
The best support for achievement of competence in reflective thinking
comes from institutions and programs that require students to consistently
consider conflicting evidence and reason from evidence to feasible
solutions to ill-structured problems (Fischer & Pruyne, 2002, p. 193).
Research suggest that “sectarian Christians” tend to “spend most of their lives in a
segregated religious community, isolated from people of different races, ethnicities, and
religious traditions,” often including attendance at Christian schools and universities
(Sherkat, 2007, p. 5). As such, it seems plausible that the emphasis on uniformity of
thought present at some religious institutions may in fact undermine the development of
cognitive complexity. In fact, Dale (2005) concluded that in order to encourage reflective
thinking, seminary “professors should allow students to wrestle with the ill-structured
issues that are present in every discipline, instead of announcing their own
solutions…professors can explain how they reached their conclusions, thus modeling
higher levels of thinking” (p. 62).
It is important to note that a respect for orthodoxy need not be sacrificed to obtain
cognitive complexity. Changes in reasoning associated with the RJM “do not necessarily
reflect a change in the content of a person’s basic point of view about the issue”; rather, it
is the “changes in the basis for holding that point of view and the person’s assumptions
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about how he or she could know and understand the topic” which really make the
difference between those who exercise reflective judgment and those who do not (King &
Kitchener, 1993, p. 41). By utilizing a pedagogy that promotes reflective judgment,
belief content is not necessarily challenged, but rather the basis of knowledge supporting
the beliefs is challenged. As alternative viewpoints are considered, the certainty with
which such beliefs are held may loosen – paving the way for tolerance, respect and
empathy for those with opposing viewpoints.

Reflective Judgment and Tolerance
Theoretically, as summarized so far, the process of obtaining reflective judgment
may well parallel the processes outlined by social psychologists needed to overcome
prejudice (Guthrie, 1996). Researchers of prejudice have long noted the double-edge
sword of “in-group” membership in both providing certain benefits, and simultaneously
promoting forms of prejudice (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Devine, 1989; Olson & Zanna,
1993; Gardner, 1994; Reiman & Peace, 2002; Devine & Sharp, 2009). The ability to
inhibit automatic stereotyping responses, and to generate larger, more complex systems
of categorizations has been well-supported as effective means of reducing prejudice
(Hewstone, Rubin, Willis, 2002; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005; Devine & Plant, 2009). Such
actions seem to require specific cognitive skills that mirror the skills achieved in higher
levels of reflective judgment.
First, cognitive complexity develops as alternative perspectives are evaluated.
Cognitive theorists in adult development have noted substantial evidence for the
importance of dialectical reflection as a key signifier of advanced levels of cognitive
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development (Moshman, 1988). Dialectical reflection has been defined as “deliberate
efforts to achieve coherence by reconstructing one’s rules, principles, intuitions, and/or
conceptions of precedent…..dialectical reflection may be defined as a deliberate effort to
make conceptual progress through active metacognition” (Moshman, 1988, p. 961).
When individuals encounter internal conflict over a particular dilemma and subsequent
applications, they have to reconsider not only the content of what they know, but also the
means by which they obtained that knowledge. In other words, advanced cognition
includes not just an ability to commit to a set of beliefs, but beyond that, an ability to
reflect actively on those beliefs while considering conflicting evidence supporting beliefs
from an entirely different viewpoint.
More specifically, the ability to achieve advanced levels of cognitive complexity
requires a specific cognitive skill -- “the ability to take the perspective of another
person” (Stephan & Finlay, 1999, p. 730), also called cognitive empathy. In turn,
cognitive empathy is a foundational element in reducing prejudice (Stephan & Finlay,
1999; Monroe & Martinez, 2009). Indeed, it seems likely that reflective thinking, which
requires an individual to consider alternative perspectives, would breed cognitive
empathy.
Empirically, several studies do indicate a correlation between reflective judgment
and the development of moral judgment. Moral judgments relate to people’s conceptions
of moral rights and responsibilities, and often involve attitudes and actions regarding the
social welfare of others. In particular, a series of longitudinal studies tested the empirical
relationship between the RJI and the DIT (Defining Issues Test – Rest, 1979) and found a
moderate correlation at all four testings (King & Kitchener, 2002). Wood (1993) found
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that reflective thinking was “necessary but not sufficient for moral reasoning,” suggesting
that “developing reflective judgment will not necessarily lead to but is likely required for
more principled moral thinking” (Kitchener et al., 2006, p. 91).
With regard to tolerance specifically, Guthrie (1996) found initial support for a
relationship between reflective thinking and increased levels of tolerance. Guthrie, King,
and Palmer (2000) found a significant negative relationship between reflective judgment
and prejudice toward African Americans and homosexuals. Their findings suggested that
individuals who utilized higher levels of reflective thinking were also in general, more
tolerant. In another study, a relationship between reflective judgment and tolerance for
stress was assessed. Findings suggested that individuals with higher levels of reflective
judgment could “access their feelings in the process of decision making, but aren’t ruled
by them” (King & Kitchener, 2002, p. 53), indicating a greater ability to approach
differences with objectivity.
Research on the relationship between reflective judgment and character related
issues such as tolerance is still sparse (King & Kitchener, 2004). However, the case for
the role of cognitive complexity in reducing prejudice is theoretically compelling and has
received initial support in the literature. The present study will provide further evidence
as to whether reflective judgment may play a role in predicting prejudicial attitudes.

Reflective Judgment and RCI
The studies reviewed so far on Reflective Judgment have primarily relied on the
Reflective Judgment Interview (RJI) as the assessment tool. A new measure of
Reflective Judgment was developed in 1996, the RCI, which is currently used by several
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universities to assess efficacy in helping students to develop reflective thinking over the
course of undergraduate education (Wood, Kitchener, & Jensen, 2002; King & Kitchener,
2006). In a study of the RCI of over 6000 undergraduate, post-graduate, and graduate
students, Kitchener and colleagues (2002) found comparable results from the RCI to
those found with the RJI. RCI scores differed significantly across education levels,
exhibiting mean scores for freshman, sophomores, juniors, seniors, incoming graduate
students, and outgoing graduate students in a similar pattern to the previously captured
RJI scores. The main difference noted to date is that RCI scores tend to be approximately
and consistently one level higher than the RJI scores. For example, in the current
investigation, mean scores of freshman started at 4.83 (in contrast to 3.57) and continued
upward accordingly. In the older RJI, individuals had to write their own statements in
response to ill-structured problems, whereas in the RCI, individuals read several
statements chosen for them and rate the ones that are most similar to their own style of
thinking. Thus, Kitchener and colleagues attribute the higher RCI scores to the nature of
the task involved in the RCI: statement recognition, as opposed to statement production.

Summary of Reflective Judgment
In conclusion, the Reflective Judgment Model is one of the most well researched
models of epistemology (Hofer, 2002). Since its inception in the early 1980’s, research
has validated the Reflective Judgment Model as a unique construct (Wood, 1997; King &
Kitchener, 1994, 2004, 2006). Longitudinal and cross-sectional research has investigated
the group differences and similarities in Reflective Judgment scores as related to gender,
ethnicity, age, and education level (King & Kitchener, 1994, 2002). Additional research
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has investigated the relationship between reflective judgment and character development,
including tolerance, and suggests a correlation between reflective judgment and increased
levels of tolerance. Finally the RCI, currently used to assess reflective judgment, has
proven to be a valid measure for this study. However, to date, no direct correlation has
been established between reflective judgment and specific religious orientations, and few
studies have established a correlation between reflective judgment and prejudice.

Conclusions from the Literature Review
Cognitive psychologists view wisdom as a key component of mature adult
thinking. Wisdom may be viewed as “expert knowledge involving good judgment and
advice in the domain, fundamental pragmatics of life” (Kitchener et al., 2006, p. 95). In
addition, wisdom includes
the recognition that knowledge is uncertain and that it is not possible to
be absolutely certain at any given point in time. Furthermore, wisdom
includes an ability to formulate clear and sound judgments in the face of
uncertainty (Kitchener et al., 2006, p. 73).
At the very least, such wisdom seems likely to breed humility – a foundational starting
point from which to consider differences of opinion, and a fundamental ingredient in
empathic and respectful attitudes toward others.
In their research on empathy and prejudice, Monroe & Martinez (2009) describe
the importance of experiencing “the other” in the development of empathy. It is
interesting to note that even the most rigid attitudes seem to soften when individuals have
a chance to interact with “the other” – whether it be a person who was previously
considered part of an “out-group,” or an alternative ideological viewpoint. Religious
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fundamentalists who had the opportunity to interact with homosexual individuals were
more open to upholding individual civil rights such as protection in the work place and
civil marriage, even if they still considered the behaviors to be wrong (Altemeyer 1996;
Altemeyer 2001; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005; Veenvliet, 2009). To put it simply –
advanced cognition requires an individual to consider the perspective of another, a
cognitive skill that seems to breed cognitive empathy and may reduce prejudicial
responses.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this study was to assess the possibility of a relationship between
cognitive complexity, as conceptualized by the RJM, and prejudice, along with
relationships between cognitive complexity and religious orientations and RWA. This
study positions itself in the empirical study of the psychology of religion, specifically
within the existing body of literature on religion and prejudice, most of which has
employed quantitative methods.5 Linear regression was chosen in order to determine
empirically whether there was a significant relationship between the RJM and RWA, and
to demonstrate statistically whether reflective judgment accounted for any of the
variability in the relationships between religious orientations and prejudice. In addition,
some qualitative data was gathered in order to supplement the quantitative findings.

Research Questions and Hypotheses
Preliminary Hypotheses: These hypotheses will establish expected relationships among
the variables based on the literature review and lay the foundation for the primary
hypotheses.
1. Is there a relationship between reflective judgment and RWA?
Hypothesis 1) There will be a negative correlation between reflective judgment and
RWA.

5

Hunsberger and Jackson (2005) reviewed 16 studies from 1990 to 2003 which examined 4
religious orientations and their relationships to prejudice. All of these studies used correlation
designs.
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2) Is there a relationship between reflective judgment and prejudice?
Hypothesis 2) There will be a negative correlation between reflective judgment and
prejudice.
3) Is there a relationship between reflective judgment and religious orientation?
Hypothesis 4a) There will be a positive correlation between reflective judgment and
quest; b) There will be a negative correlation between reflective judgment and
fundamentalism.
4) Is there a relationship between RWA and prejudice?
Hypothesis 3) There will be a positive correlation between RWA and prejudice.
5) Is there a relationship between RWA and religious orientation?
Hypothesis 5a) There will be a positive correlation between RWA and fundamentalism;
b) There will be a negative correlation between RWA and quest.
6) Is there a relationship between religious orientation and prejudice?
Hypothesis 6a) There will be a positive correlation between fundamentalism and
prejudice; b) There will be a positive correlation between orthodoxy and prejudice; c)
There will be a negative correlation between quest and prejudice.
7) Does RWA account for any of the variability in the relationships between religious
orientation and prejudice?
Hypothesis 7a) When RWA is accounted for, the relationship between fundamentalism
and prejudice will disappear; b) When RWA is accounted for, the relationship between
orthodoxy and prejudice will disappear.
Primary Hypotheses: These hypotheses will test the main thesis of this study that
cognitive complexity, as conceptualized by the RJM and measured by the RCI, is a more
important predictor of prejudice than religious orientation is.
1) Does reflective judgment account for any of the variability in the relationships
between religious orientation and prejudice?
Hypothesis 1a) When reflective judgment is accounted for, the relationship between
fundamentalism and prejudice will disappear; b) When reflective judgment is accounted
for, the relationship between orthodoxy and prejudice will disappear; c) When reflective
judgment is accounted for, the relationship between quest and prejudice will disappear.
2) Is there a relationship between reflective judgment and prejudice when controlling for
religious orientation?
Hypothesis 3) When controlling for religious orientation, there will continue to be a
negative relationship between reflective judgment and prejudice.
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Procedures
Data collection was conducted during the month of October, 2010. The
researcher visited classrooms at each of the target institutions and read an IRB approved
script during which the project was introduced, informed consent was discussed, and
participation was invited. Interested students approached the researcher after class,
signed informed consent and were given a one - page instruction sheet. The instruction
sheet provided the web links to both parts of the survey and the required password, along
with an individualized subject identification code to preserve anonymity. The DU IRB
approved each of these recruitment items (see Appendices B, C, and D for each of the
IRB approved recruitment documents). In exchange for signing up to take the survey,
students were given the option to provide their e-mail address in order to be submitted
into a drawing for a $50 gift card at Amazon.com. The e-mail addresses were kept
separately from any identifying information and could not be linked to any individual’s
survey responses. Once data collection was complete, the researcher asked an
uninvolved volunteer to select an e-mail address randomly from a shuffled pile. The
winner of the raffle was notified and the gift card was submitted electronically via e-mail.
Classroom presentations were made to over 300 students, and over 180 students
indicated their intent to participate in the study by signing and returning the informed
consent document. There was no interaction between survey participants and the
researcher once the classroom presentation was over and informed consent was obtained,
with one exception.6 Participation involved students logging into the RCI website and
completing the RCI instrument which requested demographic information and responses
6

One student gave me feedback after completing the survey, which is noted in Chapter 5.
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to three ill-structured dilemmas. The RCI portion of the survey took approximately
twenty to thirty minutes for students to complete. At the conclusion of the RCI, students
were directed to the surveymonkey.com website in order to complete Part Two of the
survey. Once directed to the surveymonkey.com website, participants were asked to reenter their subject identification code and to select a specific religious affiliation. They
then responded to 84 statements using a four-point Likert Scale ranging from Strongly
Agree to Strongly Disagree and responded to two optional open-ended questions (see
Appendix E for Part One of the survey and Appendix F for Part Two of the survey).

Sample
Strategic sampling was used to recruit students from a variety of educational
levels and religious orientations. In order to obtain a wide-range of reflective judgment
levels, undergraduate and graduate-level students were recruited. In order to obtain a
wide-range of religious orientations, students were recruited from both progressive and
conservative religious institutions, in addition to students from secular and Catholic
universities. The undergraduate university sampled was a secular, private, four-year
institution, drawing students from a variety of religious and non-religious backgrounds.
In addition, students from a women’s college within that university comprised of nontraditionally aged students was also included. The progressive institution was a
progressive graduate school of theology affiliated with the United Methodist Church; and
the conservative institution was an evangelical graduate school affiliated with the
Conservative Baptist denomination. Each of these schools is located in the Rocky
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Mountain West. The Catholic university was a private four-year institution located in
New England.
Presentations were made to over 90 students in undergraduate classes in religious
studies and business at the undergraduate university, and to over 40 students in
undergraduate classes in social science and humanities in the women’s program.
Presentations were made to over 50 students in graduate-level classes at both the
progressive seminary and the evangelical seminary. Finally, once it was noted that more
undergraduate recruitment was necessary due to poor undergraduate response rate, a
presentation was made to over 40 students at a Catholic college in New England. These
students were involved in a leadership program within the college, comprised of all
undergraduate levels and majors.
The highest rate of response follow-through was from students at the progressive
seminary – 58 students agreed to participate in the study, and 27 students followed
through (46.6%). 67 students from the evangelical seminary agreed to participate in the
study, and 28 students followed through (31.6%). The lowest rate of response was from
students at the undergraduate university – 66 students agreed to participate in the study,
and 7 students followed through by completing the survey (10.6%).
A total of 119 students started the study; and 104 of those students completed the
entire study (N=104). Of the 104 students who completed the study, 41.5% (44) were
undergraduates and 58.5% (62) were graduate students (four of the graduate students
were doctoral students). Initially, the goal was to recruit 30 students each from the
undergraduate universities, the progressive seminary, and the evangelical seminary.
Twenty-seven (n=27) students from the progressive seminary, twenty-eight (n=28)
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students from the evangelical seminary, and sixteen (n=16) students from the women’s
program completed the survey. However, only seven (n=7) students from the
undergraduate university completed the survey. Thus, in order to obtain the target sample
of undergraduate students, additional recruiting efforts were made at a Catholic college,
yielding twenty-six (n=26) students from that institution.

Demographics of the Sample
Of the 104 participants, 70.2% (73) were female and 29.81 % (31) were male.
When the all-female data from the women’s program was subtracted out, 64.8% (57) of
remaining participants were female compared to 35.2% (31) male, suggesting a female
response bias from those schools with both male and female enrollment. The average age
of the sample was 34.6 years (range = 23 - 62) for the progressive seminary, 29.3 years
(range = 23 - 41) for the evangelical seminary, 33.9 years (range = 20 - 57) for the
women’s program, 18.4 years (range = 18 - 21) for the Catholic college, and 20.8 years
(range = 19 - 22) for the undergraduate university. While a diverse representation was
sought, the majority of participants (92.3%) identified as white: only one student
identified as Black, six students identified as Asian/Pacific Islander and one student
identified as American Indian/Alaska Native. Eleven of the participants identified as
Hispanic. Five of the participants identified as non-US citizens.
With regard to religious affiliation, 52 (50%) of the 104 participants selected
Christian-Protestant, 18 (17.3%) selected Christian-Catholic, 7 (6.7%) selected Agnostic,
11 (10.6%) selected spiritual but not religious, 2 (1.9%) selected Buddhist, and 1 each
(1.0%) selected Atheist and Jewish. Finally 12 students (11.5%) selected “Other.” Of
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the “Other” participants, the following affiliations were noted in the comments section:
LDS (2), Unitarian-Universalist (2), Episcopalian (1), Lutheran (1), Taoist (1), Pagan (1),
non-denominational relationship w/ Jesus (1), and one extremely honest response:
“dunno, I’m only 18” (1). 0% of the participants identified as Muslim or Hindu.
When broken down by the religiously affiliated institutions, of the 27 progressive
seminary students, 63% (17) identified as Christian - Protestant. Of the 28 evangelical
seminary students, 100% (all 28) of the students identified as Christian-Protestant. Of the
26 Catholic college students, 53.8% (14) of the students identified as Christian-Catholic.
The majority of participants from the undergraduate university, including the women’s
program, broke down evenly between spiritual but not religious, Christian-Protestant, and
Agnostic.
Justification of the Sample
Sampling students was beneficial to this study for several reasons. First, the RCI
questionnaire is commonly used to measure cognitive development in college students
and its psychometric properties have been researched most often with that population.
Second, obtaining a diverse sample of undergraduate and graduate students allowed the
researcher to test an additional hypothesis regarding the development of cognition via
education and its potential relationship to a reduction of prejudice. The inclusion of a
non-traditionally aged sub-sample allowed the researcher to control for age with regard to
the influence of education on prejudice. Finally, by sampling from a secular university
and a Catholic college, along with a seminary and a theological school with different
approaches to religion, a diverse cross-section of individuals who approach religion from
a variety of orientations was obtained.
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Additionally, the five sub-samples allowed the researcher to assess group
differences, in addition to individual differences. In fact, the psychometric properties of
the RCI are strongest when comparing group differences. Thus, in addition to the
hypotheses previously stated, the results of this study will allow an additional analysis of
group differences between schools, not only in terms of the RCI, but in terms of each of
the religious orientation and prejudice variables.
There are some issues with the sample. First, the analysis of the undergraduate
university sample will pose some problems in terms of its significance level and power
since the group is significantly smaller than the other groups (n=7) and significantly
smaller than the optimal sample size used to ensure RCI validity. The undergraduate
university will be included in the study, but any results pertaining to this sample should
be interpreted with caution. Second, the Catholic college sample is not readily
comparable to the data obtained at the Rocky Mountain institutions since regional
differences may impact the results of the sample in ways not accounted for in the study.
Also, the Catholic college recruitment took place at a leadership program for which
students were selected on the basis of proven academic success and demonstrated
leadership skills. It is likely that data from this sample cannot be generalized to a larger
population of college students.

Instruments
Demographic Information
Demographic information was obtained in two parts. First, when participants
logged into the RCI website they were asked to select their highest level of education
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attained from a drop-down list which included the following options: did not finish high
school, graduated from high school/GED, attended college but did not complete a
degree, completed an associate’s degree, completed a bachelor’s degree, completed a
master’s degree, and completed a doctoral degree. Other demographic information
collected was gender, birth date, race, ethnicity (Hispanic or Non-Hispanic), and
citizenship (U.S. citizen or non-U.S. citizen.) In order to ensure that the data was properly
de-identified, the birth dates of each individual were re-coded as age and all birth date
data was discarded. Finally, when participants logged into Part Two of the survey, they
were asked to select a specific religious affiliation from the following options: Agnostic,
Atheist, Buddhist, Christian – Catholic, Christian – Protestant, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim,
Spiritual but not religious, and Other.
RCI
The Reflective Judgment Model has been used for nearly twenty-five years
effectively to assess cognitive approaches to complex problems and is well suited to the
research being done on religion and prejudice. The model’s focus on epistemological
assumptions rather than content of belief makes it a good tool for isolating cognitive
styles utilized to arrive at a variety of religious conclusions. The primary scale currently
used to measure reflective judgment is the Reasoning about Current Issues questionnaire
(RCI) (Wood, Kitchener, & Jensen, 2002). The RCI is a relatively new instrument that
has replaced the older Reflective Judgment Interview (RJI). It is administered
electronically through the RCI website, and is easier and less costly to administer than the
RJI.
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The RCI questionnaire consists of three ill-structured problems regarding
immigration, alcoholism, and preparing students for the modern work force. Using a
five-point scale, respondents are asked to rate statements about the problems based on
how well they resemble their own thinking. The RCI is a recognition task – participants
respond to statements representing different levels of reflective thought, choosing those
which most closely match their own thinking. The statements used for each dilemma are
based on prototypes common to each level of reflective thinking, developed from years of
data obtained from the Reflective Judgment Interviews. After each dilemma,
participants are asked to rank the top three statements that most closely correspond to
their own thinking.
The RCI is scored by assigning a number from 2 to 7 to each of the three top
ranked statements, which are then weighted .5 (for the top ranking) .3 (for the second
ranking), and .2 (for the third ranking). These numbers are then averaged, resulting in a
Reflective Judgment score for each of the 3 dilemmas. For example, a participant might
receive a score of 3.9 for one dilemma: 4(.5) + 3 (.3) + 5 (.2) = 3.9. The scores for each
of the three dilemmas are then averaged in order to obtain the total Reflective Judgment
score for that individual’s RCI – the final score is a number between 2 and 7. Scores
ranging from 2-3 represent pre-reflective thinking, scores ranging from 4-5 represent
quasi-reflective thinking, and scores ranging from 6-7 represent reflective thinking.
As a relatively new instrument, the psychometric properties of the RCI are still
being assessed; however, initial empirical support for the RCI is strong (Owen, 2005). In
terms of reliability, the internal consistency of the RCI was initially found to be
acceptable – with a Cronbach’s alpha level of .65 (Wood et al., 2002; Owen, 2005).
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Typically, alpha levels closer to .80 are considered desirable; therefore, the results of this
study should be considered in light of the moderate consistency level of the test items.
However, while the internal consistency is low in terms of studying individual
differences, it is acceptable for drawing inferences between groups of individuals (Wood,
et al., 2002). Group differences are the focus of the present study; therefore the moderate
reliability is considered adequate for this study.
Convergent validity is used to establish how well the RCI correlates to the RJI –
the better established measure for assessing reflective judgment. A strong positive
relationship has been found between the RCI and the RJI. Furthermore, the RCI and the
RJI differentiate similarly between education levels, though RCI scores are
approximately 1 level higher (in terms of the Reflective Judgment Model) than their
counterpart scores on the RJI. These findings suggest that the RCI measures a similar
construct to the RJI. The higher RCI scores may be explained by the fact that the RCI is
a recognition task – participants do not have to generate their own statements, but rather
choose from several statements which are provided for them -- whereas the RJI, upon
which most of the research has been based, is a production task – participants generate
their own statements in response to ill-structured problems (Wood, et al., 2002). In
addition, because the RCI is standardized, it does not have some of the problems with
interrater reliability reported with the RJI, which was administered via person-to-person
interviews scored by the interviewer.

63

Religious Orientation and RWA Scales
Four scales were used to measure religious orientation. They were chosen from
those frequently used in previous studies on religion and prejudice: a Christian
Orthodoxy scale (Hunsberger, 1989), a Quest scale (Batson et al., 1993), a Religious
Fundamentalism scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004), and an I/E scale to measure
extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989). In addition, a short
version of the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale was used (Altemeyer &
Hunsberger, 1992).
Christian Orthodoxy Scale
The Christian Orthodoxy (CO) scale used was a 6-item revision of Fullerton &
Hunsberger’s (1982) 24-item version (Hunsberger, 1989). The original Orthodoxy scale
was based on Glock and Stark’s (1966) attempt to focus on the content of traditional
doctrinal beliefs within Christianity. The CO scale is designed to measure the extent to
which individuals subscribe to “well-defined, central tents of the Christian religion”
common to Protestant and Catholic Christians (Fullerton & Hunsberger, 1982, p. 318).
The short-version CO scale retained the strong psychometric properties of the original,
including strong internal consistency with a Cronbach’s alpha of .94, mean intercorrelations among item scores ranging from .69 to .78, and factor analysis indicating that
it measures a single factor (Hunsberger, 1989).
Statements on the 6-item Christian Orthodoxy scale have been measured using a
6-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (strongly disagree) to +3 (strongly agree); however,
for the purpose of this study it was modified to a 4-point Likert Scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) for consistency with the other scales and ease of
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administration. Higher scores on the Christian Orthodoxy Scale indicated higher levels
of orthodox beliefs.
Quest Scale
The Quest scale used was a 12-item revision of the original 16-item scale (Batson
et al., 1993). The original scale was designed to measure “the degree to which an
individual’s religion involves an open-ended, responsive dialogue with existential
questions raised by the contradictions and tragedies of life” (Batson et al., 1993, p. 169).
Specifically, the 12-item scale was designed to address “readiness to face existential
questions without reducing their complexity (Items 4, 8, 9, and 11); self-criticism and
perception of religious doubts as positive (Items 3, 5, 7, and 12); and openness to change
(Items 1, 2, 6, and 10)” (Batson et al., 1993, p. 169).
The open-ended nature of the Quest scale’s approach to religiosity has prompted
many concerns about the scale’s validity and whether it is really measuring a construct
pertaining to “religion.” Batson et al. (1993) developed the Quest scale as an alternative
approach to religious orientation from the I-E scale. Initially it had a very low correlation
with the I-E scale (between .00 - .25) indicating it was measuring a different construct.
In addition, seminarians tend to score significantly higher on the Quest scale than do their
non-seminarian graduate counterparts; and members of various denominations which
emphasize the “search” component of religion -- and who score high on other measures
of religiosity -- also score high on quest, typically higher on quest than denominations
which emphasize doctrinal conformity (Batson, et al., 1993).
In addition, the Quest scale has a very weak negative correlation with measures of
Christian orthodoxy, leaving room for the possibility that high quest scorers can have
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both strong orthodox beliefs and weak orthodox beliefs, causing the correlation to
“average out” in the middle (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991). The Quest scale does
correlate positively with measures of religious conflict; however the 2 scales (Quest and
Religious Conflict) load onto different factors, indicating they are measuring related, but
unique constructs. It is likely that those who are high in quest may also report more
religious apprehension and religious questioning (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991; Wulff,
1997). In sum, in terms of construct validity, the Quest scale does seem to measure
something “religious” and seems to provide a space for “the liberal religious outlook”
(Wulff, 1997, p. 242).
Wulff (1997) reported that the revised 12-item scale has an internal consistency
reliability close to .80, and a correlation with the original scale around .86 – indicating
that the short version used in the current study measures a similar construct to the original
but in a more reliable manner. The revised Quest scale appears to measure three factors:
doubt, complexity, and tentativeness with regard to existential and spiritual issues. The
Quest scale has been scored using a 7-point and a 9-point Likert scale; for the purposes of
this study a 4-point scale was used for consistency with the other scoring and ease of
administration. Higher scores indicated higher levels of quest orientation.

Religious Fundamentalism Scale
The Religious Fundamentalism scale used was a 12-item revision from the
original 20-item scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004). The original scale was designed
to measure an overall approach to religious beliefs rather than the content of those
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beliefs. Specifically, the scale attempts to measure a fundamentalist orientation to
religion characterized by
the belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains
the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity
and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of
evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed
today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past;
and that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have
a special relationship with the deity (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005, p.
379).
Theoretically, this scale could be used to assess an approach to a variety of religious
belief systems and is not exclusive to Christianity.
In general, members of various Christian denominations are represented as high
scorers on religious fundamentalism; however, there are three times as many high scorers
from Baptist, evangelical, Pentecostal, and Jehovah’s Witness churches as there are high
scorers from other Christian denominations. Catholics and Lutherans have an evenly
distributed range from low to high fundamentalism; whereas liberal protestant
denominations (such as Unitarian, Methodist, and Episcopalians) tend to have relatively
fewer high scorers. Jewish individuals tend to score low on religious fundamentalism,
and Muslims tend to score high (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005). In general, females
tend to score higher on religious fundamentalism than males.
Like the 20-item original scale, the 12-item religious fundamentalism scale has
good empirical validity and strong psychometric properties, including a mean intercorrelation of .37 and a reliability alpha of .92. In addition, the 12-item scale has
stronger internal consistency than the 20-item original (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004).
The religious fundamentalism scale correlates with right-wing authoritarianism (.62-.82),
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religious ‘zealousness’ (.44-.55), self-righteousness (.52 - .54) and dogmatism (.57 - .58)
and also with scales of prejudice toward homosexuals (.42 - .61) and women (.23 - .40)
(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004). Factor analysis suggests that the religious
fundamentalism scale is measuring one construct which has to do with an overall attitude
about religious beliefs in general; it does not target any particular religious affiliation
(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005).
Statements on the original scale were assessed using an 8-point Likert Scale
ranging from -4 (very strongly disagree) to +4 (very strongly agree); however, for the
purpose of this study it was modified to a 4-point Likert Scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) for consistency with the other scales and ease of
administration. Higher scores indicated higher levels of fundamentalism.

Intrinsic/Extrinsic (I/E) Scale
Since the I/E orientations are more related to motivation than cognition, a
relationship between them and reflective judgment was not anticipated. However, a short
scale for each was included in order to be thorough. The most commonly used 14-item
I/E scale was revised to yield the 3-item short form used in this study (Gorsuch &
McPherson, 1989). The I/E scale is used to assess whether individuals approach religion
for its intrinsic value or for the benefits that it may provide extrinsically. Gorsuch &
McPherson’s (1989) factor analysis yielded one single-item scale to assess intrinsic
orientation -- My whole approach to life is based upon my religion. It also yielded a twoitem scale to assess two sub-components of extrinsic orientation: the first statement
relates to personal benefits -- What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble
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and sorrow -- and the second relates to social relationships – I go to church mainly
because I enjoy seeing people I know there (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989, p. 352).
The revised single item I scale and 2-item E scale have demonstrated reliability
equal to or better than the reliability of the original I-E scales, and were therefore used in
this study. Gorsuch & McPherson (1989) found that their single-item intrinsic scale had a
reliability alpha of .83, compared to the .82 reliability of the original scale. The 2-item
extrinsic scale demonstrated reliability of .65, compared to the .66 of the original scale. A
high score on each of these scales indicated high levels of intrinsic or extrinsic
orientation.
Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale
The original RWA scale included 30 questions (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992)
and has excellent psychometric properties, including Cronbach’s alpha levels between .83
and .91 (Altemeyer, 2004). The RWA scale was included to be consistent with prior
research indicating a strong relationship between RWA and prejudice, and the possibility
that RWA may in fact mediate a relationship between religious orientations and
prejudice. RWA correlates with fundamentalism, prejudice, and other measures of “antiradicalism.” It demonstrates good construct validity in terms of identifying a cluster of
personality factors having to do with submission to authorities and an aggressive desire to
uphold group norms and traditional viewpoints (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005).
Since hypotheses related to RWA are secondary in this study, a shortened version
was sought for efficiency of administration. Zakrisson (2005) developed a 15-item
version of the RWA scale which demonstrated reliability close to .80 and identified key
single factor items. Building upon this research, Rowatt, et al. (2009) identified a 3-item
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measure of RWA with good psychometric properties, including high internal consistency
with a Cronbach’s alpha of .77 and empirical evidence for a single factor. The 3-item
measure included the following statements, each of which was rated on a 4-point Likert
Scale: Obedience and respect are the most important things kids should learn; We must
crack down on troublemakers to save our moral standards and keep law and order; and
People should be made to show respect for America’s traditions (Rowatt, et al., 2009, p.
18). Higher scores indicated higher levels of RWA.

Prejudice Scales
Several scales, chosen from those frequently used in previous studies of religion
and prejudice, were used to assess prejudice. In order to assess subtle racism, questions
were selected from the Symbolic Racism Scale (Henry & Sears, 2002); and in order to
assess overt racism, questions were selected from the Manitoba prejudice scale
(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). In order to assess attitudes toward women, a modified
version of the Attitudes toward Women scale (Spence & Helmreich, 1978) was used.
Finally, in order to assess Attitudes toward Homosexuality, Veenvliet’s (2009) modified
version of Altemeyer & Hunsberger’s (1992) scale was used in order to assess both
attitudes toward homosexual individuals and attitudes toward homosexual behaviors.

Racism Scale
In recent years, social psychologists have reframed their understanding of racism
in America. Despite the fact that many “overt” forms of discrimination are no longer
legal and many racist attitudes are no longer socially acceptable, racism is still a problem
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on many levels and impacts the quality of life of many minority Americans. Recent data
indicates that Americans of African and Latin descent earn 61% and 71% (respectively)
of what white Americans earn (Zarate, 2009). With regard to education a significantly
higher percentage of white Americans graduate from high school than their black and
Hispanic counterparts. In the work place, studies have shown that Black Americans are
given less attention and consideration than White applicants (Zarate, 2009). Finally,
changing demographics have changed the landscape of racial prejudice. Hispanic and
Latino Americans now comprise the largest ethnic minority in the U.S. – prompting
increasingly heated public debate on such issues as bi-lingual education, immigration
policy, and voting rights. In sum, the nuances of racial prejudice have grown
increasingly complex, and there continues to be very real challenges in terms of many
quality of life variables for ethnic minorities (Henry & Sears, 2002; McConahay, 1986).
Such nuanced forms of racism are more difficult to identify and measure,
particularly when assessing individuals. Modern individuals are well educated in terms
of refraining from making statements or observations that may sound “racist,” yet racial
prejudices may still be operative. Social psychologists have several labels for these more
subtle forms of racism including “aversive racism” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2009), “modern
racism” (McConahay, 1986), and “symbolic racism” (Tarman & Sears, 2005), each of
which has its own method of assessment.
For this study, symbolic racism was used as the theoretical framework for
assessing subtle racism (Henry & Sears, 2002). Symbolic racism, like other theories of
subtle racism rests on the “underlying assumption that, among whites, new forms of
prejudice embody negative feelings toward blacks as a group combined with a sense that
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blacks violate cherished American values” (Henry & Sears, 2002, p. 254.) In particular
symbolic racism embodies four specific tenets:
1.) racial discrimination is no longer a serious obstacle to blacks’
prospects for a good life, so that 2.) blacks’ continuing disadvantages are
largely due to their unwillingness to work hard enough. As a result both
their 3.) continuing demands and 4.) increased advantages are
unwarranted (Tarman & Sears, 2005).
Symbolic racism is different than older more overt forms of racism in that it assumes that
“racism is bad” (McConahay, 1986, p. 93) and that these beliefs do not constitute racism
because these beliefs are empirical facts. In other words, individuals who endorse tenets
of modern forms of racism “do not define their own beliefs and attitudes as racist”
(McConahay, 1986, 93).
The Symbolic Racism Scale 2000 Scale (SR2K) (Henry & Sears, 2002) was
designed to address reliability and validity concerns with McConahay’s (1986) widely
used Modern Racism scale. The SR2K uses the eight most statistically valid items from
the 16-item Modern Racism Scale. For the present study, seven of these items were used
(only one of the two open-ended questions was used.) Specifically, the SR2K included
only items directly related to the four themes noted above. The principal axis method was
used to assess construct validity by assessing how symbolic racism differentiates from
measures of conservative ideology, political party, and more traditional forms of racism.
Results suggested that symbolic racism is a unique construct that may help explain the
link between traditional racism and political propensity. Exploratory factor analyses
indicated the scale measures a single factor, and has a reliability alpha of .79. Finally,
with regard to predictive validity, symbolic racism was found to be a strong predictor of
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racial policy preferences – moreso than either political propensity or traditional racism
(Henry & Sears, 2002).
In addition to questions from the SR2K, four statements from the Manitoba
prejudice scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) were included in order to assess overt
forms of racism. Items from this scale were used in order to maintain consistency with
prior studies on religion and prejudice – many of which include the Manitoba scale. The
original 20-item scale was designed to measure beliefs specifically about immigrants and
ethnic minorities. The original scale demonstrated good internal consistency, with
Cronbach’s alpha above .88. Because the scale was originally administered in Canada,
substitutions to address American participants have been made; the changes have had
little impact on internal consistency and reliability properties. In order to keep the length
of the prejudice scale manageable, four statements from the Manitoba scale were chosen
based on the averages reported by Altemeyer & Hunsberger (1992). The four questions
with the highest averages -- indicating they evoked the highest levels of prejudice -- were
chosen.
The racism scales used have been scored with 7-point and 9-point Likert scales.
In this study, the scales were converted to one 4-point Likert scale for standardization
with the other scales. Higher scores indicated high levels of racism. The open-ended
question was included at the end of the survey; and the answers provided were used to
supplement and provide additional insight into the analysis of the quantitative portion of
the racism scale.
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Attitudes Toward Women Scale
Gender roles continue to be an undercurrent in American political, social and
cultural dialogue. Over the past several decades, the key components underlying attitudes
toward gender and gender roles have become increasingly complex. These underlying
components about gender and gender roles may be summarized in terms of the following:
Stereotypes (beliefs about the characteristics of women and men); gender
schemas (knowledge structures that incorporate beliefs about the nature of
women and men); assessments of the self in terms of gender-related
characteristics (e.g. ratings of self in terms of femininity, masculinity, and
androgyny); attitudes about feminist beliefs and feminism; and gender-role
attitudes (beliefs about the appropriate role activities for women and
men) (McHugh & Frieze, 1997, p. 4).
Several scales have been developed in order to assess attitudes toward women and
attitudes toward gender roles in particular. One of the most commonly used scales used
in the religious orientation and prejudice literature is the Spence & Helmreich (1978)
Attitudes toward Women (ATW) scale – a scale that assesses attitudes toward genderrole activities specifically.
The Spence & Helmreich (1978) scale was used in the present study for two key
reasons. First, it is the most widely researched scale of gender-role activities available
and is the scale most often used in the religion and prejudice research. Second, the scale
focuses specifically on the roles, rights, and responsibilities of women – areas of
contention in certain fundamentalist religious orientations and important in Right-Wing
Authoritarian conceptions of upholding traditional values and norms. As gender role
beliefs “constitute socially shared stereotypes within a society” (Wood & Eagly, 2010, p.
631), it was hypothesized that the scale, though dated, might detect prejudicial responses
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from those religious individuals concerned with maintaining established societal norms
and roles.
The short version of the scale most commonly used is comprised of 15 items
(Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1973). Four of those items were omitted in the current
study due to out-of-date wording (i.e. It is ridiculous for a woman to run a locomotive
and for a man to darn socks). The 15-item ATW scale has strong internal consistency
(alpha = .91), has shown good construct validity and seems to measure one factor
pertaining to gender roles (Jones & McNamara, 1991). In addition, McFarland (1989)
found an internal consistency (alpha = .87) for a shortened 10-item scale similar to the
one used in this study. The scale was converted into a 4-point Likert scale for
consistency with the other scales used in this study. High scores indicated a prejudicial
attitude toward women.
In general, longitudinal research on the scale indicates increasingly egalitarian
attitudes, and that women are more consistently egalitarian in their views than men
(McHugh & Frieze, 1997). While attitudes toward women have indeed changed, it has
been hypothesized that the ATW scale is simply out-of-date and not suitable to detect
more nuanced prejudicial attitudes toward women (Spence & Hahn, 1997).

Attitudes Toward Homosexuality Scale
Recent studies suggest that the relationship between religion and prejudice may
be more extreme and complex with regard to homosexuality than with regard to racism
and attitudes toward women (Whitley, 2009). In many instances, subtle forms of
prejudice are encouraged toward homosexuality, based on a perceived violation of “the
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religion’s value system,” often including a “permitted” prejudice toward homosexual
men and women (Whitley 2009, p. 23). Research has indicated that prejudicial attitudes
toward homosexual individuals do not necessarily correlate with, and are often reversed
when applied to, racial prejudice. Prejudice toward homosexual men and women is
particularly striking among practitioners of several of the world religions in which
homosexuality is overtly condemned (Whitley, 2009).
Empirical evidence to date indicates that conservative religious viewpoints toward
same-gender sexuality are highly correlated with several forms of prejudice. Recent
research has identified the growing tendency in particular religious groups to emphasize a
“love the sinner hate the sin” viewpoint toward homosexuality (Veenvliet, 2009). As a
result, a body of research developed to assess whether such religious individuals could
make a distinction between “sin” and “sinner“ -- in other words, could an individual be
against same-sex behaviors but not demonstrate prejudice toward homosexual
individuals. Results of Veenvliet’s (2009) study indicated that religious teachings
mediated the relationship, and that religious individuals who were taught the “love the
sinner” message were slightly more positive toward gay and lesbian individuals than
those from conservative religious groups who were silent on the topic.
A modified version of Veenvliet’s (2009) scale was used for the present study.
For his study, Veenvliet (2009) created 2 sub-scales based on Altemeyer & Hunsberger’s
(1992) Attitudes Toward Homosexuals (ATH) scale and the Attitudes Toward SameGender Sexual Behavior (ATSSB) Scale (Veenvliet, 2009). The first sub-scale included
statements that addressed same-gender sexual behavior – for example, Homosexual acts
are wrong; and Same-gender sexual behavior is a perfectly acceptable form of sexuality.
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The second sub-scale included statements that referred to gay and lesbian individuals and
their civil rights – for example, Sexual orientation should not be a cause for job
discrimination; and If I discovered a new friend was a homosexual, it would not affect my
relationship with that person.
Veenvliet’s (2009) modified scale was used in this study for two reasons. In
particular, the 12-item Attitudes Toward Homosexuals scale includes overtly
discriminatory statements such as In many way, the AIDS disease currently killing
homosexuals is just what they deserve (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, p. 121). The
researcher hypothesized that the Christian students who would participate in the current
study were mostly educated in a “love the sinner, hate the sin” model which has taught
them to refrain from making such overt statements of discrimination. Second, borrowing
from the theoretical foundation underlying “subtle racism,” the researcher hypothesized
that many of the conservative Christians assessed have been educated against overt
attitudes about homophobia and truly do not believe they are prejudiced or homophobic.
Such individuals may even uphold the civil rights (i.e. the right to marry and the right to
fight job discrimination) of homosexual individuals. At the same time, such religious
individuals continue to hold beliefs about the immorality of homosexual actions – beliefs
which may be considered a form of prejudice. Veenvliet’s (2009) scale would allow the
current study to capture the subtle forms of prejudice present even in the absence of more
overt prejudicial attitudes.
The psychometric properties of Veenvliet’s (2009) modified scale were strong.
The ATSSB scale demonstrated a Cronbach’s alpha of .88 and the ATH scale was .82.
The two scales showed a strong positive correlation (.75). Factor analysis demonstrated
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that the 2 subscales measured one major factor (51.22% of the variance) and one minor
factor (8.33% of the variance). It appears that the two subscales are measuring distinct
but related constructs. Results indicated that while most people do not distinguish
between individual and behavior, a small percentage of participants did make a
distinction (Veenvliet, 2009). The nine items used in the present study were scored on a
4-point Likert scale. Higher scores were indicative of low prejudice. In addition, one of
the items was rephrased as an open-ended question -- the answers to which were used to
provide additional insight into the quantitative analysis regarding attitudes toward
homosexuality.

Social Desirability Scale
Finally, a short version of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding
(BIDR-6) social desirability scale was used in order to measure the extent to which study
participants presented themselves in a socially desirable way (Paulhus, 1991). Allport’s
original I/E religious orientation conceptualization fell under scrutiny in large part
because of an apparent correlation between intrinsic religious orientation and social
desirability. Early research indicated that intrinsically oriented individuals tended to
present themselves in a positive light – therefore, the negative relationship between
intrinsic orientation and prejudice may have in fact been mediated by social desirability
(Wulff, 1997). Recent meta-reviews have supported the idea that socially desirable
responding may be related to many forms of religiosity, particularly intrinsic religious
orientation (Trimble, 1997; Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010). On the other hand, quest
religious orientation seems to have a negative relationship with socially desirable
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responding (Spilka et al., 1985; Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010). In light of the strong role
socially desirable responding seems to play in religious orientation, a social desirability
assessment was included in the current study.
The items for the BIDR-6 were developed in order to assess the level at which
individuals embellish their own positive attributes and demonstrate an exaggerated
confidence in their own judgments (Paulhus, 1991). The assessment measures 2 subconstructs: self-deceptive enhancement (SDE) - “the tendency to give self-reports that are
honest but positively biased” and impression management (IM) – “deliberate selfpresentation to an audience” (Paulhus, 1991, p. 37). The SDE subscale focuses
specifically on the actual content of the beliefs – in other words, individual who score
high on the SDE subscale genuinely believe they are representing themselves accurately,
even though their positive representation is exaggerated (Paulhus, 1991). Research
suggests that the SDE subscale correlates strongly with measures of high self-esteem, but
also with the K-scale of the MMPI which attempts to identify individuals who achieve
normal MMPI scores, but who are in fact deviant (Paulhus, 1991). In the interest of time
and ease of survey administration, only the SDE subscale of the BIDR-6 was included in
the present study.
The BIDR-6 was chosen over other measures of social desirability for several
reasons. First, it is a social desirability scale often used in other studies of the
relationship between religious orientation and prejudice. Second, some of the other social
desirability scales (e.g. Marlowe-Crowne) include questions with religiously related
content, creating a situation in which social desirability may be confounded with
religious piety (Pauls & Stemmler, 2003). The BIDR-6 includes items that are not
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specifically related to religious themes; and research suggests it does not correlate with
other standard measures of religiosity (Paulhus, 1991; Trimble, 1997). Finally,
psychometric properties for the BIDR-6 have been strong – when all 40 items are used to
assess socially desirable responding, the internal consistency coefficient is over .80
(Paulhus, 1991.) When only the SDE statements are used the alpha is between .68 and
.80. The SDE and IM subscales have a relatively low correlation to each other (.05 - .40)
indicating they are measuring different constructs.
The original BIDR (1984, 1988, 1991) included 40 statements, each of which was
rated on a seven-point scale. Extreme responses (6 or 7) are typically given an additional
point upon scoring so that participants who give highly exaggerated responses are easily
detected. For the purpose of the present study, only the 17 questions pertaining to the
SDE scale were included; and the scoring was modified to a 4-point Likert in order to
achieve consistency with the rest of the scales in the survey. Any item that was scored a
“4” was considered an extreme response and was given 1 extra point. Individuals with
high scores on the BIDR-6 were considered to have responded in a positively skewed
manner. The scale was included as the last set of questions on Part Two of the survey.

Summary of Scales
Part One of the scale consisted of RCI, including three ill-structured problems.
Part Two of the scale consisted of 86 questions. The scales were ordered as follows:
Religious Fundamentalism (questions 1-12), Christian Orthodoxy (questions 13-18),
Quest (questions 19-30), Intrinsic (question 31), Extrinsic (questions 32-33), RWA
(question 34-36), Attitudes Toward Homosexuality (questions 37-45), Attitudes Toward
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Women (questions 46-56), attitudes toward race (questions 57-67), and Socially
Desirable Responding (questions 68-84). The final two questions of the survey were the
2 open-ended questions on race and homosexuality. Students were given until November
15 to complete the survey. The data obtained via the RCI website was collected and
analyzed by Dr. Sheila Thompson, the site administrator, who then provided it to me in
Excel format. The data obtained via the SurveyMonkey website was downloaded from
the website in Excel format. The two data sets were then merged into one Excel
spreadsheet in order to conduct the final analysis.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS
Data was collected for this study in order to assess whether there was a
relationship between reflective judgment, as measured by the RCI, RWA, religious
orientation, and prejudice. Of the 119 participants who started the study, 15 were
excluded. Five of the excluded participants completed Part One of the survey but did not
proceed to Part Two. Six of the excluded participants started Part Two of the survey, but
stopped before completing the measures related to the outcome variables (prejudice).
Four of the excluded participants did not use the correct subject identification codes,
making it difficult to match their data from Part One of the survey with their data from
Part Two of the survey. The 104 remaining participants met criteria for inclusion in the
study. In general, the use of averages preserved the overall integrity of the participants’
scores on each of the assessments, even in those data sets where a small percentage of
questions was skipped.
Scoring
Part One of the survey was a standard measure of cognitive complexity, RCI, and
was administered via the RCI website and scored objectively by Dr. Sheila Thompson,
RCI site administrator. Part Two was a set of questions taken from well-researched
surveys on religious orientations, RWA, and prejudicial attitudes. The averages for each
participant’s answers to each of the religious orientation surveys (RF, CO, Q, I, and E),
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the prejudice surveys (ATH, ATW, and ATR), and RWA were obtained. As averages
increased, the level of the particular variable in question increased. In other words, as
averaged scores on RF, CO, Q, or I, increased, that individual’s propensity toward having
characteristics that particular religious orientation increased. As averaged scores
increased on ATH, ATW, and ATR increased, that individual’s propensity toward
prejudicial attitudes increased.
The final analysis included results related to the six predictor variables (RCI,
RWA, RF, CO, Q, and I) and four outcome variables (ATHB, ATHI, ATW, and ATR).
The ATH scale was broken down into two sub-scores based on two sub-sets of questions
– those related to behaviors (ATHB) and those related to individuals (ATHI). E
(extrinsic religious orientation) did not correlate significantly with any predictor or
outcome variable, so it was not included in the main portion of the analysis. In addition,
the Socially Desirable Responding (SDR) scale did not correlate with any of the predictor
or outcome variables and was therefore not included in the analysis. Demographic
variables that impacted study results included gender, age, and education level, and each
of these variables will be included when appropriate to the specific analysis.
In an unexpected twist, institutional differences played a bigger role in predicting
the relationship between religious orientation and prejudice than did reflective judgment.
This chapter will first present findings related to institutional differences, as well as to the
RCI, since these findings were unexpected and impacted the subsequent analyses.
Second, the correlation coefficients for each of the preliminary hypotheses will be
presented. Third, the results of the linear regression will be presented for the primary
hypotheses of the study. Finally, the qualitative responses obtained in answer to the two
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open-ended questions will be presented at the end of the chapter. The qualitative data
will be broken down by institution and categorized thematically.

Institutional Differences
In order to assess for the possibility of institutional differences, the integrity of the
institutional subgroups was maintained through the use of coding. Participants from the
progressive seminary were coded as PS (n = 27). Participants from the evangelical
seminary were coded as ES (n = 28). Participants from the Catholic college were coded
as CC (n = 26). Since the university undergraduate (UU) subgroup was so small (n = 7), a
regression analysis was performed in order to determine whether it had any significant
differences from the women’s school affiliated with it (WC) subgroup (n = 16). No
significant difference between the UU and WC subgroups was found on any of the
predictor or outcome variables except for ATW. Thus, the UU and WC subgroups were
combined for each portion of the analysis, except for the ATW analysis; and the
combined group was coded WC (n = 23).
As a precautionary measure, a regression analysis was performed in order to
determine whether there were significant differences among the institutional subgroups
on each of the outcome variables (ATHB, ATHI, ATW, and ATR) and each of the
predictor variables (RCI, RWA, RF, CO, Q, I, and E). CC was randomly selected to be
the reference group. Indeed, significant differences among institutions were found on
each of the outcome and predictor variables, except RCI.
In general, each of the institutions had a unique relationship – whether positive or
negative – with at least one of the prejudice variables, when compared to the other
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schools. The evangelical seminary predicted increased scores in terms of prejudicial
attitudes toward homosexuality when compared to each of the other institutional
subgroups. The progressive seminary predicted decreased scores in terms of prejudicial
attitudes towards women and race when compared to the other institutional subgroups. In
addition, the women’s school also predicted decreased scores in terms of prejudicial
attitudes toward women when compared to the other institutional subgroups (see Table
1).
Table 1. Standard Multiple Regressions of School and Prejudice
ATHB + School
ES
PS
WC
r2
ar2
ATHI + School
ES
PS
WC
r2
ar2
ATW + School
ES
PS
WC
r2
ar2
ATR + School
ES
PS
WC
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

1.308
-0.192
0.308
0.448
0.432
beta coefficient

0.183
0.185
0.193

Std. Error

0.582
-0.106
0.091
0.299
0.278
beta coefficient

0.115
0.116
0.121

Std. Error

0.105
-0.521
-0.299
0.366
0.347
beta coefficient

0.092
0.093
0.097

Std. Error

0.057
-0.337
0.089
0.144
0.118

0.116
0.117
0.122
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t value

-7.135
1.040
-1.597

t value

-5.051
0.908
-0.754

t value

1.142
-5.619
-3.097

t value

0.490
-2.878
0.729

Pr(>|t|)
<.0001***

0.301
0.113

Pr(>|t|)
<.0001***

0.366
0.453

Pr(>|t|)

0.256
<.0001***
<.001**

Pr(>|t|)

0.625
<.001**

0.468

Similarly, each of the schools had a unique relationship with at least one of the
predictor variables. The progressive seminary predicted decreased scores on the RWA
scale when compared to the other institutions. The evangelical seminary predicted
increased scores on religious fundamentalism and Christian orthodoxy when compared to
the other institutions. The evangelical seminary and the women’s school both predicted
decreased scores on quest when compared to the progressive seminary and the catholic
college. Each of the graduate schools – the evangelical seminary and the progressive
seminary – predicted increased scores on intrinsic religious orientations when compared
to the undergraduate schools. Finally, there were no significant differences among the
schools in terms of extrinsic religious orientation (see Table 2).
Table 2. Standard Multiple Regressions of School and Predictor variables
RWA + School
ES
PS
WC
r2
ar2
RF + School
ES
PS
WC
r2
ar2
CO + School
ES
PS
WC
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

-0.063
-0.613
0.152
0.228
0.205
beta coefficient

0.148
0.149
0.155

Std. Error

1.311
-0.110
0.236
0.548
0.534
beta coefficient

0.146
0.148
0.154
0.548
0.534
Std. Error

0.866
-0.131
-0.059
0.296
0.275

0.178
0.179
0.187
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t value

-0.428
-4.116
0.977

t value

8.959
-0.744
1.533

t value

4.871
-0.732
-0.318

Pr(>|t|)

0.670
<.0001***

0.331

Pr(>|t|)
<.0001***

0.458
0.128

Pr(>|t|)
<.0001***

0.466
0.751

Q + School
ES
PS
WC
r2
ar2
I + School
ES
PS
WC
r2
ar2
E + School
ES
PS
WC
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

-0.261
0.065
-0.310
0.141
0.115
beta coefficient

0.110
0.111
0.116

Std. Error

1.147
0.474
-0.105
0.268
0.246
beta coefficient

0.229
0.231
0.240

Std. Error

0.082
0.033
0.165
0.014
-0.015

0.138
0.140
0.146

t value

-2.370
0.583
-2.684

t value

5.020
2.058
-0.439

t value

Pr(>|t|)
<.01*

0.561
<.001**

Pr(>|t|)
<.0001***
<.01*

0.662

Pr(>|t|)

0.595
0.240
1.132

0.553
0.811
0.260

In sum, the differences among institutions were not surprising in light of the
strategic sampling method used. Specific schools were targeted in order to evoke a wide
variety of religious orientations, and indeed the different schools sampled did tend to
predict increased (or decreased) levels of specific religious orientations and also
increased (or decreased) levels of specific prejudicial attitudes. School was therefore
included as a controlling variable in the analyses of each of the study hypotheses in order
to assess its influence on the relationships between each of the predictor and outcome
variables. (See Appendix G for a bar graph representation of the means and standard
errors of each religious orientation and prejudice variable by school).
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RCI
Institutional Differences and the RCI
Unfortunately, results indicated there was no significant difference among the
institutions in terms of the RCI (see Table 3). Strategic sampling efforts targeted both
undergraduate and graduate level students in order to obtain a wide range of reflective
thinking levels. Based on prior research, a significant difference was expected between
the undergraduate and graduate school samples in terms of their RCI scores.7 Indeed, the
fact that the progressive and evangelical seminaries – both graduate schools -- did not
differ significantly from the undergraduate groups, suggested that the RCI scores
obtained in this study were unusual and did not follow the patterns predicted by prior
research. Furthermore, results indicated that the scores for each institution – both
graduate-level and undergraduate – clustered around the Quasi-reflective level, indicating
a limited range (see Table 4). This limited range may have impacted the ability to
produce a meaningful analysis of the possible relationships between reflective judgment
levels and each of the other variables.
Table 3. Standard Multiple Regression of School and RCI
RCI + School
ES
PS
WC
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

0.351
0.312
0.175
0.030
0.001

0.220
0.222
0.231

7

t value

1.597
1.405
0.759

Pr(>|t|)

0.113
0.163
0.450

Research on reflective judgment suggests a correlation with education level: graduate students
tend to score significantly higher than undergraduate students (King & Kitchener, 1994; Wood,
1997; Fischer & Pruyne, 2002).
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Table 4. Average RCI score by Institution
School
CC
ES
PS
WC

Average RCI Score
4.94
5.29
5.25
5.11

Standard Deviation
0.58
0.94
0.85
0.79

To further clarify the results regarding RCI, a regression was performed to
determine if there was a relationship between RCI and education level – a relationship
well substantiated by prior research. Participants were coded as (1) if they were first and
second year undergraduates, (2) if they were third and fourth year undergraduates, (3) if
they were graduate-level students, and (4) if they were graduate level students who had
obtained a Master’s degree and were working on a second Master’s degree or a doctoral
degree. Education level was then treated as a continuous variable in the regression
analysis. Results indicated that as education level increased, there was a significant
positive increase in RCI – a finding that was consistent with prior research. However,
when age was added as a controlling factor, the relationship between RCI and education
level disappeared, and the adjusted R squared increased from 0.038 to 0.056, suggesting
that the model including both age and education level was the best model for
understanding the relationships. These results suggested that age was a stronger predictor
of RCI than education level, a finding that was contrary to prior research on reflective
judgment (see Tables 5a and 5b).
Descriptive statistics suggested that the average age of the WC undergraduate
subgroup (M = 30.39, SD = 11.56) was much higher than the traditionally aged sample of
undergraduate students from CC (M = 20.15, SD = 5.1). Furthermore, descriptive
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statistics suggested that the average RCI score for WC students was comparable to the
graduate level students, as was their age, even though they were studying at an
undergraduate level. These results suggested that the overall RCI scores obtained from
the women’s college sample were unusually high for their education level, and may help
to explain why age was a more significant factor than education level in predicting RCI
score in the overall sample.
Table 5a. Standard Multiple Regression of RCI and Education level
RCI + ED
ED
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

0.165
0.048
0.038

0.073
0.048
0.038

t value

2.260
0.048
0.038

Pr(>|t|)
<.01*

0.048
0.038

Table 5b. Standard Multiple Regression of RCI, Age, and Education level
RCI + ED + AGE
ED
Age

beta coefficient

Std. Error

0.098
0.013
0.075
0.056

r2
ar2

0.082
0.008

t value

Pr(>|t|)

1.188
1.712

0.238
<.05+

Table 5c. Average RCI and Age by Institution
School
Catholic College (CC)
Evangelical Seminary (ES)
Progressive Seminary (PS)
Women’s College (WC)

Average RCI Score
4.94
5.29
5.25
5.11

Average Age
20.15
29.32
34.85
30.39

Assessing the Three Ill-Structured Problems
The RCI is comprised of three ill-structured problems related to each of the
following areas: work force (RCIWF), alcoholism (RCIA) and immigration (RCII).
Each of the 104 participants received one score for each of the three ill-structured
problems, along with an overall RCI score, which is the average of the three sub-scores.
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Correlations were run in order to determine whether there were any significant
differences among the 3 RCI sub-scores on any of the predictor or outcome variables.
Pearson product moment correlation coefficients were generated using a two-sided test to
allow for both positive and negative correlations.
Results of the analysis suggested that each of the 3 ill-structured problems had a
strong positive correlation with each other, as expected. Results also indicated there was
a mild positive relationship between RCIA and ATHB (see Table 6a). An additional
regression was performed in order to determine whether school was influencing the
relationship between RCIA and ATHB. Indeed, when accounting for school, the
relationship between RCIA and ATHB disappeared (see Table 6b.) These results
suggested that the evangelical seminary sample accounted for the positive relationship
between RCIA and ATHB. It’s possible that there was a mild confounding relationship
between the way students from the evangelical seminary sub sample thought about
alcoholism and how they thought about homosexuality. This issue will be addressed
more specifically in the analyses of the primary hypotheses.
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Table 6a. Pearsons’ Correlation Coefficients between each of the RCI sub scales, RWA,
and each of the Religious Orientation and Prejudice variables
RCIWF
RCIWF
RCIA
RCII
RCI
RF
CO
Q
I
E
RWA
ATHB
ATHI
ATW
ATR

RCIA

1.000
0.351***
0.320***
0.776***
-0.014
-0.061
-0.047
0.086
-0.101
-0.083
0.165
0.119
-0.037
0.020

p-value < .0001***

RCII

1.000
0.279**
0.725***
0.114
-0.029
-0.051
0.104
0.132
-0.076
0.213*
0.191
0.042
0.057

p-value < .001**

RCI

1.000
0.711***
-0.080
-0.062
-0.007
0.039
-0.075
0.004
0.029
0.027
-0.007
-0.087

1.000
0.009
-0.068
-0.047
0.105
-0.023
-0.071
0.185
0.129
-0.004
-0.004

p-value < .01*

Table 6b. Standard Multiple Regression of RCIA, School, and ATHB
RCIA+ATHB+School
RCIA
ES
PS
WC
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

0.091
1.239
-0.242
0.271
0.459
0.437

0.065
0.189
0.187
0.194

t value

-1.402
-6.563
1.290
-1.399

Pr(>|t|)

0.164
<.0001***

0.200
0.165

Research Questions
Preliminary Hypotheses
The findings in terms of each of the preliminary research questions will now be
presented (see Appendix H for a summary of the findings for each preliminary
hypothesis). These hypotheses were analyzed using Pearson product moment correlation
coefficients with a two-sided test to allow for both positive and negative correlations.
Results will be grouped based on the predictor variables (reflective judgment, religious
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orientation, and RWA), since these groups provided the basis for the preliminary
hypotheses (see Table 7 for each of the correlation coefficients).

Reflective Judgment
Unfortunately, the limited distribution of RCI scores precluded a meaningful
analysis of its relationship to religious orientation, RWA, and prejudice. In terms of the
overall group (N=104), no significant relationship was found between RCI and RWA, no
significant relationship was found between RCI and RF, CO, Q, I, or E, and no
significant relationship was found between RCI and ATHB, ATHI, ATW, or ATR.
These findings should be interpreted cautiously in light of the unusual trends in terms of
the RCI scores obtained in this sample previously addressed.

RWA
As predicted, a significant positive relationship was found between RWA and
each of the prejudice variables – ATHB, ATHI, ATW, and ATR. In addition, a
significant positive relationship was found between RWA and RF. However, no
significant relationship was found between RWA and CO or RWA and Q. In addition,
no significant relationship was found between RWA and I, though a mild positive
correlation was found between RWA and E.

Religious Orientation
As predicted, a significant positive relationship was found between RF and each
of the prejudice variables -- ATHB, ATHI, ATW, and ATR. Furthermore, as predicted, a
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significant positive relationship was found between CO and ATHB, ATHI, and ATW.
However, there was not a significant relationship between CO and ATR. Finally, as
predicted, a significant negative relationship was found between Q and ATHB and ATHI.
However, there was not a significant relationship between Q and ATW and ATR.
Table 7. Pearsons’ Correlation Coefficients for RWA, RCI, RF, CO, Q, I, E, ATHB,
ATHI, ATW, and ATR
RCI

RWA

RF

CO

Q

I

E

RCI
RWA
ATHB
ATHI
ATW
ATR

1.000
0.009
-0.068
-0.047
0.105 -0.023
-0.071
1.000
0.317**
0.182
-0.097
0.130 0.276*
0.185 0.328*** 0.761*** 0.508*** -0.377*** 0.458*** 0.023
0.129
0.314** 0.627*** 0.391*** -0.339*** 0.296** 0.018
-0.004 0.455*** 0.442*** 0.320***
-0.104
0.141 0.011
-0.004 0.527***
0.236*
0.185
-0.154
-0.009 0.106
p-value < .0001*** p-value < .001**
p-value < .01*

Primary Hypotheses
Linear regression was used to perform the analyses for each of the remaining
hypotheses. Linear regression allows the researcher to build on an analysis between two
variables by adding additional variables and assessing the differences. Because school
was found to be a controlling factor, school was included as a variable in each of these
analyses, even though it was not a part of the original hypotheses. For each of the
following analyses, a series of regressions was performed, each including the addition of
a new variable into a prior existing relationship. For example, the models for each
prejudice variable were run in the following sequence:
1.) ATHB ~ School
2.) ATHB ~ RF + School
3.) ATHB ~ RF + School + RWA
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4.) ATHB ~ RF + School + RCI
5.) ATHB ~ RF + School + RWA + RCI
The model with the largest adjusted R squared was reported, as this model was
considered the best fit for the analysis of the relationships between the variables on that
particular outcome. In each instance, the model including school, the particular religious
orientation variable, and RWA was the strongest model. The only model in which RCI
played a significant role was on the analysis between religious fundamentalism and
ATHB; this model will be addressed in the final section.
The results for each of these analyses will be categorized and presented in light of
each of the remaining research questions and hypotheses. First the results of the findings
on each of the religious orientation variables, RWA, and their relationships to the ATHB
and ATHI outcome variables will be presented. Then, the key findings related to the
ATW and ATR outcome variables will be presented. Finally, results related to the RCI
will be addressed (see Appendix I for a summary of the findings for each primary
hypothesis).

ATHB: The Impact of School, RF, CO and RWA
Contrary to the hypothesis of this study, the role of RWA was muted in terms of
its impact on ATHB in this study. When controlling for RWA, both religious
fundamentalism and Christian orthodoxy continued to have a strong positive relationship
with ATHB. In addition, the evangelical seminary remained a strong predictor of
increased scores on ATHB, even when accounting for the religious fundamentalism and
orthodox Christian components of the sub sample, and also for RWA.

95

In terms of religious fundamentalism, multiple regression was used to assess
whether there was a relationship between RF and ATHB when accounting for RWA and
school. When both school and RF were included in the regression, the strong positive
relationship between RF and ATHB remained, and school remained a significant
predictor. Next, when controlling for RWA, RF and school remained strong predictors
of ATHB. This analysis suggested that both RF and ES were strong predictors of ATHB,
even when accounting for RWA. However, the relationship between school and ATHB,
while still significant, decreased when RF was included into the regression (see Table
8a).
In terms of Christian orthodoxy, multiple regression was used to assess whether
there was a relationship between CO and ATHB when accounting for RWA and school.
When both school and CO were added into the regression, both school and CO remained
predictors of ATHB. When RWA was added into the regression, the role of CO
decreased, but remained significant, while the role of ES remained strong (see Table 8b).
In sum, these findings suggested that students with a greater tendency toward
religious fundamentalism – across the institutional subgroups -- tended to have increased
scores on ATHB. Furthermore, students with a greater tendency toward Christian
orthodoxy – across institutional subgroups – also tended to have increased scores on
ATHB. In addition, the evangelical seminary continued to be a strong predictor of
ATHB, even when holding the religious fundamentalism, Christian orthodoxy, and RWA
scores constant. In other words, within the evangelical seminary subgroup, even those
scores that were lower on religious fundamentalism, Christian orthodoxy, or RWA
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tended to predict significantly higher scores on ATHB, when compared to lower scores
on religious fundamentalism, Christian orthodoxy, and RWA at other schools.
Table 8a. Standard Multiple Regression on ATHB in terms of RF, School, and RWA
RF + School + RWA
RF
ES
PS
WC
RWA
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

0.613
0.515
-0.022
0.138
0.169
0.615
0.595

0.112
0.215
0.169
0.165
0.111

t value

-5.465
-2.394
0.128
-0.836
-1.518

Pr(>|t|)
<.0001***
<.001*

0.899
0.405
0.132

Table 8b. Standard Multiple Regression on ATHB in terms of CO, School, and RWA
CO + School + RWA
CO
ES
PS
WC
RWA
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

0.215
1.142
0.039
0.270
0.331
0.521
0.497

0.098
0.193
0.188
0.182
0.118

t value

-2.189
-5.919
-0.206
-1.482
-2.797

Pr(>|t|)
<.01*
<.0001***

0.837
0.142
<.001**

ATHI: The Impact of School, RF, CO, and RWA
While RWA did not account for any of the variability in the relationship between
religious fundamentalism and ATHI, it did account for variability in the relationship
between CO and ATHI. In addition, the role of school was muted when accounting for
religious fundamentalism, but remained strong when accounting for Christian orthodoxy.
Multiple regression was used to assess whether there was a relationship between
RF and ATHI when accounting for school. When RF was added into the regression, the
relationship between school and ATHI disappeared, while the relationship between RF
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and ATHI strengthened. When RWA was added into the regression, there were no
significant changes (see Table 9a).
Multiple regression was then used to determine whether there was a relationship
between CO and ATHI when accounting for both RWA and school. Initially, when both
CO and school were added into the model, they each continued to have a strong positive
relationship to ATHI. However, in this instance, when RWA was added into the model,
the relationship between CO and ATHI disappeared, while the relationship between ES
and ATHI remained strong (see Table 9b).
In sum, these findings suggested that in general, religious fundamentalism was a
stronger predictor of ATHI than school or RWA. The evangelical seminary predicted
higher scores on the ATHI scale than each of the other schools. However, when religious
fundamentalism was accounted for, the role of school in predicting prejudicial attitudes
toward homosexual individuals disappeared. It seems likely that the relationship between
school and ATHI was mediated by religious fundamentalism. That is, the higher scores
on religious fundamentalism within the evangelical seminary subgroup accounted for its
relationship to ATHI. When these scores were held constant, there was no difference
between the evangelical seminary sample and the other schools in terms of its
relationship to ATHI.
On the other hand, RWA and school were stronger predictors of ATHI than CO.
While initially there was a significant positive relationship between CO and ATHI, the
relationship between CO and ATHI disappeared, as predicted, when RWA was included
in the model. This analysis suggested that school and RWA mediated the relationship
between CO and ATHI. In other words, within each of the school sub samples, when
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RWA was held constant, the relationship between CO and ATHI disappeared. At the
same time, even when holding RWA and CO constant, the evangelical seminary
continued to have a strong positive relationship with ATHI.
Table 9a. Standard Multiple Regression on ATHI in terms of RF, School, and RWA
RF + School + RWA
RF
ES
PS
WC
RWA

beta coefficient

Std. Error

0.267
0.241
0.006
0.008
0.134
0.428
0.399

r2
ar2

0.076
0.146
0.115
0.112
0.076

t value

-3.499
-1.645
-0.054
-0.071
-1.778

Pr(>|t|)
<.0001***

0.103
0.957
0.943
<.05+

Table 9b. Standard Multiple Regression on ATHI in terms of CO, School, and RWA
CO + School + RWA
CO
ES
PS
WC
RWA

beta coefficient

r2
ar2

Std. Error

0.064
0.540
0.032
0.063
0.211
0.363
0.331

0.063
0.124
0.121
0.117
0.076

t value

-1.015
-4.347
-0.264
-0.538
-2.766

Pr(>|t|)

0.313
<.0001***

0.792
0.592
<.001**

ATHB and ATHI: The Impact of School and Q
Quest was a significant predictor of both ATHB and ATHI, even when
accounting for school and RWA. Results suggested that as quest scores increased, scores
on the ATHB and ATHI scales decreased significantly. However, even when accounting
for quest, the evangelical seminary remained a strong predictor of increased scores on
both ATHB and ATHI, suggesting that quest did not have as much of an impact on
decreased scores on ATHB and ATHI at the evangelical seminary as it did at the other
schools (see Tables 10a and 10b).
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A look within the ES subgroup (n=29) suggested that there was a significant
negative correlation between Q and ATHB (r = -0.320, p < .001) and between Q and
ATHI (r = - 0.595, p < 0001). Why then was ES still a predictor of a positive increase in
ATHI and ATHB, even when controlling for Q? A second analysis was run in order to
determine whether RF was a confounding variable in this dynamic. Indeed, when RF and
Q were both accounted for, the relationships between ES and ATHB and ATHI
disappeared. However the adjusted R squared values decreased significantly, suggesting
the Q/RWA only model was the best fit for this analysis (see Tables 10c and 10d).
In sum, it seems likely that the average scores on the prejudice scales at the
evangelical seminary were high enough to warrant a significantly different result than the
other institutions, even when accounting for the impact of quest. In other words, even
though higher quest scores tended to produce decreased ATHB/ATHI scores within the
evangelical seminary subgroup, those decreased ATHB/ATHI scores were still higher
than the average scores produced at the other schools.
Table 10a. Standard Multiple Regression on ATHB in terms of Q, School, and RWA
Q + School + RWA
Q
ES
PS
WC
RWA
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

-0.481
1.207
0.075
0.100
0.386
0.543
0.520

0.153
0.173
0.184
0.184
0.114
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t value

3.135
-6.969
-0.409
-0.543
-3.379

Pr(>|t|)
<.001**
<.0001***

0.684
0.588
<.001**

Table 10b. Standard Multiple Regression on ATHI in terms of Q, School, and RWA
Q + School + RWA
Q
ES
PS
WC
RWA

beta coefficient

Std. Error

-0.275
0.525
0.054
-0.029
0.231
0.405
0.374

r2
ar2

0.098
0.110
0.117
0.117
0.073

t value

2.813
-4.757
-0.458
0.247
-3.173

Pr(>|t|)
<.001**
<.0001***

0.648
0.806
<.001**

Table 10c. Standard Multiple Regression on ATHB in terms of Q, RF, School, and RWA
Q+RF+School+RWA
Q
RF
ES
PS
WC
RWA
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

-0.309
0.628
0.404
-0.103
0.064
-0.624
0.605
0.309

0.141
0.106
0.205
0.155
0.167
0.624

t value

2.190
-5.914
-1.967
0.668
-0.381
0.624

Pr(>|t|)
<.01*
<.0001***

0.052
0.506
0.704
0.624

Table 10d. Standard Multiple Regression on ATHI in terms of Q, RF, School, and RWA
Q+RF+School+RWA
Q
RF
ES
PS
WC
RWA
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

-0.194
0.286
0.157
-0.062
-0.036
-0.433
0.404
0.194

0.097
0.073
0.141
0.106
0.115
0.433

t value

2.001
-3.928
-1.112
0.581
0.316
0.433

Pr(>|t|)
<.01*
<.0001***

0.269
0.563
0.753
0.433

ATHB and ATHI: The Impact of School and I
Finally, results of the preliminary analyses indicated there was a significant
positive relationship between I and ATHB and I and ATHI. In addition, students at the
progressive seminary and the evangelical seminary were more inclined to have high I
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scores than their undergraduate counterparts – a finding that is not surprising, considering
that these schools are both graduate-level seminaries which attract students very
interested in incorporating their religious values systems more globally into their lives.
However, the fact that I was correlated to more prejudicial attitudes was surprising,
particularly since PS and ES had no similarities across any of the other prejudice
measures.
A multiple regression was run to determine the role of school in the relationship
between I and ATHB and I and ATHI. When controlling for school, the relationship
between I and ATHB decreased, but remained significant. The relationship between ES
and ATHB strengthened (see Table 11a). These findings suggested that the evangelical
seminary accounted for a large portion of the variability in the relationship between I and
ATHB; but that in general, high I scores continued to predict increased ATHB scores,
even when controlling for school.
However, in terms of ATHI, when school was added into the regression, the
relationship between I and ATHI disappeared. These findings suggested that the
relationship between I and ATHI was mediated by school – when the high scores on
intrinsic religious orientation within the evangelical seminary were taken into account,
the relationship between intrinsic religious orientation and high ATHI scores
disappeared. See Table 11b).
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Table 11a. Standard Multiple Regression on ATHB in terms of I and School
I + School
I
ES
PS
WC
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

0.251
1.020
-0.311
0.334
0.502
0.482

0.077
0.196
0.180
0.184

t value

-3.277
-5.210
1.728
-1.815

Pr(>|t|)
<.001**
<.0001***

0.087
0.073

Table 11b. Standard Multiple Regression on ATHI in terms of I and School
I + School + RWA
I
ES
PS
WC
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

0.055
0.519
-0.132
0.097
0.308
0.280

0.050
0.129
0.119
0.121

t value

-1.096
-4.027
1.111
-0.802

Pr(>|t|)

0.276
<.0001***

0.269
0.425

ATW: The Impact of RWA, School, RF, and CO
In order to determine the role of RWA in the relationships between RF, CO and
ATW, the UU students were first removed from the WC sample. Next, a regression was
performed in order to determine whether gender should be included as a controlling
factor, in addition to school. Results indicated that both gender and school were strong
predictors of ATW. PS and WC students tended toward decreased scores on ATW, while
ES students and male students tended toward increased scores on ATW (see Table 12a).
RWA was then included in the regression, in addition to gender and school. When RWA
was accounted for, school and gender remained significant predictors of ATW, while
RWA also emerged as a significant predictor of ATW (see Table 12b). Finally, since RF
and CO were initially found to have significant positive correlations with ATW, they
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were each included in the model. When controlling for RWA, school, and gender, the
relationship between RF and ATW disappeared, along with the relationship between ES
and ATW (see Table 12c). Similarly, when controlling for RWA, school, and gender, the
relationship between CO and ATW disappeared, along with the relationship between ES
and ATW (see Table 12d).
In sum, results indicated that attendance at WC and PS predicted decreased scores
on ATW, while being male tended to predict increased scores on ATW. These results
suggested that PS, WC, RWA, and gender were the strongest predictors of ATW.
Students from PS and WC tended to be less prejudicial toward women then students from
ES or CC, even when accounting for RWA and gender. In addition, men tended to be
more prejudicial toward women, even when accounting for school and RWA.
Table 12a. Standard Multiple Regression on ATW in terms of Gender and School
Gender + School
ES
PS
WC
Gender – (Male)
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

0.148
-0.499
-0.237
0.250
0.439
0.416

0.088
0.088
0.093
0.070

t value

1.690
-5.672
-2.547
3.583

Pr(>|t|)
<.05+
<.0001***
<.01*
<.0001***

Table 12b. Standard Multiple Regression on ATW in terms of Gender, School, and RWA
Gender + School
ES
PS
WC
Gender – (Male)
RWA
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

0.165
-0.349
-0.273
0.255
0.244
0.536
0.512

0.080
0.087
0.085
0.064
0.054
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t value

2.049
-4.014
-3.194
3.994
4.532

Pr(>|t|)
<.01*
<.0001***
<.001**
<.0001***
<.0001***

Table 12c. Standard Multiple Regression on ATW in terms of RF, RWA, Gender and
School
RF + School + RWA
RF
ES
PS
WC
RWA
Gender (Male)
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

0.066
0.075
-0.355
-0.286
0.222
0.250
0.542
0.514

0.058
0.111
0.087
0.086
0.057
0.064

t value

1.151
0.677
-4.087
-3.326
3.891
3.921

Pr(>|t|)

0.253
0.500
<.0001***
<.001**
<.0001***
<.0001***

Table 12d. Standard Multiple Regression on ATW in terms of CO, RWA, Gender and
School
CO + School + RWA
CO
ES
PS
WC
RWA
Gender (Male)
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

0.028
0.140
-0.348
-0.270
0.239
0.255
0.538
0.509

0.045
0.090
0.087
0.086
0.055
0.064

t value

0.608
1.563
-3.995
-3.151
4.367
3.988

Pr(>|t|)

0.544
0.121
<.0001***
<.001**
<.0001***
<.0001***

ATR: The Impact of RWA, School, and RF
Results of the multiple regression suggested that in this study, RWA was the
strongest predictor of prejudicial attitudes toward race. Prior analyses suggested that RF,
PS and RWA were the only predictor variables with a significant relationship to ATR
(see Table 7). However, when controlling for RWA, the relationship between PS and
ATR disappeared (see Table 13a). When RF was added into the regression, its
relationship to ATR also disappeared (see Table 13b).
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Table 13a. Standard Multiple Regression on ATR in terms of RWA, and School
ATR +School + RWA
ES
PS
WC
RWA
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

0.078
-0.129
0.037
0.339
0.303
0.275

0.105
0.115
0.111
0.071

t value

0.743
-1.124
0.337
4.758

Pr(>|t|)

0.459
0.264
0.737
<.0001***

Table 13b. Standard Multiple Regression on ATR in terms of RF, RWA, and School
ATR+RF+School+RWA
RF
ES
PS
WC
RWA
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

-0.009
0.090
-0.128
0.039
0.342
0.303
0.268

0.077
0.147
0.116
0.113
0.076

t value

-0.117
0.613
-1.109
0.347
4.502

Pr(>|t|)

0.907
0.541
0.270
0.729
<.0001***

RCI
Since RCI did not correlate significantly with RWA, the religious orientation
variables, or the prejudice variables, it was not expected to account for the variability in
the relationships among them. A series of regression analyses were performed in order to
determine whether RCI had any influence on the outcome variables (ATHB, ATHI,
ATW, and ATR) when each of the predictor variables (RWA, RF, CO, Q, I, and school)
was included.
RCI was not a significant predictor of any of the outcome variables, except in
terms of the relationship between RF and ATHB, when also controlling for school and
RWA. When controlling for RCI, RWA, and RF, the relationship between school and
ATHB disappeared, and the adjusted R squared increased significantly. Results
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suggested that when RCI was added into the model, RF was still a strong predictor of
ATHB across the board, but that RCI was mediating the relationship between ES and
ATHB. In fact, contrary to the primary hypotheses of this study, results suggested that as
RCI scores increased, scores on ATHB increased (see Table 14).
However, as noted previously, there was a relationship between the RCI sub
question on alcoholism (RCIA) that was mediated by school. There may have been a
confounding issue with the way students from ES thought about alcoholism and how they
thought about homosexual behaviors that exaggerated the role of RCI in this analysis. In
other words, there may have been a correlation between RCIA and ATHB driving this
relationship that is not necessarily related to cognitive complexity. Therefore, it is
difficult to assess the value of this finding.
Table 14. Standard Multiple Regression on ATHB in terms of RCI, RF, RWA, and
school
ATHB+RCI+RF+RWA+school

RF
RWA
RCI
ES
PS
WC
r2
ar2

beta coefficient

Std. Error

0.638
0.171
0.189
0.416
-0.076
0.098
0.643
0.621

0.109
0.108
0.068
0.211
0.165
0.160

t value

Pr(>|t|)

-5.857 <.0001***
-1.588
0.116
-2.765 <.001***
-1.970
0.052
0.464
0.644
-0.614
0.540

Qualitative Analysis
Each participant was given the opportunity to answer two different open-ended
questions. The first question pertained to homosexuality: “How do you feel about
homosexual individuals and/or homosexual behaviors?” The second question pertained
to race: “How much discrimination against blacks do you feel there is in the United
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States today, limiting their chances to get ahead?” A sampling of the responses given by
each institutional subgroup will be provided.

Progressive Seminary - ATH
The progressive seminary student responses were generally unequivocally
supportive toward homosexual behaviors and individuals. Most of the supportive
responses from the progressive seminary subgroup suggested that the participant
considered homosexual and heterosexual categories to be arbitrary or that an individual
has no choice regarding his or her sexuality, whether sexual preference is determined
biologically or otherwise:

Sex is a gift and any variety of sexual behaviors is perfectly acceptable, laudable even, as
long as only consenting adults are involved. Consenting adults should be able to engage
in any sexual act that brings them pleasure.
I think the division of people into "heterosexual" and "homosexual" is problematic,
because there are as many expressions of sexuality as there are individuals. People need
to get over their desire to control other people and dictate the boundaries of "normal."
Well I am queer and I feel good about myself and my long-term relationship with my
partner! I think that same-sex attraction and behavior - when enacted within general
ethically-based behaviors - is a natural and healthy party of human sexuality.
I think it's great. I think people should be able to live the way they want to live, and be
loved, accepted, and embraced because of it. I think homosexuality is just as beautiful if
not more beautiful than heterosexuality.
There is no difference between homosexuals or heterosexuals.
I feel that homosexuality is biological. They should be given the same rights as
heterosexuals. I have just as much respect and love for homosexuals as I do
heterosexuals.
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I believe our sexuality is genetically based, and not a choice. I'm sad that homosexuals
have been treated so poorly, and I'm glad that public opinion is changing. I look forward
to the day when homosexuality will be as accepted as heterosexuality.
I think homosexuality is genetic and they should not be discriminated against. However, I
do admit to still gawking at men kissing because it’s so unusual. If same sex couples were
more "out" it would become normal and no one would pay attention.

Some of the supportive answers from progressive seminary subgroup were
justified from an empathic relational standpoint:
I think it is fine. I only feel bad for those who really want to have their own genetic
children with their partner. I think homosexual relationships were originally shunned
because of the lack of off spring and the emphasis faiths put on having kids.
Love whoever you love, man. If someone is crazy enough to love you back, you've struck
gold. Don't squander that.
While not my way, I respect and embrace my GLBT brothers and sisters.
I think we all have the right to decide on how we live our sexuality. I have a very good
friend who is homosexual and he had taught me a lot about life. They are normal people,
and like straight people there are "good" and "bad" people.

Two of the supportive answers from the progressive seminary subgroup
emphasized a political dimension:
It is unacceptable that the government is attempting to monitor who is allowed to get
married, hold certain jobs, or adopt children. It is no place of the government to attempt
to sanction certain types of love and deny other types. Our society needs to be radically
reformed to include views of alternate sexuality to be acceptable; the recent suicides as a
result of bullying are proof of this.
I believe homosexuals should have the same rights, privileges and responsibilities as
heterosexuals. Homosexual behaviors are just as romantic and intimate as the behaviors
of heterosexuals.

Two of the responses from the progressive seminary subgroup demonstrated an
equivocal or conflicted stance with regard to homosexuality:
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It is complex. I guess I think there is an anima/animus ideal of heterosexuality, but nor
do I think that homosexuality is a deviant behavior. It is what it is -- not right or wrong,
just a fact and a biological reality.
I am uncomfortable witnessing active homosexual sexuality, but I value the friendship of
a number of gay people and think some of them are quite wonderful. I admire all of them
for their courage in the face of pressures against being fully themselves.

Finally, two of the progressive seminary responses demonstrated a non-supportive
attitude toward homosexual behaviors. Interestingly, the non-supportive responses were
the only instances in which participants from the progressive seminary subgroup used
religious language:
The Bible is clear it is a sin. The culture in the United States is for making it acceptable
(a legitimate choice). I am for not denying homosexuals any civil right or opportunity free country.
I feel that such practices should be kept private and not be legalized. All individuals are
children of God, but my moral compass says their acts are wrong.

Progressive Seminary – ATR
The progressive seminary students generally provided sophisticated, nuanced
answers to the question on race, suggesting they had put a good deal of thought into the
topic prior to participation in this study. A majority of the responses explicitly referenced
structural discrimination and/or subtle forms of racism.
I believe that the legacy of systemic and institutional racism is so deeply engrained in the
fabric of this country that it is discrimination is operative at almost every level, even if
not overt.
I think the racism is primarily a systemic problem, not an individual problem. Individual
people with prejudices can't cause as much damage as an impersonal system that is built
on racism. In other words, discrimination isn't the problem; history and a shortage of
opportunity create circumstances in which discrimination takes place.
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The structures and systems within society inherently advantage the white culture. So if
overt racism has lessened, which I don't think it necessarily has, society as a whole is
made to promote white culture.
I believe discrimination is systemic and structural - it is significant.
I think we live in a societal system that systematically oppresses blacks on every social
level. So, I really don't think there is a whole lot of chance to get a head.
The entire basis of our economic situation, starting with slavery, has kept the African
American community steeped in limitations and poverty. While it's better than it was in
the 1700's or even in the 1960's, it's still got a long way to go.
I believe there is still a system of oppression which maintains the hierarchy of the
dominant class and keeps the other marginalized. Blacks, Latinos, Muslims and other
marginalized people are not given the same opportunities as Whites.
There is still substantial discrimination in the U.S. today. Some of it may be subtle or
indirect, but it still exists.
I believe that America is essentially a white supremacist society. Systemic and aversive
racism are a present reality for all persons of color. Everything from housing to
employment and significant relationships are under the constant surveillance of the white
supremacist culture we live in.

Many of the responses specified ongoing issues of overt forms of racism, but less
in tune with more subtle forms of racism:
It seems "we" (rich, educated, white, Americans) always have a race/religion/lifestyle
that we judge and hold back. It has been moving away from black people towards
homosexuals/people from the middle east/obese people.
It's more difficult for blacks to get jobs, and to be promoted in jobs. They can get into
colleges, they can get scholarships, but earning the equivalent of a white peer is still a
struggle for them.
While racism is definitely lessening, serious obstacles remain limiting people of color.
Discrimination definitely exists and affects persons of color psychologically in addition
to limiting jobs and opportunities for promotion.
There is significant racial discrimination against all dark skinned peoples in the US. It
may be getting better, but it is an everyday occurrence in their lives.
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I think it would be hard to talk about the USA as a country, there are states when things
are different than others, but just last year I saw a Chicago police officer give a ticket to
a black driver who happened to be parked in a prohibited way. There were two other
cars with white drives, and they did not get a ticket.

Four of the responses indicated a more equivocal or conflicted stance regarding
ongoing issues with discrimination:
I think discrimination still occurs in the South, but elsewhere it’s not as much of a
problem.
I don't think about this much but I would imagine that there is a lot of discrimination
against blacks although I don't do it myself.
A tremendous amount, especially in the South.
I don't feel that there is much discrimination against blacks today.

Evangelical Seminary - ATH
In response to the open-ended question regarding homosexuality, most of the
responses from the evangelical seminary participants reflected the “love the sinner, hate
the sin” approach:
I believe homosexual behaviors are a sin however I don't believe that the person is a bad
person or will not befriend them because of it.
I would experience some discomfort with being friends with someone who is homosexual,
however I would strive to see beyond the action and befriend the person. The tension
would come from how to love the person and hate the behavior. As far as the action, I
believe it is wrong and should not be accepted as normal.
I am working on being accepting toward homosexual individuals and appreciate them for
who they are as people. However, I believe that homosexual acts are wrong and
inappropriate and should not be condoned.
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I feel that homosexual individuals are made in the image of God and as such have dignity
and value. I feel that homosexual behaviors are contrary to His design for humanity and
displeasing to Him.
Love the sinner, hate the sin. I believe homosexual behaviors are wrong, however I try to
treat a homosexual individual no differently from a fellow Christian who struggles with
sinful decisions.
I have great empathy for homosexual individuals but I abhor the homosexual behaviors.
people ok. behaviors - just another sin.
I don't think someone's sexual identity defines them as a person, but I do think
homosexuality is wrong and I am against gay marriage. However, I don't hate
homosexuals and don't think it's "worse" than any other sin.
I do not choose homosexuality as a lifestyle for myself, but I think that if someone wants
to live that lifestyle, they will eventually answer for that to God, not me.
I don't think that we were created to live and relate to others in that way, but I also don't
condemn that particular area of sin as any worse than my own.
I feel that they are God's children. Their sin is on the outside therefore they get more
sever punishment from Christians. They deserve grace just like anyone else.

Three of the responses from the evangelical seminary subgroup reflected
delineation between a theological viewpoint and civil rights. These responses tended to
uphold homosexual behaviors as “sinful” but did not see that as a reason for civil
discrimination:
I feel that these individuals have gotten the short end of the stick and have been singled
out by the Christian church. Though I view what they are doing as sin, I have much sin in
my life that also needs to be vigorously addressed. I would not want anyone to limit my
rights based on the sin I have, nor should it happen to them. We are all equal. God will
view straight and gay equally on judgment day. In the end it will not matter, but will be
who loves the lord. That is what we should be focusing on. Who in this community loves
the Lord. God will do the transforming in his own time.
Homosexuals are treated unfairly by nearly all Christians. Christians have proven
throughout history that straight people can be wildly sexually immoral so I don't
understand the preoccupation with homosexuality as an "abomination". Also, hetero113

Christians have been really good at not being committed to their spouses in America, so I
don't get why they care if homosexuals get married when they are pretty shitty at it
themselves. (I'm making these statements as a white-protestant-married-male).
I believe it is absolutely wrong, a long with a lot of other rampant behavior exhibited by
straight people as well - which is why I don't believe it should infringe on their rights.

Finally, three students demonstrated conflicted or uncertain viewpoints:
Tough question. Viscerally very opposed, but cognitively more egalitarian. Feel that in
some cases may be the optimal orientation for an individual, but not in all.
I am undecided on the issue. I love my friends who are homosexual. I love them as whole
people. their sexual orientation is just part of it.
personally, a little uncomfortable principally, but I have no argument.

Evangelical Seminary – ATR
Most of the responses from the evangelical seminary subgroup indicated an
understanding that discrimination is an ongoing problem, particularly focusing on overt
forms of discrimination:
A little less than how it was in the 1960s... I really do not think it has changed or gotten
better.
I think there is still a lot of discrimination against blacks in the United States.
Sadly, I believe there is quite a bit of discrimination going on today.
I think most minorities are discriminated against in the US and sometimes it is in small
ways and in other ways it is in larger proportion.
I don't know how to quantify it but I would say there is still a considerable amount.
I think there is a lot more discrimination against blacks (and other minorities) than most
people realize or accept.
an incredible amount. racism is alive and rampant.
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It is much more pervasive than whites would like to admit. I think there is still an
interpersonal aspect to the discrimination that is socialized and learned in one's family of
origin.
They still make less, are in jail more, and get killed off in movies faster.

Seven of the responses indicated a more equivocal or conflicted stance regarding
ongoing issues with discrimination:
I feel that there is some discrimination, but much less that many make it out to be.
I do believe there is still some discrimination, even though sometimes people are
unaware of their own prejudices. Those discriminations make it somewhat more difficult
for minorities to get ahead, but do not limit their chances.
Still some, but worse is their own discrimination against themselves.
At least minimal generally, but more in such areas as the South.
Some, especially in certain parts of the country, but not as much as many claim that there
is.
Not as much as they think there is.
I haven't witnessed any, but I have heard examples from my black friends so I'm only
aware that it exists, but not qualified to give a quantified answer.

Five of the responses indicated a nuanced understanding of structural or subtle
forms of prejudice.
I think there is still some discrimination, but the main problem is lingering poverty from
times when discrimination was more common.
A significant amount, though in more subtle and insidious ways than before.
I feel that there are definite barriers to the societal advancement of African-Americans,
some historical and some cultural.
Much. The problem is that now a lot of it is unconscious and ingrained into our system
that it is hard to find it and address it properly. But it is completely unfair to ask these
people to succeed when the system is sometimes built against them.
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There is significant subtle racism that exists in "micro-aggressive" acts toward black
Americans, such as coaches showing favor to athletes for the assumption that because
they are black they will therefore be athletically gifted.

Catholic College - ATH
In response to the open-ended question regarding homosexuality, most of the
students from the Catholic college demonstrated unequivocal support for homosexuality
and its behavioral expressions:
I believe that homosexuality is not a choice, and that homosexuals should be free to
marry and make their own sexual decisions according to the law. They are just like
everyone else.
I think that they deserve equal rights in every aspect. Love is love no matter how one
may try to define it.
I love them.
They should have equal rights. No questions asked.
I support fully their ability to make their own decisions. If that is God's plan for them,
then I won't question it ever. I'm not uncomfortable with them either.
Why is that a question? They are like everyone else, but I prefer people of the same
gender romantically.
I am fine with homosexual individuals and homosexual behaviors, because it is not their
choice to be a homosexual and they are simply trying to live their lives.
I have no problem with homosexual individuals and behaviors. I am a very religious
person and believe that there is nothing wrong at all with homosexual individuals and
behaviors.
Deserve equality in every way. Shameful that it is still regarded as deviant.
Whatever floats your boat. I have no problem with it. They should not be forced to live a
lie.
I feel that anyone has the right to love whoever they choose and the issue of
homosexuality is much more complex than most people give it credit for.
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Two of the Catholic college students demonstrated conflicted viewpoints in their
responses:
I struggle a lot with this issue. I think all people are called to be chaste, whether heteroor homosexual. I think there is something that is wrong about homosexual behavior. It is
condemned in the Bible and it just does not seem natural. But I know many homosexual
couples in committed relationships and I somehow think that if they are loving toward
each other and committed to each other, that there has to be something right about their
love.
I am in the processing of coming to terms with my feelings on this issue. I have nothing
against homosexual individuals, some of my best friends identify as homosexuals. My gut
instinct also tells me that there is nothing wrong with homosexual behavior, though I am
having difficulty reconciling this with what my religion tells me is right. I am beginning
to think that my religion is wrong on their beliefs concerning homosexuality and leaning
towards my gut instinct.

Three of the Catholic college students expressed unsupportive or apathetic
attitudes toward homosexual behaviors:
I had a number of homosexuals who I was friends with. I don't approve of homosexuality
in general, but that does not make them bad people.
I accept homosexual individuals for who they are, but cannot stand seeing homosexual
behaviors in front of my eyes. I also do not support homosexual marriage.
I don’t care.

Catholic College – ATR
Eight of the responses from the Catholic college sample indicated an
understanding that discrimination is an ongoing problem:
Although discrimination against blacks in America is less, I think it does still exist. I
don't really know how to answer the question "how much", but I think that most black
adults have experienced discrimination in some form at least once in their lifetime.
I think it's a very complex cyclical issue, but I do believe there is discrimination against
blacks, particularly those from low-income households, that limit their chances to get
ahead.
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I think that there is a lot of discrimination against blacks, but the American public likes
to con itself into believing that it is peaceful.
I feel that it is still an issue today.
Definitely not as much as there used to be; I still feel that more of a focus should be put
on the root of the disadvantage: education.
There is less discrimination than decades ago, but discrimination is still present due to
lingering biases in society.
Blacks have had to deal with stereotypes for many centuries and I feel like it creates a
self-fulfilling prophesy in some ways. I think that a black child has a much more difficult
time then I had growing up because they are constantly dealing with stereotypes of the
past.
I think there is still a considerable amount of discrimination because people still perceive
blacks as lazy.

However, the majority of the responses from the Catholic college subgroup were
equivocal:
I feel that there is enough discrimination against blacks to limit a good amount of their
chances for getting ahead. I don't feel as though that it is a problem that has gone away
but I also think that some take advantage of it.
There is less discrimination than it was in the past, but definitely still some. However,
society is making progress because Blacks are more involved in public affairs now.
I feel there is not as much discrimination as in the past, but there is some stereotyping.
Not a lot where I live, maybe in other places of the country but I would not know about
that.
I believe that there is an internal bias that is related to blacks, but generally that it is a
result of their separate culture and mannerisms. However programs like affirmative
action compensate for any inherent bias.
There are a lot of discriminatory undertones, and this shouldn't limit their chances to get
ahead, but it might in some cases just based on the situation they are in and the people
involved.

118

I believe there is still some, but in the workplace, it is now very open and accommodating
to blacks, although some personal prejudices still exist.
There is still quite a bit, but I oppose things like Affirmative Action in college admissions,
the workplace, etc.
Coming from a region that is extremely lacking in diversity, I have typically been exposed
to the opposite discrimination, where black people tend to get promotions and
advantages before white people. However, from things that I hear from other regions, I
believe that there is still a lot of discrimination against the black population and
prejudice that keeps them from getting further ahead in life.
Some entrenched prejudices limit blacks, not necessarily legislation/systematic
discrimination.
Alot. and it's all self-created. They put it upon themselves.
I grew up with my best friend and neighbor both being black. I did not experience a lot
of discrimination with them.

Only one student addressed systematic discrimination explicitly:
I feel there is systemic discrimination against blacks, which limits their chances of getting
ahead. I think we have a long way to go before we rid the United States of such
discrimination.

Women’s College/Undergraduate University - ATH
In response to the open-ended question regarding homosexuality, the WC/UU
responses were pretty evenly divided between unequivocal support for homosexuality
and prejudicial attitudes toward homosexual behaviors. The following responses
demonstrated supportive responses toward homosexual individuals and behaviors:
I have no problem with them, I try not to let that be a factor in a friendship, and I support
gay marriage
It doesn't bother me. It is their life and homosexual individuals should be able live it in
the way they want.
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I really and truly do not care. It's never once made me uncomfortable, several friends of
mine are gay. They're humans first, friends second, sexual orientation last.
They are equals to others.
Accepting
Doesn't bother me.
I don't feel uncomfortable with homosexuals.

The following responses demonstrated equivocal or conflicted attitudes toward
homosexual behaviors:
I love the sinner NOT the sin!
I don't mind homosexual individuals. I am not comfortable with homosexual behaviors
because they are unfamiliar to me.
I don't think it's an established natural order.
One of my very closest friends is a homosexual. I can talk to him about anything,
including my opinion of homosexual behavior. I believe homosexual acts are wrong, but I
also believe to be kind and loving to everyone regardless of their beliefs. I can't ask
someone to be respectful of my beliefs if I can't be respectful of their beliefs.
As long as I am not seeing it, I am fine with whatever they do in privacy
I still struggle with this issue! There's a basic part of me that believes it is wrong. I also
believe that the accepting of gays has been crammed down our throats by an extremely
liberal (& slightly gay) media. I'm okay with most of their rights but it's still
uncomfortable for me to watch them kiss and I don't believe in them getting married, but
more because of clogged courts with divorces!!!! I do think they should be allowed to
adopt, teach, work, fight, etc. with everyone else. I guess I just don't quite know yet
where I stand. It's a struggle for me. My teenage kids are totally accepting and I tend to
think it's a generational thing....
Finally, three of the responses demonstrated apathetic viewpoints:
I don’t know I am not homosexual.
I am unconcerned.
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That's their own business. Whatever I say or do probably won't affect them in any regard.

Women’s College/Undergraduate University - ATR
Six responses from the WC/UU subgroup suggested an understanding that
discrimination is an ongoing problem for African Americans today:
It happens all the time.
It's hard to say how much but I do believe discrimination against blacks still occurs in
today's society.
I still think there is still discrimination not as much as before but there still is some.
On the forms regarding race, it still shows the black category instead of African
American.
I feel some discrimination still exists, but that it has improved in my life time. I think it
will still continue to improve as the next generations grow up.
While things are getting better, there are still some areas in the US where blacks are
getting discriminated against. I would say we are at about 85% of the way to equality.

The majority of the students gave equivocal answers or ones which denied
ongoing discrimination:

I don't think there is discrimination against blacks; because the blacks I know are not
facing discrimination.
It strongly depends on socialization & location
Not really sure, I would like to read more about that.
There will be discrimination no matter what race/ethnicity a person is. Some have it
easier than most, but most people get discriminated regardless of gender, race, ethnicity
or religious beliefs.
Overall I think that blacks have the same advantages as others. I believe that about all
races, although I'm fully aware some have more struggles. But fundamentally I believe
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that everyone can pull themselves up and do better. I know we all come from a different
place, but it's possible and I don't think being black is an excuse not to make yourself
better.
I don’t know it’s hard for me to answer this question since I am not African American.
I don't really know. I see it as a problem in the media, but I don't really ever see first
hand.
I feel there is very little discrimination. Blacks are often given more opportunities to
improve at universities with scholarships and so forth and in obtaining interviews so a
company can meet some quota that gives them an unfair advantage over white males.
still some, but not as much as 30-50 years ago.
A fair amount, really haven't heard much of either side though.
I think there is now reverse discrimination.

One student addressed issues related to subtle and/or structural discrimination:
I think conscious discrimination does occur, but not nearly to the level that it has in the
past. I would hesitate to say it exists more so than any other ethnicity, and if it did, it does
not by too large an amount. Discrimination is wrong in general, but no ethnicity and/or
race has monopolized it. I would note that there is still a fair amount of unconscious
discrimination (a child in a poor family has less opportunity than in a rich, an
uneducated less than an educated, and so on). I feel this is more due to history and
culture than conscious discrimination, as it affects every race and ethnicity; but
minorities tend to experience this worse.

Summary of Results
Overall, the results of this study were inconclusive with regard to the role of
cognitive complexity in the relationship between religious orientation and prejudice.
There simply was not enough range within the RCI data to determine whether it was a
factor. However, the results of this study did support previous research in terms of the
relationships between religious fundamentalism, Christian orthodoxy, quest and
prejudice. Indeed, as with other studies, a strong, positive relationship was found between
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religious fundamentalism and prejudice and a negative relationship was found between
quest and prejudice. In addition, a positive relationship was found between Christian
orthodoxy and prejudice. In a surprising twist, a positive relationship was also found
between intrinsic religious orientation and prejudice, while no relationship was found
between extrinsic religious orientation and prejudice.
While reflective judgment did not account for any of the variability in this study,
school did account for some of the variability. The relationship between Christian
orthodoxy and prejudice toward homosexual individuals disappeared when school was
accounted for. Participants in this study who identified with orthodox Christian beliefs
did not all address issues related to homosexuality in the same manner, and the
environment in which they were studying impacted their attitudes. Finally, it was
noteworthy that the qualitative responses from the undergraduate subgroups seemed to be
more prejudicial than the quantitative analysis indicated.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to explore whether cognitive complexity, as
operationalized by the Reflective Judgment Model (RJM), and measured by RCI, might
help to explain any of the variability in the relationships between religious orientation
and prejudice. While a relationship between cognitive complexity, religious orientation,
and prejudice has been theorized (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005), it had yet to be tested
using a standardized measure of cognitive complexity such as the Reflective Judgment
Model. This study tested empirically whether there would be significant relationships
between reflective judgment and religious orientations, reflective judgment and RWA,
and reflective judgment and prejudice, and whether reflective judgment would help to
explain the variability in the relationships between religious orientation and prejudice.
Overall, the results of this study were inconclusive with regard to the role of
reflective judgment in the relationship between religious orientation and prejudice.
However, results did support previous findings in the psychology of religion establishing
a significant positive relationship between religious fundamentalism and prejudice
toward a variety of subgroups. In addition, results of the current study supported
previous research indicating that Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) has a significant
positive relationship with prejudice – and in the case of the present study, particularly
racial prejudice. Results of the current study also supported previous findings suggesting
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a negative relationship between quest orientation and various forms of prejudice. Finally,
the inclusion of school as a predictor in the current study, helped to clarify the role of
educational environment in the relationship between Christian orthodoxy and prejudice,
particularly with regard to gay and lesbian individuals (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004,
2005; Veenvliet, 2009; Whitley, 2009; Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010).
The following chapter will present a discussion of the findings including the
following areas: 1.) RCI scores; 2.) the key findings from the quantitative analysis of the
study, including insights provided by the qualitative portion of the study; 3.) the findings
with regard to RWA, attitudes toward women and racial prejudices; 4.) implications for
future research; and 5.) limitations of the current study.

RCI Scores
Building on a large body of social psychology research indicating a strong
cognitive component in prejudice, this study sought to assess whether cognitive
complexity might be a predictor of prejudice, and also a predictor of religious orientation,
thereby explaining the variability in the relationship between religious orientation and
prejudice. In order to test this hypothesis, a wide-range of religious orientations and
reflective judgment levels was sought. Strategic sampling was used in order to recruit
participants from first and second year undergraduate students, as well as upper-level
undergraduate students. Participants were also recruited from graduate level programs –
both Master’s degree and doctoral level students. Finally, participants were recruited
from a non-sectarian institution, a Catholic institution, a conservative seminary, and a
progressive school of theology.
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RJM research suggests a strong correlation between reflective judgment and
education level. Longitudinal and cross-sectional research has shown that individuals
increase in reflective thinking with each year of formal education: high school students
are expected to demonstrate pre-reflective thinking (stages 2 and 3), while graduate
students often demonstrate optimal levels of reflective thinking (stages 6 and 7)
(Kitchener, 2002). While RCI scores tend to be higher, on average, than the RJI scores
used in much of this research, they tend to follow the same incremental pattern: as
education level increases, so do RCI scores. As such, the sample for this study –
comprised of 44 undergraduates ranging from first to fourth year, and 62 graduate
students including some doctoral level students – was expected to generate a wide range
of reflective judgment scores from stages 3 – 7.
However, no statistically significant differences were found among the
institutions sampled for this study on RCI score – a finding that was completely
unexpected. Indeed, there should have been a difference between the undergraduate and
graduate institutional subgroups in terms of RCI scores. In general, the undergraduate
sample in this study obtained higher RCI scores than expected. The WC group,
comprised mostly of non-traditionally aged female students, had an average RCI score of
5.13 – well above the average RCI score expected for undergraduate students in their first
years of college. The average RCI score for the Catholic college subgroup was 4.94, also
higher than expected for undergraduate students in their first years of college.
While the RCI scores did have a mild correlation with education level, that
relationship disappeared when controlling for age. The WC sample was obtained from a
non-traditionally aged population of female undergraduates. It seems that when the non126

traditionally aged WC students were accounted for, the relationship between RCI and
education level disappeared, indicating that age was a more important predictor of RCI
than education level was. It is possible that the greater breadth of life experiences of nontraditionally aged working women impacted their RCI scores, regardless of their
educational level. However, prior research on reflective judgment has indicated that nontraditionally aged undergraduate students do not have significantly higher scores than
their traditionally aged counterparts (Fischer & Pruyne, 2002); therefore, age difference
was not expected to make a difference in the scores obtained between the two
undergraduate subgroups.
The high percentage of female respondents should also be addressed. In general,
research suggests there is no significant difference in terms of gender with regard to
reflective judgment (King & Kitchener, 2002). If anything, females may score slightly
lower than their male counterparts, which would suggest that the female response bias
would have skewed the WC RCI averages lower than expected, not higher. In addition,
the female response bias was distributed throughout each of the institutional subgroups:
67.2% of the progressive seminary respondents were female; 78.6% of the evangelical
seminary respondents were female; 79.2% of the UU/WC respondents were female; and
57.8% of the Catholic college respondents were female. Therefore, it seems unlikely that
a female response bias contributed unduly to the higher than expected RCI average for
the WC subgroup.
The CC sample was obtained from a very competitive undergraduate institution
that admits students with only the highest SAT scores. Research has suggested a mild
correlation between reflective judgment and performance on standardized aptitude tests
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such as the SAT (King & Kitchener, 1994). Furthermore, the students recruited from
Catholic college were recruited from a selective leadership program within the school. It
is possible that the CC students sampled developed higher than average cognitive
complexity skills through taking advantage of a variety of educational and leadership
training opportunities.
All in all, the high RCI scores in the undergraduate population are a positive
finding for the educators at the two undergraduate institutions represented. In particular,
the average RCI score for the WC group was slightly higher than the average for the CC
group; and the WC group had a higher percentage of students in the stage 6 reflective
thinking category. One of the most effective uses of the RCI is to compare group
averages (King & Kitchener, 2002); and in this instance the non-traditionally aged
sample from WC performed very well in terms of cognitive complexity in comparison to
the traditionally-aged sample of Catholic college leadership students and to graduate
level seminarians. The majority of WC students sampled are already utilizing quasireflective thinking; and faculty would do well to recognize the aptitude for cognitive
complexity and help them progress into reflective thinking levels as they continue
through their undergraduate studies.
In terms of the graduate samples, in general, the students performed as expected
though more individual scores in the reflective thinking level were anticipated from each
of the graduate institutions. King & Kitchener (2002) found that entering graduate
students tend to fall into the Quasi-reflective level, while advanced graduate students
cluster between stages 5 and 6. In addition, research has indicated that students who
specialize in the social sciences and humanities tend to do better in terms of reflective
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thinking than those in science and math (Fischer & Pruyne, 2002). While a small
percentage of the graduate students did fall into the highest level of reflective thinking,
there were not as many students scoring in the reflective thinking (levels 6-7) range as
anticipated.
It is possible that the graduate schools sampled are not doing as well as they could
to help students move into advanced levels of reflective thinking. Indeed Dale (2005)
found that graduate students at a specific evangelical seminary did not improve in their
reflective thinking skills over the course of their seminary education. Dale (2005)
hypothesized that the epistemology of revealed knowledge emphasized at the evangelical
school she studied may have precluded students from advancing to the reflective thinking
level.8 A slightly higher percentage of the progressive seminary students were
categorized as reflective thinkers (18.5%) than the students at the evangelical seminary
used for this study (14.2%). However, in general results from the current study suggested
no significant differences between the RCI scores of students attending the progressive
seminary and those attending the evangelical seminary.
In sum, while encouraging for the undergraduate institutions involved, the fact
that this sample did not generate a wide range of RCI scores is unfortunate for the
analysis needed in the current study. The cluster of RCI scores in the Quasi-reflective
range precluded a meaningful analysis of the relationship between reflective judgment
and RWA or reflective judgment and prejudice. Furthermore, there was no significant
relationship between RCI and religious orientation – a finding that will be analyzed more
thoroughly in the sections on quantitative and qualitative analysis.
8

Reflective Thinking is characterized by a view of knowledge that takes into account its
constructed nature (King & Kitchener, 1994).
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Key Findings
In terms of its primary hypotheses, the results of this study were largely
inconclusive due to the limited range of RCI scores obtained. However, the results do
suggest that cognitive complexity may not play as big a role in predicting religious
orientation as hypothesized. In addition, this study provides some important insight into
the ongoing positive relationship between religious fundamentalism and prejudice, the
ambiguous relationship between Christian orthodoxy and prejudice, and the negative
relationship between quest orientation and prejudice. In particular, the results suggest that
educational institution may account for some of the variability in the relationship between
Christian orthodoxy and prejudice. Also, this study provides some insight into the nature
of the relationship between intrinsic religious orientation and prejudice, particularly
among graduate students studying religion and theology.
The discussion of the results will be presented in terms of four key findings.
Qualitative data will be used to aid in the interpretation of each of the key findings.

Key Finding #1: Reflective Judgment did not have a significant
relationship with religious orientation, prejudice, or RWA
The lack of a significant relationship between reflective judgment and religious
orientation, RWA, and prejudice was in direct conflict with the primary hypotheses of
this study. The following section will focus on the non-significant relationship between
RCI and religious orientation. Though the limited distribution of RCI scores makes this
finding somewhat inconclusive, this study suggests that reflective judgment may not
predict religious orientation as originally hypothesized.
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First, the results of the data analysis do not support the hypothesis of this study
that as reflective thinking scores increased, quest orientation scores would increase and
fundamentalism scores would decrease. The average score on religious fundamentalism
for students from the evangelical seminary was 3.16 (SD = 0.42), while the average score
on religious fundamentalism for students from the progressive seminary was 1.73 (SD =
0.55). In addition, the average score on quest for students from the progressive seminary
was 3.04 (SD = 0.35), while the average score on quest for students from the evangelical
seminary was 2.71 (SD = 0.37). Yet, the range and average RCI scores for each of these
schools were nearly identical. RCI was simply not a significant predictor of the religious
orientation utilized by these individuals.
Second, the results of this study undermined one of the key theoretical
underpinnings of the hypothesis regarding cognitive complexity: that quest and religious
fundamentalism represent opposite ends of a similar construct related to cognitive style
(as suggested by Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005).9 While there was a significant negative
correlation between religious fundamentalism and quest (r = -0.303, p < 0.001), the
relationship disappeared when controlling for school. Indeed, data from the evangelical
seminary sample suggested that an individual could have a high average score on
religious fundamentalism and a high average score on quest at the same time, providing
at least some evidence that the two religious orientations are not mutually exclusive. In
other words, this sample suggested that one individual could use a more “absolute”

9

Studies have found that religious fundamentalists tend to use less cognitive complexity to think
about existential issues (Hunsberger, Alisat, Pancer, & Pratt, 1995, 1996), whereas quest thinkers
are more likely to incorporate more sophisticated critical thinking skills to approach their
religious beliefs (McFarland & Warren, 1992).
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approach to religious truth claims AND still be open to doubt, uncertainty, and to
question certain aspects of religiosity.
Individuals high in religious fundamentalism tend to focus on concrete
foundational absolutes as their epistemological starting point (e.g. Question #1 from the
RF scale: “God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and
salvation, which must be totally followed”). The absolute of the truth claim precedes the
methodology for investigating it; and any method for ascertaining that truth is secondary
to the primacy of the truth itself. In fact, the point of religious truth claims, to many
religious individuals, is that they are taken on faith (e.g. Biblical references such as “We
walk by faith, not by sight,” 2 Corinthians 5:7 or “In the beginning was the Word, and the
Word was with God, and the Word was God,” John 1:1). Furthermore, religious truth
claims are often thought to come directly from God – knowledge is “revealed” from
above, not ascertained from below. For individuals high in religious fundamentalism,
this epistemology of revealed truth is the foundational starting point upon which
subsequent investigations are based, functioning as the contextual or subjective lens
through which all other data is subsequently filtered (Dale, 2005).10
At the same time, it seems quite possible that high RF individuals, particularly
those who are invested in examining their religious beliefs through higher education, find
themselves in a cognitive conundrum. Regardless the absolute nature of the original truth
claim or claims, there are simply many details of “God’s plan” that are not easily

10

This kind of thinking is congruent with stage 5 quasi-reflective thinking. Quasi-Reflective
thinkers tend to interpret evidence subjectively and contextually – in other words, a quasireflective thinker’s beliefs tend to precede the evidence used to justify those beliefs (King &
Kitchener, 2004).
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ascertained. Such individuals may believe in abstract absolutes such as heaven and hell,
good and evil, and being “for” or “against” God, but have very real questions about how
these abstract principles are applied in concrete realities. In other words, they may be
absolute about the fact that religious “fundamentals” exist, but very uncertain about how
those fundamentals play themselves out in every day life.
In sum, an in-depth look at the data from the evangelical seminary sample may
help explain why there was no significant relationship between reflective judgment and
religious orientation. The data suggests that religious fundamentalism and quest are not
necessarily mutually exclusive orientations, and may be operative simultaneously in one
individual. This does not mean that these religious orientations aren’t linked to a
cognitive style; however it does suggest that individuals are more complex regarding
their cognitive approach to religious viewpoints than originally hypothesized. Indeed, it
seems likely, based on this evidence, that a religious thinker could have a variety of
approaches to his or her religious viewpoints, including the ability to access different
orientations at the same time.

Key Finding #2: School accounts for some of the variability in the relationship
between Christian orthodoxy and prejudice toward homosexuality
This study suggested that there is a relationship between Christian orthodoxy and
prejudice, but contributes new evidence that institution may be a mediating factor. The
Christian orthodoxy score (M = 3.23, SD = 0.76) was the highest average of any of the
religious orientation scores in the sample as a whole, and was the highest religious
orientation score for each of the institutional subgroups except the progressive seminary,
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where the quest average was just slightly higher. While Christian orthodoxy did have a
significant positive relationship to prejudicial attitudes, when school was controlled for,
the relationship between Christian orthodoxy and prejudicial attitudes toward
homosexual individuals disappeared. Indeed, the evangelical seminary seemed to
account for much of the variability in the relationship between Christian orthodoxy and
prejudicial attitudes toward homosexual individuals.
The lack of prejudicial attitudes toward homosexuality in the CC subgroup was
particularly noteworthy, considering it had a higher average score on Christian orthodoxy
(M = 3.04, SD = 0.74) than either the progressive seminary (M = 2.91, SD = 0.78) or WC
(M = 2.99, SD = 0.74). The qualitative responses from the CC subgroup regarding
homosexuality were almost universally accepting and supportive. In addition, several
responses were from individuals who identified as gay and lesbian themselves. The
quantitative and qualitative data from this subgroup suggested a very pervasive “ethos” of
support for and acceptance of homosexual individuals and behaviors – as if they were not
even sure why the question was being asked. CC had the youngest average age in the
sample by far. One interpretation of this finding is that there is a generational difference
in how older students who subscribe to orthodox Christian beliefs approach homosexual
behaviors as compared to their younger counterparts. Simply put, younger students may
just be more sensitized.
In addition, schools such as CC, WC and the progressive seminary promote
accepting attitudes toward gay and lesbian individuals within the larger educational
context. Indeed, the qualitative data suggested that personal relationships with
homosexual individuals may have had a significant impact on students from these schools
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who struggled with prejudicial attitudes toward homosexual individuals for religious
reasons. Students from CC and WC wrote:
I struggle a lot with this issue. I think all people are called to be chaste,
whether hetero- or homosexual. I think there is something that is wrong
about homosexual behavior. It is condemned in the Bible and it just does
not seem natural. But I know many homosexual couples in committed
relationships and I somehow think that if they are loving toward each
other and committed to each other, that there has to be something right
about their love.
I am in the processing of coming to terms with my feelings on this issue. I
have nothing against homosexual individuals, some of my best friends
identify as homosexuals. My gut instinct also tells me that there is nothing
wrong with homosexual behavior, though I am having difficulty
reconciling this with what my religion tells me is right. I am beginning to
think that my religion is wrong on their beliefs concerning homosexuality
and leaning towards my gut instinct.
I am uncomfortable witnessing active homosexual sexuality, but I value
the friendship of a number of gay people and think some of them are quite
wonderful. I admire all of them for their courage in the face of pressures
against being fully themselves.
I am undecided on the issue. I love my friends who are homosexual. I love
them as whole people. Their sexual orientation is just part of it.
Each of these responses indicated that proximity to homosexual friends or homosexual
relationships had challenged thinking on homosexuality. If these individuals were at
institutions wherein proximity to homosexual individuals was unlikely, and acceptance of
homosexuality was not encouraged, their viewpoints might not be challenged.
Conversely, at schools like the evangelical seminary, where gay and lesbian
individuals are less likely to attend, students are struggling with the issue of
homosexuality in the abstract, theoretical realm. Indeed, the qualitative responses from
these students were almost entirely void of references to personal relationships with
homosexual individuals. The answers included nuanced theological viewpoints, but few
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references to personal experiences. In fact, two of the statements referenced discomfort
with engaging in friendships or relationships with homosexual individuals:
I would experience some discomfort with being friends with someone who
is homosexual, however I would strive to see beyond the action and
befriend the person. The tension would come from how to love the person
and hate the behavior. As far as the action, I believe it is wrong and should
not be accepted as normal.
I am working on being accepting toward homosexual individuals and
appreciate them for who they are as people. However, I believe that
homosexual acts are wrong and inappropriate and should not be condoned.
It seems likely that the lack of proximity to gay and lesbian individuals might preclude
theoretical ideals from being challenged by real life encounters and experiences.
Finally, it is possible that orthodox Christian individuals simply choose
institutions which reflect their pre-existing values and attitudes. In other words, orthodox
Christians who hold strong convictions regarding the morality or immorality of
homosexual lifestyles may simply choose to attend institutions which clearly reflect their
values.
In sum, school seems to play a role in mediating the relationship between
Christian orthodoxy and prejudicial attitudes toward homosexual individuals. Qualitative
data suggested that schools which foster proximity to and friendships with gay and
lesbian individuals may have helped to challenge theoretical biases against homosexual
individuals in those students who held orthodox Christian viewpoints. On the other hand,
those schools that do not foster such proximity may keep conversations about
homosexuality at a theoretical, abstract level. Finally, it is uncertain to what degree
orthodox Christian individuals simply choose schools that reinforce their pre-existing
values.
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Key Finding #3: Results provided evidence for the impact of a
“love the sinner hate the sin” approach to homosexuality
Results suggested that students at the evangelical seminary were not any more
prejudiced toward homosexual individuals, when controlling for RWA and religious
fundamentalism, than students at the other schools, while they continued to be more
prejudiced toward homosexual behaviors. Indeed, the differing averages within the
evangelical seminary sample on the question regarding homosexual behaviors (M = 3.12,
SD = 0.54) and those regarding individuals (M =1.98, SD = 0.48) suggested that students
distinguished between behaviors and individuals.
Overwhelming evidence from the qualitative data suggested that these students
were heavily influenced by a “love the sinner, hate the sin” approach to homosexuality
(Veenvliet, 2009). In fact, the majority of the qualitative responses to the question on
homosexuality from the evangelical seminary subgroup referenced a “love the sinner,
hate the sin” approach explicitly:
I believe homosexual behaviors are a sin however I don't believe that the
person is a bad person or will not befriend them because of it.
I feel that homosexual individuals are made in the image of God and as
such have dignity and value. I feel that homosexual behaviors are
contrary to His design for humanity and displeasing to Him.
Love the sinner, hate the sin. I believe homosexual behaviors are wrong,
however I try to treat a homosexual individual no differently from a fellow
Christian who struggles with sinful decisions.
I have great empathy for homosexual individuals but I abhor the
homosexual behaviors.
People ok. behaviors - just another sin.
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Study participants were able to distinguish between support for homosexual individuals
(in terms of civil rights, support, friendship, etc.) and condemnation of homosexual
behaviors.
Furthermore, the evangelical seminary students who volunteered for this study
were all enrolled in the counseling program. Counselors, regardless of whether they are
religious or not, are intensively trained to approach individuals with positive regard, even
when individual behaviors are considered problematic. The students sampled from
evangelical seminary represented a group of highly orthodox Christians training in
psychotherapy – counselors who may approach foundational beliefs with fundamentalist
tendencies, but who are simultaneously trained to help individuals with unconditional
regard. In fact, the unique qualities required to be a counselor, particularly in a very
conservative religious setting, may well explain the high RF/high Q constellation found
in many of these participants in the evangelical seminary subgroup.11
In sum, results of this study are consistent with more recent findings suggesting
that the “love the sinner hate the sin” approach to homosexuality does have at least some
impact on how students view homosexual individuals (Veenvliet, 2009; Whitley, 2009).
Such students were able to support civil rights for gay and lesbian individuals in terms of
marriage and discriminatory practices in the work place, even when they believed
homosexual behaviors to be sinful. This finding is consistent with social psychology
research suggesting that an effective way to reduce prejudice is to maintain the in-group
identification (e.g. evangelical students do not tend to support homosexual lifestyles),
while helping individuals to increase the complexity with which they understand a
11

It would be interesting to see if students enrolled in Biblical studies or theology programs
would have had a similar high RF/high Q constellation.
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perceived out-group (e.g. separate “sin” from “sinner,” thereby creating a larger in-group
of “sinners” of which everyone is a part) (Brewer, 1999; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005).

Key Finding #4: There was a significant correlation
between intrinsically oriented individuals and prejudice
Originally, Allport theorized that individuals who were intrinsically motivated to
be religious would be less prejudiced than those who were motivated extrinsically
(Allport & Ross, 1967). He suggested that intrinsically oriented individuals would be
more likely to internalize religious messages of love, respect, and concern for others. On
the other hand, he suggested that individuals who were religious for extrinsic reasons –
perhaps for potential social benefits – would be less inclined to internalize religious
themes of love and good will, and would thereby be more prejudiced. Initially Allport’s
theory was supported and intrinsically religious people were found to be less prejudiced.
However, more recently, a more positive relationship between intrinsic religious
orientation and prejudice has been found as more subtle measures of prejudice have been
developed (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005).
Indeed, the current study provides support for the recent trend in research on
intrinsic religious orientation -- a significant, positive relationship was found between
intrinsically oriented individuals and prejudice toward homosexuality, while no
significant relationship was found between extrinsically oriented individuals and
prejudice of any kind. Perhaps not surprisingly, there was a correlation between
education level and intrinsic religious orientation in the overall sample. Presumably
students who voluntarily enroll in graduate-level religious and theological studies would
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take their religious beliefs seriously and would be more likely to internalize religious
themes and ideals, incorporating them into everyday life.
When controlling for school and RWA, the relationship between intrinsically
oriented individuals and prejudicial attitudes toward homosexual behaviors decreased,
and the relationship between intrinsically oriented individuals and prejudicial attitudes
toward homosexual individuals disappeared. The evangelical seminary accounted for
much of the variability in these relationships, indicated that students high in intrinsic
religious orientation at the evangelical seminary were accounting for a large portion of
the prejudicial responses.
Qualitative responses from the evangelical seminary students to the open-ended
question on homosexuality shed further light on how an intrinsically oriented individual
might still retain prejudicial attitudes. Several responses reflected nuanced views that
took into account an understanding of unconditional love and also reflected aspects of the
theology of imago Dei12:
I feel that they are God's children. Their sin is on the outside therefore
they get more severe punishment from Christians. They deserve grace just
like anyone else.
I feel that homosexual individuals are made in the image of God and as
such have dignity and value. I feel that homosexual behaviors are
contrary to His design for humanity and displeasing to Him.
I am undecided on the issue. I love my friends who are homosexual. I love
them as whole people. their sexual orientation is just part of it.
I feel that these individuals have gotten the short end of the stick and have
been singled out by the Christian church. Though I view what they are
doing as sin, I have much sin in my life that also needs to be vigorously
12

Larry Graham (1997) states that “the imago Dei is to reflect God’s intention for humanity; it is
to be whole, or in the process of becoming whole, rather than to be fundamentally flawed.” (p.
147).
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addressed. I would not want anyone to limit my rights based on the sin I
have, nor should it happen to them. We are all equal. God will view
straight and gay equally on judgment day. In the end it will not matter, but
will be who loves the lord. That is what we should be focusing on. Who in
this community loves the Lord. God will do the transforming in his own
time.

Each of these responses demonstrates an internalized theological ideal that individuals
have inherent worth because they are children of God or equal before God. The ability to
regard individual worth regardless of individual behavior seems to be congruent with
many religious teachings. While the attitudes toward homosexual behaviors were still
prejudicial, the qualitative responses suggested that that a designation of “prejudiced” is
not as unilateral or one-dimensional as the quantitative results would suggest.

RWA and prejudice
Prior research has suggested a consistently significant positive relationship
between RWA and many forms of prejudice, as well as RWA and religious
fundamentalism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005). Indeed, prior research has suggested
that RWA accounts for much of the variability between religious orientation and
prejudice. Results from the current study supported prior research in that there was a
significant relationship between RWA and religious fundamentalism and also with each
of the prejudice measures. However, when controlling for school and religious
orientation, the role of RWA was muted, except with regard to racism. In most cases, the
role of school and religious orientation remained strong predictors, or even strengthened
as predictors of prejudice, even when accounting for RWA.
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The limited impact of RWA in this study is noteworthy. First, the mean for RWA
in the sample was low (M = 2.07, SD = 0.46). In contrast, the mean for RF in the sample
was low, but yielded a wider range of scores (M = 2.22, SD = 0.79). Religious
fundamentalism tended to be a stronger predictor of prejudice in this study than RWA. It
simply may be that the range of the RWA data was too limited to enable a meaningful
analysis.
In fact, a closer look at the qualitative data suggested a more complex picture than
what was assessed quantitatively. Both of the undergraduate institutions had RWA scores
comparable to the evangelical seminary, yet only the evangelical seminary tended to have
consistently significant positive relationships to prejudice toward homosexuality when
controlling for RWA. Yet, several of the qualitative responses in the undergraduate sub
samples used language very consistent with Right-Wing Authoritarian attitudes to justify
subtle forms of prejudice not detected by the quantitative scales:
I don't mind homosexual individuals. I am not comfortable with
homosexual behaviors because they are unfamiliar to me.
I don't think it's an established natural order.
As long as I am not seeing it, I am fine with whatever they do in privacy
I still struggle with this issue! There's a basic part of me that believes it is
wrong. I also believe that the accepting of gays has been crammed down
our throats by an extremely liberal (& slightly gay) media. I'm okay with
most of their rights but it's still uncomfortable for me to watch them kiss
and I don't believe in them getting married, but more because of clogged
courts with divorces!!!! I do think they should be allowed to adopt, teach,
work, fight, etc. with everyone else. I guess I just don't quite know yet
where I stand. It's a struggle for me. My teenage kids are totally
accepting and I tend to think it's a generational thing....
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The first statement is characterized by fear of the unknown; the second statement is
characterized by an understanding of a “natural” or conventional order; the third
statement is characterized by a desire to keep unwanted or uncomfortable behaviors
private; and the fourth statement addresses a perceived liberal agenda. These kinds of
approaches to social issues are strongly reminiscent of Right-Wing Authoritarian
attitudes, and indeed manifest subtle forms of prejudice. Yet, in the quantitative analysis,
students from these schools tended to have lower prejudice scores.
It may be that the low averages on prejudice toward homosexuality in the
undergraduate samples – even in the presence of increased RWA – had to do with
targeted educational efforts. At many schools such as the undergraduate schools used in
this study, students are being taught differently about homosexuality from the start. In
fact, many of the WC students sampled were taking a class on prejudice and
discrimination; and the CC students sampled were required to complete intensive training
on topics of discrimination, including those related to gay and lesbian individuals. While
these students may have latent “automatic” prejudicial biases, including RWA
tendencies, they were perhaps more adept at inhibiting their biases -- when given
contrasting options -- as a result of the targeted education they have received than those
students at the evangelical seminary (Devine, 1989, 2005).
As a final note, it would be interesting to investigate the level at which targeted
educational efforts impact motivation to reduce prejudice. The qualitative data from this
study would suggest that the undergraduate students were not necessarily less prejudiced
than those at the evangelical seminary, but were perhaps more adept at inhibiting latent or
subconscious prejudicial responses. Plant and Devine (1998) developed a scale to
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distinguish between internal motivations for inhibiting prejudice, and external
motivations for inhibiting prejudice. Recent studies have suggested that internally
motivated individuals carry out their non-prejudicial values in much different ways than
externally motivated individuals (Plant & Devine, 2008, 2009). A follow-up study to
determine the motivations of study participants might help to shed light on the
discrepancy between the quantitative and qualitative response sets in the undergraduate
samples.

Attitudes Toward Women and Attitudes Toward Racism Scales
The average scores on the scales used to assess attitudes toward women (M =
1.66, SD = 0.41) and attitudes toward race (M = 1.71, SD = 0.45) were extremely low in
this sample. As a result, any conclusions about relative levels of prejudice will be
interpreted with caution. Instead, a critique of the scales used will be offered.
In terms of attitudes toward women, religious orientation was not a significant
predictor of attitudes toward women when controlling for school. The students sampled
from WC and the PS tended to be less prejudiced toward women than the students
sampled from CC and ES. Gender played a large role in mediating this relationship,
particularly with regard to the WC sample, which was comprised exclusively of women.
However, with such a low average and range of scores, it does not seem warranted to
draw meaningful conclusions about the relative levels of prejudice toward women from
students in the CC (M = 1.83, SD = 0.4) and ES (M = 1.94, SD = 0.33) sub samples. In
general, the scores indicated a relatively low amount of prejudice toward women across
the board.
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This could be interpreted as wonderful news! However, it is likely that the
Attitudes Toward Women scale used was simply not sophisticated enough to detect
subtle forms prejudice. The best evidence for this assessment came from an impromptu
interview with one of the students who completed the survey. This undergraduate student
saw me in the hallway while I was giving classroom presentations and approached me to
talk about the survey. He mentioned that the questions about gender were “way old
fashioned.” I asked the student whether he thought there were still prejudicial attitudes
toward women among his fellow students. His unequivocal answer was “yes!” He then
said, “guys have no problem with the fact that women are smart and career-oriented –
that’s way old-fashioned…but they still see them as bitches and hoes and that is as
present as it ever was!” In other words, it is most likely that the scale used in this study
simply did not have the nuance to capture subtle attitudes of prejudice toward women that
emerge in much different ways on college campuses today than they did decades ago.
With regard to attitudes toward race, RWA was the most prominent predictor of
prejudicial attitudes. When accounting for RWA, the relationship between religious
fundamentalism and prejudicial attitudes toward race disappeared, as well as the
relationship between the progressive seminary and non-prejudicial attitudes toward race.
In terms of the qualitative data, the answers to the open-ended question on race from the
progressive seminary sample were extremely nuanced and showed evidence of deeply
thought out beliefs about structural discrimination not present in the other samples.
These answers supported the quantitative finding that students from the progressive
seminary were significantly different from students at the other institutions in their ability
to articulate non-prejudicial attitudes toward race.
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In contrast, many of the answers, particularly from the undergraduate samples,
indicated very little understanding of the nuances of subtle forms of racism:
I feel there is very little discrimination. Blacks are often given more
opportunities to improve at universities with scholarships and so forth and
in obtaining interviews so a company can meet some quota that gives them
an unfair advantage over white males.
Overall I think that blacks have the same advantages as others. I believe
that about all races, although I'm fully aware some have more struggles.
But fundamentally I believe that everyone can pull themselves up and do
better. I know we all come from a different place, but it's possible and I
don't think being black is an excuse not to make yourself better.
I don't think there is discrimination against blacks; because the blacks I
know are not facing discrimination.
I think discrimination still occurs in the South, but elsewhere it’s not as
much of a problem.

Several of these responses meet at least two of the criteria for subtle or symbolic racism
as explained by Tarman & Sears (2005, p. 733): “1.) racial discrimination is no longer a
serious obstacle to blacks’ prospects for a good life, so that 2.) blacks’ continuing
disadvantages are largely due to their unwillingness to work hard enough.” Thus, even
though the overall average scores on the racism scale were low, qualitative data
suggested there was still a considerable amount of subtle racism, particularly in the
undergraduate samples.
The scale used to assess racism may explain the disparity between the quantitative
and qualitative results. The scale used combined questions from the Symbolic Racism
Scale 2000 (Henry & Sears, 2002) -- used primarily to assess subtle racism -- and the
Manitoba prejudice scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) – used primarily to assess
overt forms of racism. It is possible that the modified scale simply did not pick up on
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more nuanced prejudicial views held by study participants. Perhaps some participants
simply knew how to check the right box in terms of discriminatory comments, but when
offered a chance to speak freely revealed more of the subtle prejudicial attitudes
identified by social psychologist researchers such as Henry & Sears (2002), Dovidio &
Gaertner, (2009), and Tarman & Sears (2005).
In fact, the results of this study suggest that the current trend toward assessing
implicit prejudice – e.g. Farnham’s (1998) Implicit Association Test (IAT) – may be
increasingly important. While explicit measures, such as the one used in this study, ask
individuals directly about their attitudes and beliefs, measures of “implicit” prejudice
attempt to tap into attitudes which may be at work indirectly and even outside of
conscious awareness (Gawronski, et al., 2005). The priming tactics used in implicit
testing may have helped to pick up on the more nuanced forms of prejudice that were
evident in the qualitative responses of the study participants, but not reflected in the
quantitative averages.

Limitations
One limitation of this study was the sampling method. 119 students started the
study, and 15 of those students dropped out without completing the entire study. It is
possible that the length of the study, and the fact that it was divided into two parts,
discouraged some students from completing the full study. Indeed, the majority of the
study participants who did not complete the survey were from the UU subgroup, an
important group to the study in terms of obtaining a wider range of reflective judgment
scores. Future studies would need to obtain a larger, more diverse sample from each of
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the institutions in order to ensure a greater distribution across reflective judgment levels.
Finally, the small sample size precluded analysis of more subtle distinctions on each of
the relationships assessed.
Furthermore, recruitment efforts may have led to sampling bias. Students were
originally targeted to obtain a wide range of students from the undergraduate university –
from first year undergraduates to upper level graduate students. However, very few of
the UU undergraduates (except the WC students) followed through with completing the
survey. Of the 66 UU undergraduate students who agreed to participate, only 7 followed
through (9.5%). In contrast, close to 30% of the WC and Catholic college students who
agreed to participate in the study followed through. It may be that recruitment efforts
were biased toward the CC and WC subgroups. For example, the WC group was
recruited from a class on research methodology for which students were designing their
own studies – these students had strong incentive to participate. Other WC students were
recruited from a class on race and society – a topic which dovetailed nicely with some of
the topics touched on in this study. Finally, the CC students were given some class time
to begin the study, providing greater incentive to finish it to completion. As a result,
sampling bias may have impacted the final results – evoking a sample already biased in
terms in many of the study variables.
Another limitation of the study was the scales used. First, a shortened version of
the RWA scale – consisting of only three questions – was used in order to reduce the time
required to take the already lengthy survey. It is possible that using such a modified
version of the scale precluded more nuanced findings regarding the presence of RightWing Authoritarian tendencies at the fours institutions. Second, score averages on the
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Racism scale and the Attitudes Toward Women scale were extremely low with limited
range. While it would be exciting to conclude that prejudice toward women and race
simply did not exist in these samples, that is unlikely. Instead, it seems likely that more
nuanced assessments of subtle or implicit prejudice were needed. Finally, the RCI scale
was also problematic in terms of its construct validity. It is a relatively new scale, and
much less researched than the RJI. The RCI includes statement recognition tasks in
order to assess cognitive complexity, rather than statement production. It seems likely
that participants could detect the “right” answer on the RCI scale, without necessarily
utilizing cognitive complexity.
Finally, the results of this study would be difficult to generalize. The schools
chosen represent very unique institutions with very unique institutional characteristics.
Further, the samples from each of the schools represent even more unique sub-sets of
students from within each those institutions – for example, from the evangelical seminary
the sample was taken entirely from students enrolled in the counseling program and the
Catholic college sample was taken entirely from students selected to participate in an
exclusive leadership program. It would be extremely difficult to generalize the findings
of the sample as a whole or any of the individual sub samples beyond the confines of the
institutions in this study.
Implications for Future Research
While no significant relationship was found between reflective judgment and
religious orientation, RWA, or prejudice, there was an interesting finding in terms of the
impact of school on religious orientation and prejudice. While each of the schools had a
high percentage of participants high in Christian orthodoxy, only one of the schools had a
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high percentage of students high in prejudice toward homosexuality. Future research is
needed to focus on the ways in which educational environment may impact religiously
orthodox individuals and their views toward homosexual individuals. Specifically,
further evidence is needed to determine the role of proximity to homosexual individuals
and its impact on prejudicial belief systems.
Secondly, more research is needed to assess whether reflective judgment has an
impact on religious orientation or prejudice. The results of this study suggest that it does
not; however, a larger study with a more diverse range of reflective judgment scores is
needed in order to be more conclusive. The unusually high RCI scores from the two
undergraduate institutions, combined with the slightly lower than anticipated RCI scores
from the graduate level institutions suggest that the data obtained from this study is not
reflective of the larger population of undergraduate and graduate students. Further
research utilizing a more evenly distributed sample of RCI scores may reveal different
results. In addition, different tools for assessing cognitive complexity should be
considered.
Finally, a more in-depth look is needed in order to determine whether quest and
religious fundamentalism are measuring opposite ends of a similar construct. Indeed, the
possibility that an individual can simultaneously access both fundamentalist and quest
tendencies with regard to religious belief systems suggests that religious individuals are
more complex than initially thought. Future research would do well to focus on high RF/
high quest individuals in order to determine the ways in which these two orientations
work together, and how that constellation may be targeted in order to understand the
complexity of prejudicial belief systems.
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Appendix A.
STAGES OF REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT
Pre-Reflective Thinking - Stage 1
Belief System:
•
A concrete, single-category belief system.
•
No separation of the self from what is true or known.
View of Knowledge:
•
Knowledge assumed to exist absolutely and concretely; not understood as
an abstraction
•
Knowledge obtained with certainty by direct observation.
Concept of Justification:
•
Beliefs need no justification because belief corresponds absolutely to truth.
•
No differentiation between individual belief and what authorities say is true.
Pre-Reflective Thinking - Stage 2
Belief System:
•
Believes that there is a true reality that can be known with certainty but is
not known by everyone.
•
One’s own view and the views of “good” authorities are seen as right, while
others’ views are seen as wrong, ignorant, misled, uninformed, maliciously
motivated, and so on.
•
Some separation of the self from what is true or known.
•
Beliefs differentiated into right beliefs and wrong beliefs.
View of Knowledge:
•
Knowledge is assumed to be absolutely certain or certain but not
immediately available.
•
Knowledge comes directly through the senses (as in direct observation) or
via authority figures.
Concept of Justification:
•
Beliefs are either unexamined and unjustified, or justified by their
correspondence with the beliefs of an authority figure.
•
Most issues are assumed to have a right answer; differences between views
can be resolved simply.
Pre-Reflective Thinking - Stage 3
Belief System:
•
Believes that in some areas even authorities may not currently have the
truth.
•
The understanding of truth, knowledge, and evidence remains concrete and
situation bound.
View of Knowledge:
•
Knowledge is assumed to be absolutely certain or temporarily uncertain.
•
In areas of temporary uncertainty, only personal beliefs can be known until
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absolute knowledge is obtained.
•
In areas of absolute certainty, knowledge is obtained from authorities.
Concept of Justification:
•
In areas in which certain answers do not exist, defends beliefs as personal
opinion because the link between evidence and beliefs is unclear.
Quasi-Reflective Thinking - Stage 4
Belief System:
•
Believes that one cannot know with certainty.
•
Emergence of knowledge understood as involving abstraction, not limited to
concrete instances.
•
Begins to understand the need to relate evidence to belief and distinguish
beliefs from evidence for those beliefs.
View of Knowledge:
•
Knowledge is uncertain.
•
Knowledge claims are idiosyncratic to the individual since situational
variables dictate that knowing always involves an element of ambiguity.
Concept of Justification:
•
Beliefs are justified by giving reasons and using evidence, but the
arguments and choice of evidence are idiosyncratic.
•
Does not acknowledge qualitative differences between experts' opinions and
thinker's own opinions or between different experts’ opinions.
Quasi-Reflective Thinking - Stage 5
Belief System:
•
Believes that while people may not know directly or with certainty, they
may know within a context based on subjective interpretations of evidence
(relativism).
•
Able to differentiate and integrate knowing and justification, unconsidered
claims and considered evaluation, and opinions of authorities and opinions
of self.
•
Unable to weigh evidence for competing views beyond the perspective each
allows or to otherwise integrate perspectives (claims in physics v. claims in
sociology).
View of Knowledge:
•
Knowledge is contextual and subjective because it is filtered through a
person’s perceptions and criteria for judgment.
•
Only interpretations of evidence, events, or issues may be known.
•
May prefer offering balanced views of differing perspectives and avoid
choosing one as better or right.
Concept of Justification:
•
Beliefs are justified within a particular context by the rules of inquiry for
that context and by context-specific interpretations of evidence.
•
Acceptance of knowledge as contextual leads to identifying ways of
knowing that allow for interpretations.
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Reflective Thinking - Stage 6
Belief System:
•
Believes that knowing is a process that requires action on the part of the
knower.
•
Initial recognition that ill- structured problems require solutions that must be
constructed.
•
Abstracts common elements from different perspectives.
•
Looks for ways to integrate conflicting elements in a more inclusive
framework; able to draw cross-domain comparisons and conclusions.
View of Knowledge:
•
Knowledge is constructed into individual conclusion about ill structured
problems on the basis of information from a variety of sources.
•
Can make interpretations based on evaluations of evidence across contexts
and on the evaluated opinions of reputable sources.
Concept of Justification:
•
Beliefs are justified by comparing evidence and opinion from different
perspectives on an issue or across different contexts.
•
Constructs solutions that are evaluated by criteria such as the weight of the
evidence, the utility of the solution, and the pragmatic need for action.
Reflective Thinking - Stage 7
Belief System:
•
Believes that while reality is never a given, interpretations of evidence and
opinion can be synthesized into epistemically justifiable conjectures about
the nature of the problem under consideration.
View of Knowledge:
•
Knowledge is the outcome of a process of reasonable inquiry that constructs
solutions to ill-structured problems are constructed.
•
Solutions are evaluated in terms of what is most reasonable or probable on
the basis of the current evidence.
•
Solutions are reevaluated when relevant new evidence, perspectives, or
tools of inquiry become available.
Concept of Justification:
•
Beliefs are justified probabilistically on the basis of a variety of
interpretative considerations, such as the weight of the evidence, the
explanatory value of the interpretations, the risk of erroneous conclusions,
the consequences of alternative judgments, and the interrelationships of
these factors.
•
Defends conclusions as representing the most complete, plausible, or
compelling understanding of an issue on the basis of the available evidence.
Excerpted from Patricia M. King and Karen Strohm Kitchener, Developing Reflective
Judgment: Understanding and Promoting Intellectual Growth and Critical Thinking in
Adolescents and Adults (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994), p. 14-16.
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Appendix B.
INFORMED CONSENT FORM
DISSERTATION RESEARCH

The Role of Reflective Judgment in the
Relationship Between Religious Orientation and Prejudice
You are invited to participate in a study that will investigate the relationship between
cognitive style, religious orientation, and prejudice. In addition, this study is being
conducted to fulfill the requirements of a doctoral dissertation. The study is conducted
by Alison Cook. The results of the study will be used to complete the doctoral
dissertation and might be published in a journal. Alison Cook can be reached at
alcook@du.edu. This project is supervised by the dissertation committee chair, Dr.
Sandra Dixon, Department of Religious Studies, University of Denver, Denver, CO
80208, sdixon@du.edu.
Participation in this study should take about 30 minutes of your time. Participation will
involve selecting multiple choice options in response to statements about your views on
religion, prejudice, and cognitive dilemmas. There are also 4 open-ended questions you
may choose to complete. Participation in this project is strictly voluntary. The risks
associated with this project are minimal. If, however, you experience discomfort you may
discontinue the survey at any time. We respect your right to choose not to answer any
questions that may make you feel uncomfortable. Refusal to participate or withdrawal
from participation will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise
entitled.
Your responses will be identified by code number only and will be kept separate from
information that could identify you. This is done to protect the confidentiality of your
responses. Only the researcher will have access to your individual data and any reports
generated as a result of this study will use only group averages and paraphrased wording.
However, should any information contained in this study be the subject of a court order
or lawful subpoena, the University of Denver might not be able to avoid compliance with
the order or subpoena. Although no questions in this interview address it, we are required
by law to tell you that if information is revealed concerning suicide, homicide, or child
abuse and neglect, it is required by law that this be reported to the proper authorities.
If you have any concerns or complaints about how you were treated during the interview,
please contact Susan Sadler, Chair, Institutional Review Board for the Protection of
Human Subjects, at 303-871-3454, or Sylk Sotto-Santiago, Office of Research and
Sponsored Programs at 303-871-4052 or write to either at the University of Denver,
Office of Research and Sponsored Programs, 2199 S. University Blvd., Denver, CO
80208-2121.
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You may keep this page for your records. Please sign the next page if you understand and
agree to the above. If you do not understand any part of the above statement, please ask
the researcher any questions you have.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I have read and understood the foregoing descriptions of the study called The Role of
Reflective Judgment in the Relationship Between Religious Orientation and Prejudice
I have asked for and received a satisfactory explanation of any language that I did not
fully understand. I agree to participate in this study, and I understand that I may withdraw
my consent at any time. I have received a copy of this consent form.

Signature _________________________________________Date _________________

___________ I would like the following e-mail address to be entered into a drawing for a
$50.00 gift card at Amazon.com (the winner will be notified via e-mail):____________

___________ I would like a summary of the results of this study to be sent to me at the
following e-mail address:__________________________________________________
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Appendix C.
Student Recruitment Script
(IRB Approved)
-My name is Alison, and I am a doctoral student at DU, conducting research for my
dissertation in the psychology of religion.
-I am collecting data on the attitudes and beliefs of undergraduate and graduate level
students from several different schools. The survey asks questions about your personal
beliefs and values including your spiritual and religious perspectives and your attitudes
about others.
-While I am interested in your individual perspective, I am also interested in group
differences between the different schools and institutions. So your participation is crucial
to ensuring that ____________’s perspective is well-represented.
-Participation in this study will provide you with an opportunity to reflect on your values
and beliefs about some really significant cultural issues. I would be happy to provide you
with a copy of the results so that you can see how others around you are thinking about
these issues as well.
- Your responses will be entirely confidential and anonymous – none of the information
you provide will be connected to you as an individual. There are no right or wrong
answers – so please be as honest as you can.
-The survey should take about 20-30 minutes to complete. There are 2 parts. The first
will ask you to respond to 3 questions about contemporary issues. The second part will
ask you to respond to multiple choice questions about your personal beliefs and attitudes.
HAND OUT INFORMED CONSENT
-Please review this Informed Consent document. If you are interested in participating in
the study, please sign and date the second page and return to me at the end of class. Your
participation in this study is strictly voluntary and participants may skip any questions
they do not wish to answer. If you choose to participate, please sign the second page of
the informed consent document and return to me along with your e-mail address. You
will then receive a randomly assigned Subject ID code, along with the necessary
instructions to complete the on-line survey. Your subject ID code will in no way be
linked to your name or e-mail address.
-By returning the signed informed consent document, along with your e-mail address,
you will automatically be entered into the drawing for a $50.00 gift card at Amazon.com.
The winner will be contacted by e-mail.
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Appendix D.
SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS

Subject ID:

__________________

1. Go to www.reflectivejudgment.org
2. Select “Univ of Denver research project” from the
dropdown menu in the Login box.
3. Enter the following password: p1oneers
4. Enter the Subject ID provided for you at the top of this
page.
5. Complete the Demographic Information and the 3
“Current Issue” sections.
6. Click on the link at the end of the RCI to go to Part II of
the survey.
7. Enter the same Subject ID provided for you at the top of
this page.
8. Complete the rest of the survey.
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Appendix E.
Reasoning About Current Issues Questionnaire
Transcribed from www.reflectivejudgment.org
Copyright Kitchener, Wood, King and Jensen, 2000
Purpose
One of the major goals of a college education is to promote the ability to think critically
about current issues. This questionnaire is designed to access how you think about a few
current issues; it is not a test of your factual knowledge about these topics, your
individual abilities, or your mastery of content of particular classes you may have taken.
It is designed to help educators better understand how students think and reason about
current issues.
Instructions
Because this questionnaire is aimed at understanding how people like you think about
various current issues, it asks not only what you think but why you hold the opinions you
do.
The Task
You will be shown three short descriptions of some current issues. These issues are
similar because people sometimes disagree about the best answer.
For each issue, you will be asked to consider four general questions:
Question 1:
In Question 1, you will be asked for your personal opinion about the issue. Please
indicate it in the space provided.
Question 2:
For some issues you will be asked:
Why experts disagree.
For other issues you will be asked:
Why you believe the way you do.
Take a moment to consider your opinion about the question. Write down your response
to the question in a few sentences in the space provided. (Do not, for example, write
down “I think experts disagree.” Or “I think that food additives are safe.”
Instead indicate in a few sentences why experts disagree or why you believe the way you
do.
Please give the best answer you have to each question.
Question 3:
You will be shown statements taken from interviews with people like yourself. Please
indicate which statements are most similar to your own views by selecting the
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appropriate radio button ( ). For example, if you read sentence A below and decided that
it was similar to your views, you would select the radio button labeled Similar as follows:
A. Researchers who are honest will not disagree about whether a particular artificial
sweetener is harmful.
Very Similar ()
Similar ()
Dissimilar () Very Dissimilar ()
Meaningless ()
It may be that your views on a topic do not exactly match the ones presented here. Please
indicate a few statements for each issue which are at least somewhat similar.
A check on Reading: Because we have found that some people do not read the
statements carefully, we have included some statements that should not make sense to
you. When you encounter such statements, mark them as “Meaningless” by selecting
that radio button.
Question 4:
You will be asked to indicate your first, second and third choices for which statements
are like how you think. Try to rank the top three statements for each issue, even if the
statements do not exactly match your views. If only one or two statements are similar to
your views, select the “none of these” radio button in the appropriate rankings.
Please select only one statement per ranking.
Ready to proceed with the RCI Questionnaire?
Yes, I’ve read the instructions, please continue

Required Demographic information
Subject ID____________________
Highest education attained:
Did not finish high school
Graduated from high school/GED
Attended college but did not complete degree
Completed an associate’s degree (AA, AS, etc.)
Completed a bachelor’s degree (BA, BS, etc.)
Completed a master’s degree (MA, MS, MBA, etc.)
Completed a doctoral degree (PhD, PsyD, JD, etc.)
Gender
Male
Female
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Birthdate (yyyy-mm-dd)
Race
American Indian or Alaskan Native
Asian or Pacific Islander
Black
White
Ethnicity
Hispanic origin
Not of Hispanic origin
Citizenship
U.S. citizen (including dual citizenship)
Non-U.S. citizen
Submit Demographic Information

1. Preparing the Work Force for the 21st Century
Educators, civic leaders and members of the business community disagree about how to
best prepare the work force of the 21st century. Some claim that colleges should
emphasize basic subjects such as math, English, or history. If these courses are welltaught, they argue, students will have the general skills necessary for the future. Others
argue that the rapid rate of change in the 21st century requires specific training in skills
that are adaptable to many situations, such as critical thinking or problem-solving. They
argue that colleges should emphasize such general skills in order to better prepare people
for learning after they leave college.
1. Please indicate your personal opinion on the issue: I think that colleges should do
more to:
Emphasize basic subjects

I do not know/
cannot decide

Specifically teach
critical thinking/
problem solving

2. People give different explanations for their opinions about what colleges should
emphasize. What is the basis for your point of view about this question? (Please write
your answer on the lines provided.)
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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3. Many people disagree about this and give different reasons for their own beliefs. How
similar is each of the following reasons to the basis for your beliefs about what colleges
should emphasize.
VS = Very Similar, S = Similar, D = Dissimilar, VD = Very Dissimilar, M =
Meaningless
A. There isn’t much proof on either side of the issue about what colleges should
emphasize so I believe what I want to believe. My point of view just makes sense to me.
B. The facts aren’t very clear because there is so much information involved in deciding
what to emphasize in college. So I just believe what seems right to me based on my own
background.
C. When I hear people I respect say what they believe about how to best prepare for the
work force in the 21st century, then I know what to believe.
D. My beliefs are based on what I have been taught about how people should be
educated by those who really understand what will be needed in the 21st century.
E. I look at the ocular opinions and the assumptions I can draw from its collusiveness.
Generally, the facts of this issue must be probabilistic migrated from that which is proven
that which is unproven.
F. My point of view is based on an evaluation of the evidence and its fit with related
arguments and assumptions. As a result of that evaluation, I am confident about the
reasonableness of my conclusion.
G. I believe what I want to believe because there are no correct answers right now. We
won’t know the right opinion about what colleges should emphasize until some time in
the future.
H. The issue of what colleges should emphasize is a very complex one. I try to move
beyond quick and easy solutions and draw a conclusion after evaluating and weighting
the evidence on both sides.
I. After comparing the interpretations on both sides of the issue, my point of view seems
more reasonable to me because the evidence is stronger and the assumptions on which
this view is based seem more valid.
J. There are several valid ways of looking at this issue. People’s conclusions are related
to their assumptions about the nature of the 21st century as well as their values and their
understanding of the evidence. People’s assumptions determine how they interpret
evidence.

181

4. Please rank the statements above (A,B,C, etc.) that are most similar to your thinking.
Please check only one statement per line. If no statement beyond one or two is at all like
your thinking, check the box labeled “None of These” on the appropriate line(s).
Statement A B C D E F G H I J: is most like how I think.
Statement A B C D E F G H I J None of these: is second most like how I think.
Statement A B C D E F G H I J None of these: is third most like how I think.

2. Causes of Alcoholism
Some researchers contend that alcoholism is due, at least in part, to genetic factors. They
often refer to a number of family and twin studies to support this contention. Other
researchers, however, do not think that alcoholism is in any way inherited. They claim
that alcoholism is psychologically determined. They also claim that the reason that
several members of the same family often suffer from alcoholism is due to the fact that
they share common family experiences, socio-economic status, or employment.
1. Please indicate your personal opinion on this issue: With respect to alcoholism, I
think that genetic factors:
Contribute at least partially

I do not know/cannot decide

Do not
contribute

2. People give different explanations for their point of view about this issue. What is the
basis for your point of view about this question? (Please write your answer on the lines
provided.)
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
3. Many people disagree about this and give different reasons for their own beliefs. How
similar is each of the following reasons to the basis for your beliefs about what colleges
should emphasize.
VS = Very Similar, S = Similar, D = Dissimilar, VD = Very Dissimilar, M =
Meaningless
A. When I hear a scientist say whether alcoholism is genetically determined or not then I
know what to believe.
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B. My beliefs are based on what I have been taught about alcoholism by people who
really know the right information.
C. There isn’t much proof on either side of the issue about the determinants of
alcoholism, so I believe what I want to believe. My point of view just makes sense to
me.
D. After comparing the interpretations on both sides of the issue, my point of view seems
more reasonable to me because evidence appears stronger and the assumptions on which
this view is based seem more valid.
E. My point of view is based on my analysis of where the weight of the evidence lies. It
is more probable because it best accounts for the evidence and other things I know about
related topics, such as other addiction, personality, and genetics.
F. I look at the quality and density of the proof-claim of this issue and align my
assumptions intrinsically. The facts of this issue must be probabilistically migrated from
what is unproven to proven.
G. I believe what I want to believe about whether alcoholism is genetically determined
because there’s no right answer right now and there may never be one.
H. There are several valid ways of looking at this issue. People interpret evidence using
different criteria; further, their conclusions are related to their assumptions about how
scientists do research and draw conclusions.
I. The issue of the causes of alcoholism is a very complex one. I try to move beyond
stereotypes and draw a conclusion after evaluating and weighing the evidence on both
sides.
J. The facts aren’t very clear because there are so many variables involved in assessing
the origins of alcoholism. So I just believe what seems right to me about the causes.
4. Please rank the statements above (A,B,C, etc.) that are most similar to your thinking.
Please check only one statement per line. If no statement beyond one or two is at all like
your thinking, check the box labeled “None of These” on the appropriate line(s).
Statement A B C D E F G H I J: is most like how I think.
Statement A B C D E F G H I J None of these: is second most like how I think.
Statement A B C D E F G H I J None of these: is third most like how I think.
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3. Immigration Policy
Some economic experts claim that a less restrictive immigration policy adds to the
overall economic prosperity of the United States. Admission of new immigrants, they
argue, expands the tax base and economic competitiveness of American products and
services. Other economic experts suggest that such policies result in a drain on the
medical, financial and educational resources of the United States. These experts argue
that a less restrictive immigration policy harms the economic well-being of the country.
1. Please indicate your personal opinion on this issue: I think that a less restrictive
immigration policy would generally:
Harm the economic
prosperity of the US

I do not know/cannot decide

Add to the economic
prosperity of the US

2. How is it possible that different economic experts can disagree or arrive at different
conclusions about the effect of immigration policy on economic prosperity? (Please
write your answer on the lines provided.)
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
3. Many people have heard about disagreements among experts about this, and they
suggest different reasons why that might happen. How similar is each of the following
reasons to your own understanding of why experts can disagree?
VS = Very Similar, S = Similar, D = Dissimilar, VD = Very Dissimilar, M =
Meaningless
A. Experts disagree because they approach the issue with different opinions already in
mind and then find evidence to support their own opinion.
B. Experts who are honest will not disagree about whether a less restrictive immigration
policy improves or reduces the overall prosperity of the United States.
C. Experts disagree about the issue because, like everyone else, they are confused about
the role that immigration policy plays in economic prosperity. So what they conclude is
just their opinion.
D. Experts disagree about whether enough research has been done to show that a less
restrictive immigration policy contributes to or reduces the prosperity of the United
States.
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E. Experts disagree because of the different ways they were brought up and/or the
different schools they attended.
F. Experts might say that one view about the contribution of immigrants to economic
prosperity was better, but they would also say that this viewpoint was relative to a
particular of understanding this issue.
G. Experts disagree because the rule for allusiveness offers a solidified basis for
choosing whether immigrants contribute to economic prosperity or reduce it.
H. Experts arrive at different conclusions because the evidence itself is complex and they
examine it from several perspectives. They arrive at a decision based on synthesizing
their knowledge, experience and other expert opinions.
I. Experts disagree because they are really interested in different facets of the issue and
the ways to more clearly understand one facet of the issue are different than the ways to
more clearly understand other facets.
J. Experts disagree because their evaluation of the evidence leads them to defend
different conclusions. Some experts’ conclusions are more reasonable, however, and
reflect a more comprehensive synthesis of the available information.

4. Please rank the statements above (A,B,C, etc.) that are most similar to your thinking.
Please check only one statement per line. If no statement beyond one or two is at all like
your thinking, check the box labeled “None of These” on the appropriate line(s).
Statement A B C D E F G H I J: is most like how I think.
Statement A B C D E F G H I J None of these: is second most like how I think.
Statement A B C D E F G H I J None of these: is third most like how I think.
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Appendix F.
RELIGION AND PREJUDICE QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Please enter your 6 or 7 digit Subject ID code here (begins with “ac”):
2. Please select the choice that best represents your current religious affiliation:
Agnostic
Hindu
Atheist
Jewish
Buddhist
Muslim
Christian-Catholic
Spiritual but not religious
Christian-Protestant
Other (please specify)

The following choices were provided after each of the following questions:
Rate your answer: Strongly Agree Agree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

1. God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which
must be totally followed.
2. No single book of religious teachings contains all the intrinsic, fundamental truths
about life.
3. The basic cause of evil in the world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously
fighting against God.
4. It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right religion.
5. There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, you can’t
go any “deeper” because they are the basic, bedrock message that God has given
humanity.
6. When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the
world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, who will not.
7. Scriptures may contain general truths, but they should NOT be considered completely,
literally true from beginning to end.
8. To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true
religion.
9. “Satan” is just the name people give to their own bad impulses. There really is no
such thing as a diabolical “Prince of Darkness” who tempts us.
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10. Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science is probably right.
11. The fundamentals of God’s religion should never be tampered with, or compromised
with others’ beliefs.
12. All of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong techniques. There is no
perfectly true, right religion.
13. Jesus Christ was the divine Son of God.
14. The Bible may be an important book of moral teachings, but it was no more inspired
by God than were many other such books in human history.
15. The concept of God is an old superstition that is no longer needed to explain things
in the modern era.
16. Through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, God provided a way for the
forgiveness of people’s sins.
17. Despite what many people believe, there is no such thing as a God who is aware of
our actions.
18. Jesus was crucified, died, and was buried but on the third day He arose from the
19. It might be said that I value my religious doubts and uncertainties.
20. I was not very interested in religion until I began to ask questions about the meaning
and purpose of my life.
21. As I grow and change, I expect my religion also to grow and change.
22. I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs.
23. I have been driven to ask religious questions out of a growing awareness of the
tensions in my world and in my relation to the world.
24. For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious.
25. My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious convictions.
26. I find religious doubts upsetting.
27. I dot not expect my religious convictions to change in the next few years.
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28. God wasn’t very important to me until I began to ask questions about the meaning of
my own life.
29. There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing.
30. Questions are far more central to my religious experience than are answers.
31. My whole approach to life is based on my religion.
32. What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow.
33. I go to church mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there.
34. We have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going
to save our moral standards and preserve law and order.
35. Obedience and respect are the most important things kids should learn.
36. People should be made to show respect for America’s traditions.
37. Sexual orientation should not be a cause for job discrimination.
38. The sight of two men kissing does not particularly bother me.
39. Homosexual acts are wrong.
40. If two homosexuals want to get married, the law should let them.
41. I won’t associate with known homosexuals if I can help it.
42. A sexual relationship between two men can be just as intimate as a sexual relationship
between a man and a woman.
43. If I discovered a new friend was a homosexual, it would not affect my relationship
with that person.
44. Same-gender sexual behavior is a perfectly acceptable form of sexuality.
45. Homosexuals should not be allowed to teach in elementary schools.
46. Swearing and obscenity are more repulsive in the speech of a woman than a man.
47. Under modern economic conditions with women being active outside the home, men
should share in household tasks such as washing dishes and doing the laundry.
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48. It is insulting to women to have the “obey” clause remain in the marriage service.
49. A woman should be as free as a man to propose marriage.
50. Women should worry less about their rights and more about becoming good wives
and mothers.
51. Women should assume their rightful place in business and all the professions along
with men.
52. The intellectual leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men.
53. Women earning as much as their dates should bear equally the expense when they go
out together.
54. Sons in a family should be given more encouragement to go to college than
daughters.
55. In general, the father should have greater authority than the mother in the brining up
of the children.
56. There are many jobs in which men should be given preference over women in being
hired or promoted.
57. It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try
harder they could be just as well off as whites.
58. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked
their way up. Blacks should do the same.
59. Blacks work just as hard to get ahead as most other Americans.
60. Arabs are too emotional and hateful and they don’t fit well in our country.
61. Blacks are demanding too much from the rest of society.
62. There is nothing wrong with intermarriage among the races.
63. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
64. Discrimination against blacks is no longer a problem in the United States.
65. In general, Indians have gotten less than they deserve from our social and antipoverty programs.
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66. Many minorities are spoiled: if they really wanted to improve their lives, they would
get jobs and get off welfare.
67. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.
68. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.
69. I don’t care to know what other people really think of me.
70. Once I’ve made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.
71. I never regret my decisions.
72. I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon enough.
73. I am very confident of my judgments.
74. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.
75. It’s all right with me if some people happen to dislike me.
76. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.
77. I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught.
78. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.
79. I always declare everything at customs.
80. I have done things that I don’t tell other people about.
81. I never take things that don’t belong to me.
82. I have taken sick leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really sick.
83. I have some pretty awful habits.
84. I don’t gossip about other people’s business.
85. How much discrimination against blacks do you feel there is in the United States
today, limiting their chances to get ahead?______________________________
86. How do you feel about homosexual individuals and/or homosexual behaviors?
______________________________________________________________
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Appendix G.
MEANS AND STANDARD ERRORS FOR
RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION AND PREJUDICE BY INSTITUTION
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Appendix H.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:
PRELIMINARY HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis #5: Is there a
relationship between RWA and
religious orientation?
RWA and RF
yes at r = .317
RWA and CO
no
RWA and Q
no
RWA and I
no
Hypothesis #6: Is there a
relationship between religious
orientation and prejudice?
RF and ATHB
yes at r = .761
RF and ATHI
yes at r = .627
RF and ATW
yes at r = .442
RF and ATR
yes at r = .236
CO and ATHB
yes at r = .508
CO and ATHI
yes at r = .391
CO and ATW
yes at r = .320
CO and ATR
no
Q and ATHB
yes at r = ‐0.377
Q and ATHI
yes at r = ‐0.339
Q and ATW
no
Q and ATR
no
I and ATHB
yes at r = .317
I and ATHI
yes at r = .317
I and ATW
no
I and ATR
no

Hypothesis #1: Is there a
relationship between reflective
judgment and RWA?
RCI and RWA
no
Hypothesis #2: Is there a
relationship between reflective
judgment and prejudice?
RCI and ATHB
no
RCI and ATHI
no
RCI and ATW
no
RCI and ATR
no
Hypothesis #3: Is there a
relationship between reflective
judgment and religious
orientation?
RCI and RF
no
RCI and CO
no
RCI and Q
no
RCI and I
no
Hypothesis #4: Is there a
relationship between RWA and
prejudice?
RWA and ATHB yes at r = .328
RWA and ATHI
yes at r = .314
RWA and ATW
yes at r = .455
RWA and ATR
yes at r = .527
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Appendix I.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:
PRIMARY HYPOTHESES
Primary
Additional
Hypothesis #1: Is
Hypothesis: Is
there a
there a
relationship
relationship
Information established from
between religious between religious
preliminary hypotheses
orientation and
orientation and
prejudice when
prejudice when
accounting for
accounting for
RCI?
school?
RF and ATHB
yes at r = .761
yes at b = .828
yes at b = .861
yes at b = .667
RF and ATHI
yes at r = .627
yes at b = .371
yes at b = .396
yes at b = .312
RF and ATW
yes at r = .442
yes at b = .176
yes at b = .234
yes at b = .152
RF and ATR
yes at r = .236
no
yes at b = .136
no
CO and ATHB yes at r = .508
yes at b = .540
yes at b = .609
yes at b = .258
CO and ATHI
yes at r = .391
yes at b = .224
yes at b = .261
no
CO and ATW
yes at r = .320
yes at b = .134
yes at b = .175
no
CO and ATR
no
no
no
no
Q and ATHB
yes at b = ‐0.724
yes at b = ‐0.767
yes at b = ‐0.460
yes at r = ‐0.377
Q and ATHI
yes at b = ‐0.361
yes at b = ‐0.387
yes at b = ‐0.262
yes at r = ‐0.339
Q and ATW
no
no
no
no
Q and ATR
no
no
no
no
I and ATHB
yes at r = .317
yes at b = .391
yes at b = .410
yes at b = .251
I and ATHI
yes at r = .317
yes at b = .134
yes at b = .147
no
I and ATW
no
no
no
no
I and ATR
no
no
no
no
Changes as a result of the multiple regression analysis are highlighted in yellow.
Hypothesis #7: Is
there a
relationship
between religious
orientation and
prejudice when
accounting for
RWA?
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